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August 15, 2014  
Dear Conference Participants,   
Thank you for joining us today at the Voinovich Archives Project Conference on Public 
Private Partnerships. It’s quite flattering that we have a number of scholars and other 
professionals from all over Northeast Ohio and outside of the region gathered here today to 
discuss the importance of public private partnerships. Over the course of the past year our 
team has worked hard preparing for this conference by digitizing research material for the 
Voinovich Collections online archive. As well, we have been working on a primer which 
outlines my view and other’s on public private partnerships and how we believe they are 
more needed today because of enormous financial and management challenges facing 
America’s cities, towns, and in some cases States.  
The purpose of both the conference and the primer is to create a tool for public policy 
makers, businesses, organized philanthropy and nonprofit sector leaders which explains, in 
depth, how to make the best use of limited financial resources and human capital to solve 
complex and long term problems. The primer will concentrate on two Operation 
Improvement Taskforces (OIT) that I initiated in the City of Cleveland and the State of Ohio, 
with heavy emphasis on the City of Cleveland.  
When I served as Mayor of Cleveland, the city was under immense financial strain and the 
OIT was the saving grace that got Cleveland back on even keel and created the synergism 
that lead to Cleveland receiving an unprecedented three All America City Awards in a five 
year period. The OIT and the other partnerships flowing from it were used for several years 
as a case study at the Harvard Business School to illustrate the role of businesses in public-
private partnerships. It is my opinion that the partnerships in Cleveland and the State of 
Ohio paved the way for my becoming the only person in the United States to be President of 
the National League of Cities and Chairman of the National Governor’s Association.  
I sincerely regret that because of a knee operation that has limited my mobility and an IV 
pump that I will be tethered to for several weeks, I cannot be with you today. I am 
impressed with the program that was organized by Stuart Mendel and Dennis Young and 
having read your proposals I was looking forward to the presentations and the detailed 
discussion generated by them. 
Thank you for attending and making this conference a success.  
Sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
Mailing Address:  2121 Euclid Avenue, UR 330    Cleveland, Ohio 44115-2214 
Campus Location:  Glickman-Miller Hall, Room 330    1717 Euclid Avenue    Cleveland, Ohio 
(216) 687-5271    Fax (216) 687-9239  http://urban.csuohio.edu/nonprofit/ 
  
 
Senator George V. Voinovich 
From his time as a member of the Ohio House of Representatives, 
Cuyahoga County Commissioner, County Auditor, Lieutenant 
Governor of Ohio, Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of Ohio to his 
twelve years as Ohio's senior United States Senator, George 
Voinovich has strived for more than 40 years to make all levels of 
government "work harder and smarter and do more with less." 
During his time as a state legislator he was dubbed the father of the 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, and he considers his 
career-long fight to win the "Second Battle of Lake Erie" and 
protect the Great Lakes to be one of his most significant accomplishments. As mayor of 
Cleveland, USA Today credited him with "turning the nation's 22nd largest city from a 
laughingstock in the 1970s into a three-time All-America City winner during the 1980s". 
His work rebuilding the city through public-private partnerships earned him additional 
praise from the National Urban Coalition, which hailed him as one of four distinguished 
urban mayors in America.  
He was named Governing magazine's "Public Official of the Year" in 1995 for his many 
accomplishments as governor. Before arriving in the nation's capitol as a Senator, The 
National Journal called Voinovich "one of five local and state officials who make a 
difference in Washington." He is the only person to have served as both chairman of the 
National Governors Association and president of the National League of Cities.  
As a United States Senator, Voinovich focused on four major areas: assuring fiscal 
responsibility, strengthening national security, enhancing American competitiveness, and 
improving the management, efficiency, and effectiveness of the federal government. He 
came to be known as a “Debt Hawk” for his sustained leadership on improving fiscal 
discipline. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he was actively 
involved in foreign policy development in many critical areas, including Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Iran, North Korea, the Balkans, NATO expansion, and former Captive Nations in Eastern 
Europe. He repeatedly called for policies that would harmonize our economic, energy, 
environmental, and national security needs. In addition, the most significant reforms to the 
federal civil service in more than three decades were enacted under his leadership.  
Since retiring in January 2011, Voinovich has been named a Senior Fellow at Cleveland 
State University, and Ohio Visiting Professor of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio 
University. He remains committed to and involved with the Voinovich School of Leadership 
and Public Affairs at Ohio University.  
In 2009, Joe Hallett of the Columbus Dispatch wrote that George Voinovich "ranks with 
Republican James A. Rhodes and Democrat Frank Lausche...as the most popular politicians 
in Ohio history." Despite his many accomplishments in the public sphere, Voinovich calls 
  
 
Janet, his wife of 47 years, God's greatest blessing on him. Together they have three 
children, George, Betsy, and Peter, and eight grandchildren. 
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The Voinovich Archives project conference on Public Private Partnerships 
By Stuart C. Mendel 
Introduction 
Much has been written in the popular press and by some scholars of the achievements of 
the Mayoral administration of George V. Voinovich.  During his two mayoral terms, the 
Voinovich administration successfully positioned Cleveland to receive three All-America 
City designations within five years.  Mayor Voinovich was also recognized as an 
outstanding Mayor by his peers, elected President of the National League of Cities, and 
credited by the National Journal as one of five local and state public officials with influence 
in Congress and federal agencies.   
As governor of the State of Ohio, Voinovich was again recognized as an effective public 
leader skilled at making the best use of human capital, public-private partnerships and 
empowerment through total quality management on achievements.  In December 1995, he 
was named “Public Official of the Year” by Congressional Quarterly’s Governing Magazine.   
In serving 12 years in the U.S. Senate, Voinovich further burnished his reputation as an able 
leader through his work as Chairman or the ranking member of the Oversight of 
Government committee,  Federal Workforce Committee and District of Columbia  sub-
Committee of  the  Homeland Security, and Governing  Affairs Committee. He was named a 
fellow in National Academy of Public Administration. 
In reflecting back on his experiences from the 1980s, Voinovich credits his successes in 
Cleveland -- and later in reforming state government as Ohio Governor in the 1990s -- to 
the extraordinary public-private partnership processes of the era.  
 
A case for Public Private Partnership   
Public-private partnerships empower the public and private sector to work together. But 
the need for partnerships must be recognized by both the private and public sectors.  And, 
business, nonprofits, and foundations must respond to the call for help from the public 
sector or suggest on their own initiative their willingness to support the public sector with 
human capital resources and/or financial resources.  
 
In the private sector, there is often a reluctance to get involved because not all business 
leaders fully understand and appreciate the symbiotic relationship they have with the 
community.  In addition, public leaders need to reach out to the private sector for help or 
respond positively when the private sector presents an offer of help. Too often, public 
leaders do not comprehend the valuable resource they have in the private sector.  
The opportunity for interaction between the public and private sector allows for progress 
to be made in improving the city’s government and the community as a whole and it 
provides a framework for sharing risks in a world with limited resources. In a time of 
decreasing funding from the federal and state government, if our cities are to survive and 
succeed, it will take a local public-private partnership effort with cooperative efforts from 
every stakeholder.   
  
 
Why a conference? 
Through a distinctive process involving leadership of city government, business and 
nonprofit and philanthropic institutions, Cleveland emerged from a financial disaster 
decades in the making.  Among the outcomes was a resurgence that included rebuilding 
local government administration in no small part due to the collaboration fostered through 
public private partnerships. 
Many of the fiscal and operations challenges Mayor Voinovich worked through in the 1980s 
and 1990s are present in cities of the United States today.  Municipal bankruptcy and fiscal 
emergencies in places like Detroit, Michigan; Cincinnati, Ohio; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; 
Oakland; and Fresno, California are but a few examples.   
But what tools exist for public policy makers, businesses, organized philanthropy and 
nonprofit sector leaders today to make the best use of limited financial and human capital 
for the complex and long wave problems they seek to address? 
To begin to answer this question, we have conceived and are holding a conference 
comprised of research papers tapping primary documents of the Voinovich Archives.  We 
have invited researchers and participants from northeastern Ohio and other places to 
reflect the practice of partnership and collaboration we are examining.   
Acknowledgements  
I would like to take a moment to acknowledge those individuals who have helped advise us 
in taking the steps that have led to this conference.   Foremost, we are grateful for the help 
and participation of retired Senator George V. Voinovich, who has tirelessly provided us an 
experienced and wise perspective.   
Because we are interested in stimulating sustainable collaboration, we have sought and 
readily received the participation of some of the best, reflective thinkers drawn from 
northeastern Ohio’s many institutions of higher education.   Many of these individuals 
attended two preparatory, advisory meetings convened in August and December 2013 here 
at the Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University.  
The August and December meetings were co-chaired by myself and my friend and teacher 
Dennis R. Young currently with Georgia State University and formerly with Case Western 
Reserve University.    
We acknowledge and thank Jennifer Madden, Joseph Mead, Melanie Furey  Julie 
Rittenhouse, Anna Jones and Lauren Sargi of Cleveland State University;  David C. 
Hammack, Kathryn Lavelle, Matthew Rossman, Dan Flannery, Anna Santiago, Robert 
Fischer, Mark Chupp and John Yankey all of Case Western Reserve University;  William 
Jenkins from Youngstown State University;  John Green form the Bliss Institute at the 
University of Akron;  Bob Cahen and Carol Willen of the Lakeland Community Foundation;  
Matt Starkey from the Voinovich School at Ohio University,  Pamela Willits, Paul Feinberg of 
the Jewish Federation of Cleveland, Richard Pogue of Jones Day,  France Post of  Ogden Post 
consulting, Michelle Seyranian, Hunter Morrison, and Raymond Cox.   
  
 
We also express appreciation to both Edward (Ned) W. Hill, dean of the Maxine Goodman 
Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University and Grover (Cleve) Gilmore, Dean 
of the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences, Case Western 
Reserve University for their support and interest in this project. 
About this Project: 
The Ohio University Libraries and the George Voinovich School of Leadership and Public 
Affairs at Ohio University have partnered with the Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban 
Affairs at Cleveland State University to bring you an interactive digital home of the 
Voinovich Collections. This Omeka-based web platform provides users the opportunity to 
explore exhibits comprised of material from the collections, view multimedia pieces, and 
learn about George Voinovich’s impressive 45-year career in public service.  
The Voinovich Collections (www.voinovichcollections.library.ohio.edu) comprise four sets 
of archival collections created by three of the offices held by George V. Voinovich; Mayor of 
Cleveland, Governor of Ohio, and United States Senator, and his various campaigns. In 
addition to this virtual location, The Voinovich Collections are physically housed at two 
institutions:  
• The Mayoral Papers(1979-1989): The Western Reserve Historical Society - 
Cleveland, Ohio  
 
• The Gubernatorial (1990-1998) , Senatorial Papers  (1998-2010) and Campaign 
papers (1988-2004): Ohio University-  Athens, Ohio 
 
The goal of this project is to bring together the three archival collections into an integrated 
and searchable digital collection. In addition, there is great educational importance in 
disseminating the archival materials far more widely than is otherwise typically possible 
for such archives.  It is the project team’s hope that students will benefit from this 
innovative tool by advancing solid research skills and developing an interest in public 
service. Ultimately, it is the unique collaboration between two great Ohio institutions that 
aims to bring transformative education into the classroom across the nation.  
This project does not seek to digitize the Voinvoich Collections in their entirety. Documents 
drawn from the collections will be digitized in an incremental fashion according to 
thematic foci. These foci are chosen based on faculty, classroom, and student demand. As of 
August 2014 there are almost 400 documents and other pieces of material available for 
research.  
The Partners:  
Ohio University 
OU Libraries: Ohio University was chartered in 1804 as the first college in what was then 
the Northwest Territory of the United States of America.  Ten years later, the University’s 
library was founded.  Today, the Ohio University Libraries holds over three million volumes 
  
 
and is a member of the Association of Research Libraries.  The Ohio University Libraries 
support the educational mission of the University, seeking to serve as a dynamic gateway 
for the discovery, creation, and exchange of knowledge by students, faculty, scholars, and 
members of the public.  The Voinovich Gubernatorial and Senatorial Collections are 
proudly held in the Mahn Center for Archives and Special Collections, and are curated by 
Doug McCabe.  The Mahn Center is housed in Alden Library.  The Voinovich Collections 
offer a window into Senator Voinovich's decades of public service in the fast-moving and 
historic late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
George Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs: The Voinovich School of 
Leadership and Public Affairs partners with colleges and academic units at Ohio University 
to educate students and provide them with unique learning opportunities. Two degree 
programs are offered through the school—the Master of Public Administration (MPA) and 
the Master of Science in Environmental Studies (MSES). The school integrates scholarship, 
learning, and practices to mold current and future strategic leaders in public, business and 
environmental affairs, solve environmental and energy problems, promote value creation, 
smart policymaking and innovation in governments and nonprofits; build business, drives 
entrepreneurship, and help develop the region’s economy. Directed by Professor Mark 
Weinberg, the Voinovich School is currently home to 11 full-time faculty, nearly 70 
professional staff and over 150 students (including the MPA, MSES, and the Voinovich 
Undergraduate Research Scholars. 
Cleveland State University 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs: The Maxine Goodman Levin College of 
Urban Affairs teaches men and women how to work effectively in the urban community. By 
blending a broad understanding of the urban environment with advanced problem-solving 
skills, urban affairs graduates qualify for a variety of positions in the public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors. Research undertaken through the college directly links the university 
with the concerns of the Cleveland metropolitan area.  The Levin College is Ohio's only 
College of Urban Affairs and is ranked among the top schools of urban affairs in the United 
States. The College is ranked second in the graduate specialty of city management and 
urban policy in U.S. News and World Report's 1998, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013 editions of 
"America's Best Graduate Schools." 
  
  
 
Sara Harrington 
Sara Harrington is the Head of Arts and Archives at Ohio University Libraries in Athens, 
Ohio, where she works with Doug McCabe, Curator of Manuscripts, who oversees the 
George V. Voinovich Gubernatorial and Senatorial Collections.  Dr. Harrington has a Ph.D. in 
Art History and a Master’s in Library Science, both from Rutgers University, and a Master’s 
in Higher Education from Ohio University.  As Head of Arts and Archives, Ms. Harrington 
seeks to integrate library collections into the academic classroom, as well as to make 
collections freely available online. 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
Morning Session Q&A Discussion 
Session Chairwoman: Kathryn C. Lavelle 
Kathryn Lavelle is the Ellen and Dixon Long professor of World 
Affairs at Case Western Reserve University.  Her research explores 
the exchange between economic and political institutions with a 
particular emphasis on global financial issues.   
Her interest in US foreign policy commenced as an undergraduate 
in Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and 
continued as a graduate student at the University of Virginia 
where she completed a Master’s degree in Government and 
Foreign Affairs.  During the summer between her first and second 
years in Charlottesville, she worked as an intern in the political 
and economic sections of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania.  She later earned a Ph.D. in political science at 
Northwestern University where her dissertation explored the economic and political 
development of the African group of states in the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development.  Her first book, The Politics of Equity Finance in Emerging Markets, explored 
the political circumstances that surround stock exchanges and large issues of stock in the 
developing world.   
After she was tenured in the political science department at Case Western, Kathryn began 
her next major project--research on the book Legislating International Organization: The US 
Congress, the IMF, and the World Bank.  She was awarded an American Political Science 
Association Congressional Fellowship and named the William A. Steiger fellow, a 
designation given to the most promising political scientist in her class of fellows.  While in 
Washington, she worked on the staff of the House Committee on Financial Services on 
issues related to domestic and international monetary policy.  After teaching for a year in 
Cleveland, she drafted the manuscript for the book during the 2008-9 academic year while 
a resident fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  The next year, 
she was the inaugural holder of a Fulbright Visiting Chair in Global Issues at the University 
of Toronto Munk Centre.   
As a result of her time in Washington during critical moments in the country's financial 
history and her interest in financial politics, her most recent book titled Money, Banks and 
the American Political Process traces the conduct of financial policy in the formal political 
institutions of the federal government of the United States as compared to other countries.   
[Her favorite city by far is Cleveland, Ohio—where she was born and attended St. Joseph 
Academy!]   
  
  
 
  
 
Joseph Mead 
Joseph Mead is an Assistant Professor at the Maxine Goodman Levin 
College of Urban Studies at Cleveland State University, where he 
holds a joint appointment with the Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law.  His research interests include the legal, theoretical, and 
empirical study of nonprofit law and administrative law, with a 
particular focus on interactions between governmental entities, 
nonprofit organizations, and the courts.  Prior to joining the faculty 
at Cleveland State, he was a trial attorney for the United States Department of Justice, Civil 
Division, Federal Programs Branch, where he represented the United States in litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes, agency regulations, and other agency 
action.  He has also worked or volunteered for a wide range of nonprofit organizations.  He 
received his law degree from the University of Michigan.  He can be reached at 
j.mead@csuohio.edu 
 
Kate Warren 
Kate Warren is seeking her Master of Public Administration and Certificate in Urban 
Economic Development while working as a Research Assistant for the Center for 
Community Solutions. After completing her B.A. in Communications and Religious Studies 
at CSU in 2010, she worked in various capacities with homeless men & women, as well as 
at-risk youth. She currently volunteers as a mentor for teens in the Clark-Fulton and 
Tremont neighborhoods of Cleveland. She also serves as the Education & Professional 
Development Chairperson for the CSU American Planning Association. 
 
  
  
 
Quasi-Governmental Organizations at the Local Level: A Descriptive Approach 
Joseph Mead 
Katherine Warren 
Introduction  
What happens when the government controls the board of a private organization? Can 
there be such a thing as a governmental nongovernmental organization?  Or a government-
run independent sector?   These and other questions are raised by organizations that, as 
incorporated nonprofit organizations, are nominally private, yet are governed by a board 
that must have directors affiliated with traditional government.   
The government-controlled nonprofit organization is a particular subset of quasi-
governmental organizations (QGOs) that populate many urban landscapes.  QGOs are 
hybrid entities that borrow structural characteristics from both the public (governmental) 
and private (for-profit or nonprofit) sectors.  As hybrids, they are not easily categorized 
into either the government or non-governmental spheres of organizations.  The use of 
QGOs threaten the old definitions of the public and private sectors, warranting additional 
study of the definition, structure, use, and implications. 
How do we make sense of these strange creatures?  We undertake the first step by defining 
quasi-governmental organizations and situating them within the larger organizational 
ecology.  In particular, we offer one explanation for how QGOs can be used by Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) to achieve their objectives.  We then apply this construct to 
several organizations in and around a mid-size city with a history of innovation in local 
governance structures.   
This paper proceeds in four parts.  First, we survey existing literature to develop a 
construct of quasi-governmental organizations.  Second, we identify potential motivations 
that could explain certain characteristics of a quasi-governmental organization.  Third, we 
describe several QGOs that we identified locally.  We find that the QGOs in our study tend to 
emphasize their private incorporation status more than their affiliation with the 
government.  Finally, we discuss implications of our QGO construct and pose a series of 
research questions for future researchers.  One overriding lesson from our survey is that 
the nuances of QGOs merit further study. 
Public and Private Organizations 
Humans structure their activity into a wide range of formal and informal institutions.  The 
American tradition, broadly speaking, tends to sharply distribute formal organizations into 
public and private sectors, with the private sector commonly subdivided into for-profit and 
nonprofit spheres.  (Mendel 2009; Stone and Ostrower 2007; Friendly 1982; Horwitz 1982)  
This division is reflected across a variety of perspectives, including dichotomous legal 
rules, different management norms and practices, and socially-assigned significance.  
Under this tradition, public organizations are run by leaders elected through popular and 
open elections (and individuals who answer through the chain of command to such 
leaders) who owe a duty to promote the public interest at large, while private 
organizations are run by directors who are put in place by a vote of shareholders, 
  
 
members, or existing board members, and who owe a fiduciary duty to further the narrow 
interests of the organization.  (Moe and Gilmour 1995).  Public entities reflect community 
or majoritarian values, while private entities express the views of their narrower 
constituencies.  (Moulton and Eckerd 2012).  Because they are accountable to the 
electorate, public entities have a more legitimate claim to coerce non-consenting parties, 
and therefore can pass laws and collect tax revenue; private entities have power only over 
those who consent to their rule, and must rely on consensual receipts of funding (whether 
commercial or donative revenue).  A corollary of public accountability is that public entities 
can be abolished at will by the electorate, while private organizations enjoy perpetual life, 
at least while solvent, until their managers choose to close down the enterprise.  (M. Lee 
2007).  Public entities are given designations such as departments, cities, and authorities, 
while private entities are called corporations, trusts, and nonprofit organizations.   
Table 1 highlights a few of the salient differences, somewhat simplified, of governing 
structure between public and private organizations in the United States: 
Public Private 
Boards, departments, authorities Nonprofit and for-profit corporations 
Managers work towards public interest Managers work to further narrow interests 
(fiduciary duties) 
Accountable through popular elections 
(directly or indirectly) 
Accountable through market 
Coercive Voluntary 
Funded through involuntary tax revenue Funded through sale of goods and services, 
donations, performance of contracts 
Creates laws Follows laws 
Can be abolished at will by electorate Can be abolished only by managers 
Owned by the people Owned by private interests or self-owned 
Reflects majoritarian values Vehicle for civic engagement, advocacy, 
individual expression 
 
Some of these characteristics hold as a matter of definition, while others are simply 
perceived tendencies of each type of organization.   
The Quasi-Governmental Organization 
Whether or not the tidy divide between public and private has ever been empirical reality, 
the complexities of modern society increasingly call it into question.  This is particularly 
true given the rise of quasi-governmental, quasi-private organizations that do not fall 
neatly into either the public or private realm.  These organizations have been called hybrid 
organizations, quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (Quangos), gray sector 
organizations, or, as we will refer to them, Quasi-Governmental Organizations (QGOs).   
QGOs are extremely difficult to define (van Thiel 2004; Cole 1998).  As Moe (2001) put it: 
“The truth is that the quasi government, virtually by its name alone and the intentional 
blurring of its boundaries, is not definable in any precise way.” Sure enough, the literature 
  
 
abounds with differing definitions. Definitional difficulties are compounded by 
transnational differences in legal regimes, social history, and cultural traditions, but even 
scholars focused on the American experience have failed to reach a consensus.  The varying 
attempts at definition congeal around the idea that the organizations of interest possess a 
mix of public and private characteristics, but scholars differ as to which characteristics are 
considered, focusing variously on funding sources, missions, performance characteristics, 
means of accountability, and/or application of certain laws (such as personnel rules or 
governmental immunities).  (Becker 2010; Andre 2010; Moe 2001; Bertelli 2005; O’Connell 
2014; Kosar 2008; Musolf and Seidman 1980).  One reason why scholars have not agreed 
on--or even sought--a common definition is because the variables of interest will differ 
depending on the scholar’s particular research aims.   
Prior definitions also have something of a circularity problem, as they depend on an 
identifiable set of “public” versus “private” characteristics, which the very nature of QGOs 
call into question.  (O’Connell 2014).  Future efforts to define QGOs should first identify the 
characteristics that are being considered, and specify which characteristics qualify as 
public or private (as we have attempted to do in Table 1).  This will often limit a definition 
to a particular social, historical, political, and/or legal tradition.  However, difficulties with 
definitions should not distract from the significant conceptual puzzle that QGOs pose.   
Existing literature on QGOs is surprisingly limited, and is largely focused on the federal 
level, where QGOs can be highly visible.  (Koppell 2003; O’Connell 2014; Kosar 2008).  
Salient examples include the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the 
Smithsonian Institution, Amtrak Corporation, and the National Park Foundation.  However, 
legal, political, and historical circumstances suggest that QGOs chartered by Congress could 
differ from those incorporated by state legislatures, which could in turn differ from those 
created as adjuncts to local political units such as cities.  
QGOs at the local level, while not unusual, have hardly been examined in the literature. One 
exception has been Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) which have been the subject of 
research (Hoyt 2003; Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007; Gross 2013; Billings and Leland 2009). 
BIDs are a specialized type of PPP that are prevalent around the world.  A common type is 
where local businesses form a contract with the city to self-fund services that will improve 
a specified area, most often in the form of safety and sanitation services.  BIDs can be 
considered local QGOs: they typically have some, but not total, autonomy from local 
government, and they may have public privileges and a somewhat public mission, but are 
considered to be privately owned (Andre 2010).  
The Role of Organization in PPPs 
Just as QGOs blur the traditional dichotomy between the public and the private sectors, 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) challenge the typical division of organizational forms 
into public and private.  Prior literature has studied the formation of PPPs, their widely 
varying governance structures, and their effectiveness (Liu, et. al, 2014; Van Gestel, Voets, 
& Verhoest, 2012; Ysa 2007).  The New Public Management movement more broadly blurs 
sectoral boundaries by insisting that private sector management styles and market-based, 
  
 
outcome-focused mechanisms of accountability be applied to the public side.  (Peters and 
Pierre 1998).  
PPPs might exist in a variety of forms, from informal short-term arrangements to ongoing 
institutions.  (Gazley 2008).  With a few important exceptions (Mendel and Brudney 2012; 
Becker 2010; Shaol, Stafford, Stapleton 2012), scholars have not paid as much attention to 
the organizational forms employed by PPPs.   
Creators of a PPP who intend or anticipate a long-term, perpetual project have a series of 
choices to make about institutional design.  Thus, scholars have begun to study the role of 
institutional design in PPPs by parsing the specifics of contractual terms on aspects of 
management, financing, and ownership.  (Marrewijk, et al, 2008) 
Formal contractual arrangements, however, have limitations of minimal flexibility, 
unintended ambiguities, and monitoring and enforcement costs.  As a result, originators of 
a partnership sometimes choose to create new legal entities to institutionalize the 
partnership.  Mendel & Brudney’s recent article (2012) highlights the role of nonprofit 
organizations as the institutional intermediary that implements PPPs.  This article 
compellingly demonstrates how organizations served as a physical and/or conceptual 
space for the partners to develop and implement various PPPs in the Cleveland area over 
time.   
The versatility of QGOs may make them an attractive vehicle for many Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs).  These new entities can be structured in a way that specifies an 
ongoing role for each of the partners in the governance of the partnership via the new 
entity’s board of directors.  This has the advantage of providing a mechanism for the 
resolution of disputes, ambiguities, and new circumstances, but this flexibility may allow 
for departures from the original vision of the partnership at its genesis.  
Private Legal Status, Publicly-Appointed Board  
Without intending to define QGO for all purposes, we focus on a particular type of QGO: one 
that mixes a private legal status (i.e. nonprofit organization or for-profit corporation) with 
public governance (i.e. having at least one director who is appointed by a unit of 
government).  Given our local focus, we consider organizations that have a tie with city, 
township, or county government.   
The relationship between the government and private organizations (specifically nonprofit 
organizations1) has been modeled by several scholars, who have noted the varying levels of 
                                                          
1
 The private role played by nonprofit organizations in these models often can be performed by 
for-profit companies. For example, for-profit and nonprofits alike receive and administer 
governmental funding.  For-profit companies have increasingly adopted public or social 
missions.  And for-profit companies have increasingly assumed a role in political and ideological 
advocacy and even religious expression and identity.  This is not to minimize the valuable and 
rich field of inquiry into differences between for-profit and nonprofit organizations.  Rather, the 
point is that the differences were not implicated in the particular study we perform here.  
  
 
cooperation or adverseness that can exist between the sectors (Coston 1998; Najam 2000; 
Young 2000; Salamon 1987).   Other scholars debate the wisdom of certain types of 
interactions between government and private organizations, such as whether certain 
regulations or funding decisions threaten the nonprofit sector’s independence.  (Brody 
2004; Mead 2008).  For the most part, however, this literature presumes a distinctness 
between government and nonprofit.2  Existing literature studying the relationship between 
government and the private sector has focused on the government’s power to regulate, tax, 
and fund, but rarely considers the possibility of direct political control.   
In the normal situation, boards of for-profit organizations are picked by shareholders or 
owners, and nonprofit boards are elected by members or the existing board.  Government 
appointments are a departure from the normal course of things in the United States.  The 
ability to appoint directors offers government the theoretical possibility of controlling or 
influencing an organization by appointing directors friendly to the government’s position.  
The relationship between appointment of personnel and control has long been studied by 
political scientists in the realm of public administration (Lewis 2008; Wood and Waterman 
1991; Scher 1961).   
Because the board of directors has formal control over private organizations, it makes 
sense to analyze the appointment of the organization’s formal leaders.  Granted, 
particularly for nonprofit boards, the board does not always have the level of control 
contemplated by the law, and decisionmaking for the organization is driven by factors well 
beyond a boardroom vote.  Yet the board’s status as the ultimately responsible organ for 
the direction of the organization, and its power (even if unexercised) to override the 
decisions of staff, make it an important component of the organization to understand.   
Even outside of the QGO context, the government asserts some measure of control over the 
governance of private organization.  It requires that organizations be governed by a board 
in the first place, prescribes what these directors are to consider when acting, and can 
remove directors for perceived misbehavior.  It can require certain board membership for 
organizations with which it contracts (Guo 2007; LeRoux 2009).  Private organizations also 
can choose to elect government officials (whether past or present) to their boards.  The 
government official might bring influence or insight that is desired by the organization 
(Hillman 2005).  None of these situations, however, offer a governmental unit the same 
potential for control as the power to directly pick an organization’s leaders. 
Why Use A QGO Form? 
Why might creators choose to structure a new enterprise as a QGO instead of a more 
traditional form?   More specifically, why would the creators choose to create a nonprofit 
                                                          
2
 Two of the watershed articles in the field of government-nonprofit relations have carefully 
noted the problem of cross-sector organizations.  Young (2000) noted the difficulties the resulted 
from “governing boards of some nonprofit community development agencies in the United 
States [which] have members appointed by government officials.”  Salamon (1987) observed 
that both Harvard and Yale once had boards staffed with trustees appointed by state legislatures.  
Generally, though, the implications of government control over the composition of nonprofit 
boards has not been subject to much scrutiny. 
  
 
organization with government-affiliated directors, instead of a purely private nonprofit 
organization or an independent, nominally-public organization?  There are several, non-
exclusive reasons that might exist for any particular organizational structure, and the 
reasons that motivate a QGO’s founding may differ from those that apply to the QGO as its 
ages. 
Institutional embodiment of a PPP or Intergovernmental Agreement.  As noted earlier, the 
QGO can be used to facilitate the work of a PPP.  (Mendel and Brudney 2012).  The 
institution could serve as the space for the PPP’s work, and/or it could embody the details 
of the agreement between the various partners in a PPP, specifying percentages of public 
and private ownership or control over the project.  Similarly, the QGO could specify the 
details of a joint venture between different public bodies, such as different units of local 
government.  This view of the QGO as the embodiment of a complex agreement is 
consistent with the construct of the corporate form as simply a complex network of 
contractual agreements.  
Government and Market Failure.  Some have pointed to QGOs as a way of overcoming 
instances where both traditional government forms and the market fail to produce goods at 
a socially optimal level.  (Becker 2010).  BIDs are a good example of this.  Business districts 
desire, and are willing to pay for, additional services, but to obtain the optimal level of 
service they need to overcome collective action problems (market failure) and elected 
officials focused on different political preferences (government failure).  By combining 
elements of both the public and private, BIDs allow businesses to overcome these hurdles 
to arrange heightened services for the district.  Although this rationale might explain some 
QGO structural elements, additional theoretical or empirical work is needed to explain why 
a nominally-private form is needed to overcome the various failures.   
Autonomy.  A QGO with less government control might also be indicated when a measure of 
independence from traditional government is desired.  This might be the motivation when, 
for example, leaders believe a plan should be dictated by those with some specialized 
expertise, or when there is concern for the interests of a political minority.  Depending on 
its composition, a pseudo-private form could potentially be more independent than even an 
insulated public body.  For example, an organization governed by a board with a majority 
of directors who are not subject to governmental appointment or removal would be 
theoretically more distant from local government, in terms of control, than an independent 
commission.  Further, even holding political and legal constraints constant, leaders of a 
nominally private organization may perceive themselves as less constrained by public will 
than those with a nominally public entity.   
Whether the private form actually leads to autonomous decisionmaking is not certain.  For 
example, nationally, the vast majority of BIDs claim to have independence in setting policy, 
the level of their services, and level of revenue, Becker 2010, but a recent study of quasi-
autonomous organizations in Canada show a significant degree of political influence in 
funding decisions.  (Mehiriz 2014)  
  
 
Commitment.  Another aspect of independence is the degree of commitment to a project.  
Government funding can be discontinued in future funding cycles, and public departments 
can be abolished, but transfer of ownership of public property to a legally private 
institution may be irreversible.   
Commitment is often disfavored in public administration because it interferes with popular 
sovereignty and the ability of the electorate to undo mistakes made by their leaders.  
However, commitment may be needed before private partners will be willing to invest in a 
particular project.  Thus, for example, municipalities must commit to repayment of their 
loans or no one would loan them the money, at least not at a reasonable interest rate. 
Similarly, without some assurance that a project will not be abandoned upon a change in 
political leadership, it may be difficult to obtain the investment of monetary, intellectual, or 
other resources in an endeavor.  This assurance cannot always be provided by contract, 
and a QGO might be structured such that the organization has a life of its own that cannot 
be undone solely by the actions of municipal government.   
This motivation can be illustrated by the City of Detroit’s bankruptcy, where the City’s 
massive art holdings (much of which was donated) could be sold and the proceeds used to 
pay for other City functions.  The result of the bankruptcy will likely be to insulate the art 
holdings from future budgetary threats by transferring them to a QGO or purely private 
nonprofit. 
Selection of Rules.  The use of QGO can be a way of picking which legal rules will apply.  
Public entities often have to comply with laws concerning public meetings and access to 
records, conflict of interest rules, whistleblower protections, and personnel policies.  There 
are commonly requirements providing for judicial review of agency decisions.  And 
governmental entities must comply with federal and state constitutional rules that prohibit 
certain actions, such as discrimination or censorship.  At the same time, public entities and 
their officers may enjoy immunity from lawsuit.  Private entities are bound by fewer 
statutory requirements.  The use of a QGO rather than a purely public form could be a way 
of opting out (or at least attempting to opt out) of the myriad legal requirements that 
constrain public administrators.  Depending in part on one’s normative position, the use of 
a QGO to select a particular portfolio might be described as either cutting through 
bureaucratic “red tape” or an end-run around rules of accountability.   
Facilitating trust. Calling an organization a “private nonprofit organization” may be 
perceived as a way of obtaining the trust of those who are skeptical of the government.  
(Van Slyke and Roch 2004; Drevs, Tscheulin, Lindenmeier 2014).   The government gets the 
best of both worlds: benefiting from the warm glow that people feel towards the nonprofit 
sector while still maintaining some measure of electoral accountability for the organization. 
This assumes that people will trust an organization based the type of legal status chosen 
during incorporation rather than how independent an organization is from the government 
based on other metrics, such as presence of government officials on the board or extent of 
government contracting.  This runs counter to some evidence which suggests that people 
may not know the legal status of the organizations with which they interact.  (Handy et al. 
  
 
2010).  If the assumption of a change in perception is accurate, the flip-side is that an 
organization designated as private will not benefit from the positive perceptions that 
people may have of “governmental” entities.  Further research is needed into the level of 
information that people have about quasi-governmental entities and how that influences 
their perception of them.   
Limiting Debt Liability.  Much like a company might form a subsidiary to undertake a new 
real estate project or enterprise without risking the parent company’s assets, the 
government could create nonprofit organizations to immunize itself from debt from a new 
endeavor.   
“Better” Directors on Nonprofit Boards.  Nonprofit board governance is overwhelmingly 
criticized by scholars and practitioners, who claim that boards regularly fail to live up to 
their legal or ethical obligations.  (Boyd 1986; Brody 1996; D. P. Lee 2003).  Inattentive or 
incompetent board members are common targets of complaint.  One might attempt to 
remedy this problem by eliminating the self-perpetuating board, and instead vest 
appointment in an outside body to perform a sort of quality control.  For this to work, the 
political body must be viewed as superior to appointing directors than alternative means of 
appointment.   
A similar--and marginally more plausible--explanation is that government appointment 
will lead to more representative board members.  Nonprofit board members are often 
recruited for their connections or their fundraising capacity, which often excludes large 
segments from the community from having a seat on the board.  (Guo and Saxton 2010). 
Since local political institutions have been forged through the electoral process, they reflect 
a more diverse range of perspectives than nonprofit boards.  Indeed, Salamon pointed to 
government involvement as a means to remedy philanthropic paternalism (Salamon 1987), 
and some evidence suggests increased government funding leads to more representative 
boards (LeRoux 2009).  The concern of nonrepresentative boards--and seemingly 
unchecked power to harm employees, consumers, and/or the environment--led some 
commentators to propose publicly-appointed directors on large corporate boards (Conard 
1977; Blumberg 1973).  Further study is needed to determine whether government-
appointed directors are, in fact, more representative or competent than directors 
appointed through other means. 
Research Method 
In an attempt to better understand QGOs at the local level, we will take a descriptive 
approach, analyzing the structure of several organizations from the Cleveland area.  The 
Cleveland metropolitan area has a rich history of using PPPs in innovative ways to solve 
pressing problems, making it an ideal environment for studying the development of QGOs.  
We selected organizations in the Cleveland area that appeared to possess characteristics 
that fell within our definition of QGOs of interest.  These organizations were non-randomly 
selected by broadly examining nonprofits and PPPs across Cleveland’s political landscape, 
and evaluating those organizations to determine if their structure fit our criteria of private 
status but public involvement in directorships.  We sought to understand how these 
  
 
organization are currently structured and any apparent reasons why they were created in 
that manner.  We were interested in how these organizations perceive themselves, and 
how they choose to identify themselves to the public.  We collected data on the sampled 
organizations using the organizations’ own web sites, newspaper and journal articles, 
articles of incorporation, Form 990s, and other public documents.   
The Organizations 
Special Improvement District:  Downtown Cleveland Improvement Corporation 
The Ohio Revised Code (ORC) allows for nonprofits or groups of business or property 
owners to create a Special Improvement District (SID), better known nationally as a 
Business Improvement District (BID). SIDs have the unique capability as a nonprofit to 
collect assessments from property owners within their assigned district for use in safety 
and sanitation initiatives as well as capital projects. Though the business owners in the 
district must vote to incorporate the SID, once it has been passed, all business owners in 
the district must pay the assessment, which is based on property value, front footage, and 
the benefits the business will receive from being part of the SID.   
The District is governed by a board of directors, which must include a person appointed by 
the legislative authority of each participating political subdivision, and the municipal 
executive of each municipal corporation.  Ohio Rev. Code § 1710.04.  Moreover, SID 
assessment plans must be approved by the legislative authority of the relevant political 
subdivisions before they can be implemented.  These organizations represent a form of 
quasi government because they provide services to the area generally provided by 
government (safety, sanitation, capital improvements) with public funds, collected in the 
form of assessments, and they have public officials as directors. We chose one SID in 
Cleveland. 
In 1994, Northcoast Development Coordinators was founded, holding several different 
identities through the years: Downtown Development Coordinators in 1996, Downtown 
Cleveland Partnership in 1999, and Downtown Cleveland Alliance (DCA) in 2006. It was in 
2006 that DCA took its present form as the nonprofit management arm of a new SID. 
According to their mission statement, they are “committed to making Downtown Cleveland 
the most compelling place to live, work and play. Downtown Cleveland Alliance works 
hand-in-hand with Downtown stakeholders to enhance the quality of life in NEO’s urban 
core by implementing initiatives like the Clean & Safe Program, economic development 
assistance, marketing & special events, advocacy and strategic projects.” The SID is known 
as the Downtown Cleveland Improvement Corporation (DCIC), though the two 
organizations appear to overlap considerably in their day-to-day operations.  
DCIC was established in 2005, and has a contract relationship with all of the business 
owners in the district, by which they are required to pay an annual assessment fee to DCIC. 
In return DCIC’s Board of Directors is responsible for deciding how to use the assessment 
dollars. DCA is then contracted by DCIC to implement the programs in Downtown 
Cleveland as DCIC’s Board decides.  DCA’s funding comes almost entirely from the 
assessment fees that DCIC collects, though they also conduct some private fundraising 
  
 
activities. The assessment funds are used mostly for safety and sanitation within the 
district, but they can also be used on capital projects for the improvement of the district.  
Currently, DCIC has 21 members on their Board of Directors, including one councilman, and 
one City of Cleveland staff person. DCA has a Board of 25 Directors, with no public officials 
on the Board.  
Cuyahoga Land Bank 
Senate Bill 353 and House Bill 602, better known as the Land Bank Bill, was passed in 2008, 
allowing for the creation of a County Land Reutilization Corporation (CLRC).  Ohio Rev. 
Code Chs. 1724, 5722.  Originally only Cuyahoga County could create this type of 
corporation, but the power was extended to other large counties in 2010.   
The Cuyahoga Land Bank was incorporated under this law through a collaborative effort of 
local politicians, including the Cuyahoga County treasurer.  The Cuyahoga Land Bank’s 
mission is to “strategically acquire properties, return them to productive use, reduce blight, 
increase property values, support community goals and improve the quality of life for 
county residents.” It identifies itself as a “separate non-profit, government-purposed 
entity” and as “a quasi-governmental corporation.”  The statute authorizing the creation of 
the Land Bank expressly reserves the right to the County to dissolve the organization. 
The Board of Directors of the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation consists of 
the County Treasurer, two county commissioners, one representative from the largest 
municipality in the county, one representative from another township, and the remaining 
members selected by the county officials on the board. Originally, the law required a 
majority of local mayors to approve appointed board members, but that requirement was 
eliminated in 2010.  2010 Sub. House Bill 313.  Currently, the Land Bank’s Board has nine 
members, two of whom are not local city or county employees. 
The Land Bank receives some government funding in the form of tax dollars, though most 
of their funding comes from “accumulation of penalties and interest on collected delinquent 
real estate taxes and assessments” or grants from local partners.  According to the County 
Budget Book, the Cuyahoga Land Bank received $7 million in county funds in 2012 and 
2013. It also received $4.6 million in federal grants in 2010 to demolish blighted homes. 
The penalties and interest are collected by the county and distributed to the Cuyahoga 
Land Bank by the County Fiscal Officer.  It is required to comply with auditing rules as if it 
were a traditional government agency.   
Gateway Economic Development Corporation 
Gateway Economic Development Corporation is a nonprofit corporation that was 
established in 1990 by City of Cleveland officials to own and manage two large sports 
facilities for professional teams. Its articles of incorporation state that it was established 
"for the purposes of constructing and operating a sports facility [in Cleveland]… and for the 
additional purposes of conducting redevelopment and economic development activities 
within the City of Cleveland." They explicitly claim on their website to be a “501 (c)(3) non-
profit Ohio corporation legally separate from any other entity.” The organization has 
  
 
argued in court--at times successfully--that it is not bound to provide constitutional 
protections such as free speech because it is not a governmental entity.  Cleveland v. 
Bregar, 106 Ohio App. 3d 713, 721, 667 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Contra United 
Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 455 
(6th Cir. 2004).  However, their board of 5 members is appointed by the City of Cleveland 
and Cuyahoga County officials, and each board member can be removed by either a vote of 
the board or by a vote of the council that appointed them.  Id.   
Interestingly, it is a widely held belief that the sports facilities are owned by local 
government and are thus public facilities. However, it appears that the facilities are in fact 
legally owned by this nonprofit, which leases them to the professional sports teams who 
play in the facilities.  
Cleveland Citywide Development Corporation 
Cleveland Citywide Development Corporation (CCDC) was founded in 1981, with a purpose 
“to advance, encourage, and promote the industrial, economic, commercial, and civic 
development of the City of Cleveland” (CCDC Articles of Incorporation). Currently, its 
mission is to “promote Economic Development in the City of Cleveland by serving as fiscal 
intermediaries in the review and recommendation for approval of loans to businesses 
within the City of Cleveland.” It exists as a nonprofit corporation, but it is the approval 
authority for City of Cleveland economic development loans under $250 thousand, and it 
provides recommendations to City Council on loans over $250 thousand. It reviews all loan 
requests approved by City of Cleveland administration and financed by the Economic 
Development Department. Its expenses are minimal, and it pays no salaries, but its funding 
comes from government grants, in-kind contributions, and closing and processing fees. Its 
Board of Trustees is composed of 17 members, 7 of whom are public officials, and 10 of 
whom are private appointees.  All board members are appointed by the mayor. 
CCDC has no staff of its own, and is administered primarily by City of Cleveland staff.  
Interestingly, as can be learned from a document outlining plans for various PPPs in 
Cleveland in 1981 (Cleveland Area Development Corporation, Greater Cleveland Growth 
Association, and Cleveland (Ohio). Department of Economic Development, “Plan for 
Partnership for Economic Development in Cleveland, Ohio, draft, August 1981,”Voinovich 
Collections, accessed July 28, 2014, https://www.voinovichcollections.library.ohio.
edu/items/show/400), when CCDC was founded, its creators were open to the idea of 
CCDC eventually operating with its own staff and functioning more independently from the 
city. Though those changes never happened, the board has grown since the organization’s 
inception (it originally had thirteen members), though the ratio of public to private board 
members has remained the same through the years, with private directors always being in 
the slight majority. 
Cleveland Transformation Alliance 
The Cleveland Transformation Alliance was created in 2012 following the passage of state 
legislation promoted by a collection of local leaders.  The Alliance represents a component 
of the “Cleveland Plan,” a strategy for improving primary and secondary education within 
  
 
the City of Cleveland.  Although the Alliance primarily has an oversight and communication 
role, it is also required to ratify the mayor’s proposed plan for improving area schools.   
The Cleveland Transformation Alliance is organized as a nonprofit organization as a 
“municipal school district transformation alliance” specially authorized by state law.  It is 
governed by a board of directors, and the mayor has the “sole authority” to appoint 
directors.  However, state law requires that directors be appointed who represent four 
categories: the municipal school district; partnering community schools; the community at 
large; and business leaders.  Ohio Rev. Code § 3311.86.  No single category can constitute a 
majority of the board.  The mayor has appointed a 29 member board, which includes 
several public officials as well as representatives from many influential local organizations.  
The Alliance must comply with public records and meetings laws, but directors are not 
considered public officials.  The Alliance will automatically terminate in 2018. 
Analysis 
Governance and Government 
The structure of the board could differ along several dimensions, including whether the 
directors are public officials or merely appointed by a public official, the political body in 
which appointment is vested or from which directors are drawn, and the relative 
percentages of each.  The studied organizations revealed considerable diversity in 
allocation of board members.  
 
Figure 1.  
Public Officials v. Public Appointees. Our data show that some organizations allow 
government bodies to appoint officers, while others provide that a public official sit directly 
on the board.  Even within an organization, there can be a mix of governmentally-appointed 
directors and public officials.   
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Both appointment and ex officio mechanisms offer some measure of influence to the 
political body, since it provides a chance to select a director who is predicted to act 
consistent with the preferences of the political unit.  However, political costs and 
information costs preclude perfect fulfillment of preferences, and placement of ex officio 
members on a board is likely to lead to greater control on the part of the political unit than 
appointment.  Even assuming, as seems quite unlikely, that an appointing authority has 
numerous candidates for a position and conducts a lengthy investigation of each, it still 
cannot guarantee that the chosen director will faithfully implement its policy preferences.  
The mayor’s preferences might be shared by a director appointed by the mayor, but the 
mayor himself will be a stronger champion of his own preferences.   
Political scientists have for years studied the dynamics of appointment within the context 
of government, finding that, for example, Presidential power to appoint agency leaders 
often fails to provide the promised measure of control over the organization (Rourke 
1990).  This, of course, assumes a model where the appointing authority is the principal, 
seeking to implement its preferences through the appointee/agent.  Additional research is 
needed to uncover whether a principal-agent model is appropriate and what factors 
influence the political appointment of nonprofit directors locally.  
Legislative v. Executive Authority.  The discussion so far assumes a monolithic political body 
with a singular set of preferences.  In fact, the organizations draw directors from different 
local political units (county, the City of Cleveland, and/or other municipalities).  Even 
within a particular political body, the organizations differ in how they allocate 
directorships between the local executive and legislative units.  Cleveland Transformation 
Alliance gives total control to the mayor (executive), Gateway depends on the action of two 
legislative bodies, and the other organizations have a mix of executive and legislative-
originating directors.  This, too, indicates a rich vein of potential research into the political 
processes that different appointment methods might reveal. 
Proportions of Board Members. All but one of the studied organizations had a board that 
was 100% composed of government-affiliated (whether through appointment or ex officio) 
directors.  Several of the boards had a mix of public officials and public appointees, and at 
least one organization (Cleveland Citywide Development Corporation) has a majority of 
directors who are affiliated with a single municipality’s executive (either as city officials or 
mayoral appointees).  Some of the organizations were carefully designed to avoid having a 
majority of the board from any particular bloc.  The Cleveland Transformation Alliance, for 
instance, may not have a majority of members from any of four categories, and Gateway is 
structured to ensure complete equality in terms of board membership between the City of 
Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. 
Appointment versus Removal.  
Appointment is but one half of the equation; if an appointed director fails to perform as 
hoped, what are the remedies?  Only one of the organizations—Gateway—had information 
about removal, and it gives the appointing authority the power to remove a director.  The 
remainder of the organizations did not have clear information about removal, which 
  
 
suggests that it can only be done by a vote of the organization’s board, and not the outside 
political body.   
With the power of removal comes the potential to issue threats ex ante, and act ex post, to 
persuade the director to act in accordance with the remover’s wishes.  Yet removal is 
hardly a perfect tool of control, as political scientists have documented the ways that, for 
example, the President’s greater formal power to remove some agency heads more than 
others does not always lead to increased control over their agencies (Lewis 2003).  
Nevertheless, the combination of appointment and removal power give a considerable 
amount of political control to the government over directors.   
Law and Labels 
Name Type of 
Nonprofit 
Website Description 
Downtown Cleveland 
Improvement Corporation 
Specialized 
nonprofit 
[describes self as SID] 
Cuyahoga Land Bank Specialized 
nonprofit 
“separate non-profit, government-purposed 
entity” and as “a quasi-governmental 
corporation.”   
Gateway Generic 
nonprofit 
"non-profit Ohio corporation legally separate 
from any other entity" 
CCDC Generic 
nonprofit 
[limited web presence] 
Cleveland Transformation 
Alliance 
Specialized 
nonprofit 
"nonprofit advocacy organization" 
Table 2 
Legal Rules. 
Two of the five organizations we studied appear to be incorporated under the general 
nonprofit incorporation statute.  Three of the five are incorporated as specially-authorized 
nonprofit organizations, which allows the state legislature to specify the particular rules 
that apply to the organization.  The three specialized nonprofit forms do reveal some 
differences in what mix of laws the legislature has prescribed for them.  A few examples are 
summarized in table 3:   
Organization Specialized 
Nonprofit 
Type 
Local 
approval of 
charter? 
Public 
records 
laws? 
Public 
meetings 
laws? 
Considered 
public 
officials? 
Governmental 
immunities? 
Express 
reservation 
of authority 
to dissolve? 
Downtown 
Cleveland 
Improvement 
Corporation 
Special 
Improveme
nt District 
Y Y Y Y Y N 
Cuyahoga 
Land Bank 
County 
land 
reutilizatio
n 
Y    Y Y 
  
 
corporation 
Cleveland 
Transformatio
n Alliance 
Municipal 
school 
district 
transformat
ion alliance 
Y Y Y N   Y 
Table 3. 
Self-Identification.  As seen in Table 2, some of the organizations emphasize their private, 
nonprofit status on their webpages.  The Land Bank says a little bit more about its 
relationship with the government, but two others singularly stress their privateness in 
their external communications.  There are two possibilities for this emphasis.  First, the 
organization’s leaders perceive of the organization as a genuinely private endeavor, 
discounting the role of director appointment in the orientation of the organization.  The 
cause and effect of such organizational identity is worthy of further study.  Second, the 
organization could believe that being perceived as distant from elected government would 
benefit the organization in some way.  
Implications and Questions for Further Research 
Beyond Labels. 
One lesson from our survey is that labels can be at least potentially misleading, and 
scholars must be careful to consider right of control or other structural characteristics, and 
not simply rely on an organization’s title when assessing privateness or independence.  The 
American social conception of nonprofit organizations (tellingly called “nongovernmental 
organizations” in other traditions) is premised on notions of independence and distinction 
from the majoritarian government, and there is a debate over whether government 
regulation and oversight or government funding threaten the sector’s independence, but 
our survey highlights the more specific and concrete possibility of direct governmental 
control over some nonprofit boards.  This, in turn, raises an empirical question of how 
independent these organizations really function.  Further research is needed on how 
government-affiliated nonprofit directors and organizations behave and are perceived.   
More concretely, scholars who study public administration or nonprofit organizations 
should use caution when classifying organizations that exist on the boundary between 
sectors.  Depending on an author’s research aims, the classification of an organization 
based solely on legal status could lead to an imprecise or inaccurate understanding of the 
phenomenon observed. 
Implications for Accountability. 
There is an extended literature discussing the accountability of PPPs, but many of the same 
conceptual issues apply with equal force to QGOs outside the PPP context.  (David M. Van 
Slyke and Christine H. Roch 2004).  What are the mechanisms through which QGOs are 
accountable?  Who do QGOs view as their constituencies?  How does their structure 
promote or interfere with political or market accountability?   
Interestingly, some of the QGOs identified are controversial among the public.  For 
example, Gateway Economic Development Corporation was the subject of public discourse 
during debates over renewal of Cuyahoga County’s “sin tax,” and the wisdom of the 
  
 
Cleveland Transformation Alliance was debated in local press during its creation.  Some of 
the controversy involved the specifics of the QGO structure (i.e. whether CTA should be 
subject to public records laws), but other parts of the debate dealt with whether the 
attempted project was sound public policy at all.  Our data are not sufficient to compel any 
conclusions over whether QGO form precipitates political controversy or is the product of 
such controversy, or neither.  We leave to other scholars to consider the possibility that a 
QGO form might be used when political leadership wants to retain control but also wants 
the political cover of a superficially private organization to implement a controversial 
project. 
Legal implications.   
The mix of public control and private status place QGOs in ambiguous legal terrain.  
(O’Connell 2014).  For example, it is often unclear whether they must comply with open 
meetings and public records statutes, whether they are bound to follow constitutional rules 
of process and equality, whether their assets can be seized and repurposed by elected 
government, whether they enjoy First Amendment rights of free expression or not, and 
whether the managers owe fiduciary duties to the organization or the public at large.  
(Seidman 1998)  Further, the extent to which QGOs can exercise delegated power from the 
traditional government is in question, and will be ruled upon by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the upcoming term (Dep’t of Transportation v. American Ass’n of 
Railroads).  There are also difficulties posed under state law, such as Ohio constitution’s 
ban on joint ownership between the government and private entities.  (Osmer 2012)  
Equally unsettled is the role that government-appointed directors are expected to play.  
Some cases have suggested that they owe a fiduciary duty to the organization in exactly the 
same manner as any other director, and therefore must sacrifice the broader public 
interest to the mission of their organization; however, at least one scholar has argued that a 
public method of appointment should be considered when defining the nature a director’s 
fiduciary obligations (Froomkin 1995).   
These issues are starting to reach the courts but no clear answers have yet emerged.  
Indeed, courts have shown that they are desperate for a clearer conceptual model.  For 
example, in a recent opinion, the second highest federal court in the country had such 
difficulty figuring out whether public or private law applied to National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak)--a nominally private for-profit with Presidentially-appointed 
directors--that it ended up striking down some of the organization’s activities as 
unconstitutional largely because Amtrak’s website ended in .com instead of .gov.  At a 
minimum, courts will need to wrestle with the traditional conception of law neatly divided 
between public law versus private law, and will benefit from a more fulsome 
understanding of the complexity and variety of modern organizations.   
Historical and Social Implications.   
In the pre-revolution American colonies, organizations were not clearly so divided between 
public and private forms, and the corporation as a legal construct bore little resemblance to 
its modern descendants with the same name.  However, as American law and society 
evolved, legal rules and social conception divided organizations between public and private 
  
 
sectors, and later public, for-profit, and nonprofit (Lee 2007).  The proliferation of QGOs 
and PPPs over the past few decades could suggest that we may be coming full circle back to 
a less compartmentalized view of the corporate form.  This trend is parallel to the 
relaxation of the border between nonprofit and for-profit, where social enterprise and the 
evolution of hybrid for-profit, public benefit corporations threaten earlier distinctions.   
We hope that our observations and questions will guide future scholars who are seeking to 
understand the rich and increasing diversity of organizations that have evolved in the 
urban ecosystem.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been described as a social development 
mechanism to accomplish large-scale undertakings and to address urban-based 
pathologies. PPPs are also a form of New Public Management (Hood, 1995; Rubin & 
Stankiewicz, 2001) promising efficiency and risk sharing (Joyner, 2007). Public-private 
partnerships can attract resources, increase efficiency (ADB, 2008), enable creativity and 
innovation (Li & Akintoye, 2008) making them a viable strategy for addressing complex 
urban problems (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Roberts, 2000) and facilitating local 
economic development (Keating, 1998).  
 
To better understand public-private partnerships, semi-structured interviews were 
completed with 31 participants across 15 U.S. affordable housing public-private 
partnerships. The data is grounded in the experiences of participating leaders from local 
government, nonprofit organizations, and private developers. The research design and 
methods are noteworthy. A grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008) was 
adopted, collecting data from semi-structured interviews to develop theory inductively. 
The grounded theory approach permits a naturalistic study that uses qualitative data in a 
systematic and rigorous way (Glaser and Strauss 2009; Babbie 2010), providing a rich 
understanding of social phenomena by examining patterns, themes, and common 
categories discovered in observational data (Babbie 2010).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insight on what key attractors contributed to 
effective of public-private partnerships and what attractors did not in the case study 
examples. This paper begins with insight from literature starting with types and a 
definition of public-private partnerships, then a summary of purposes of PPPs including 
government/nonprofit PPPs. A conceptual framework is then presented building from the 
schematic of general and unique organizational aspects proposed by Galbraith (1977). 
Background information on affordable housing policy and the community development 
corporation model for urban economic development follows. This paper concludes with a 
brief summary of research methods, a discussion of findings, and implications for future 
research. 
INSIGHT FROM LITERATURE 
The literature identifies partnerships and cross-sector partnerships. According to Boviard 
(2004: 203-204) types of partnerships include: sectoral (i.e., partnerships with third sector, 
private business, with business and third sector); relationship (i.e., loose network, 
collaborative, power sharing, contractual); economic (i.e., supply side, demand side, or 
mixed demand/supply side partnerships); policy; and scope (i.e., vertical, horizontal, 
mixed). The literature distinguishes between four types of cross-sector partnerships: 
public-private partnerships (government and business); public-nonprofit partnerships 
(government and a nonprofit); private-nonprofit partnerships (business and a nonprofit); 
and trisector (or tripartite) partnerships (partnerships of all three sectors) (Seitanidi & 
Crane, 2009; Selsky & Parker, 2005). Cross-sector collaboration, based on explanations by 
Mihaly (Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009, p.: 25) and Ignlesias (2005) are initiatives 
involving shared allocation of resources, risk, roles and responsibilities to achieve a 
combination of public and private goals. This study builds upon the definition of Boviard 
  
 
(2004, p. 200) for public-private partnerships as “working arrangements based on a 
mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector 
organization with any organization outside of the public sector” and defines public-private 
partnership as cross-sector collaborations, “involving government, business, nonprofits, 
and/or communities and the public or citizenry as a whole” (Bryson & Crosby, 2008, p. 3).  
Purposes of public-private partnerships include facilities or infrastructure development 
(Coopers, 2010; Li & Akintoye, 2008); program design, planning, coordination, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review; service delivery; resource 
mobilization; and resource management (Bovaird, 2004). Also studied are the economics of 
public-private partnerships (De Bettignies & Ross, 2004; Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2007; 
Iossa & Martimort, 2009; Linder, 1999), governance and risk management (Nisar, 2007; 
Vining & Boardman, 2008), and the links of public-private partnerships to neoliberal or 
neoconservative ideologies (i.e., management reform, problem conversion, moral 
regeneration, risk shifting, restructuring pubic service and power sharing) (Linder, 1999). 
There is an abundance of literature explaining public-private partnership history (Smith & 
Wohlstetter, 2006), formation, evolution, performance (Wettenhall, 2003), strengths and 
weaknesses (Bovaird, 2004), analysis of options, conflicting goals, rules for government 
engagement (Rosenau, 1999), and possible pitfalls (Vining & Boardman, 2008).  Also 
addressed in the literature is the role of public-private partnerships in infrastructure 
projects between government and private sector (for a detailed assessment see Akintoye, 
Beck, and Hardcastle (2003)), emerging markets (Koveos & Yourougou, 2010) and the 
increasing importance in nonprofit organizations in public-private partnerships (Mendel & 
Brudney, 2012).  
Some of the scholarship on government/nonprofit as a form of public-private partnerships 
cautioned the potential dilution of the advocacy role, and “vendorism,” defined as the 
distortion of agency’s mission in pursuit of available government funding, resulting in loss 
of flexibility and local control (Bovaird, 2004; Hood, 1995). While other scholars suggest 
nonprofit organizations play a critical role in assisting public-private partnerships actualize 
potential and retain values (Mendel & Brudney, 2012) where public-private partnerships 
with strong collaborative character can effectively build upon existing resources and 
competences (Salamon, 1995). Government’s growing reliance on its partners in the 
private and nonprofit sectors means that its success in many cases has come to depend in 
large part on how well those partners perform (Bovaird, 2004). Exploring the importance 
of collaboration as a critical success factor in public-private partnerships may uncover 
critical findings.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In examining local economic development public-private partnerships, conceptually (as 
Ghere (1996) observes) there is consensus in the literature that government does some 
things best, the private sector other things, and the nonprofit sector still different things 
(figure 1). Often these sectors act independently or have task-based interactions to achieve 
efficiency. For example, during the Voinovich Mayoral Administration (1980 to 1989 in 
Cleveland, Ohio) ten City of Cleveland departments worked with the private sector to set up 
an internal auditing enabled accounting system improving operations and efficiency. As a 
result, this “Operations Improvement Task Force” secured cost savings for the city 
(Voinovich Archives, 2013).  
  
 
 
Figure 1: Sectors active in local economic development public-private partnerships 
 
This research builds upon the schematic of general and unique organizational aspects 
(figure 2), proposed by Galbraith (1977). Galbraith outlines that on some dimension, every 
organization is like every other organization (A); is like some organizations, but unlike 
others (B); and has features that are unique to the specific organization (C). In theory, 
public-private partnerships should combine the best of what each sector brings to the 
relationship (Rosenau, 1999).  
 
Figure 2: Schematic of general and unique organizational aspects (labels added) 
 
 
This research seeks to understand which factors influence the effectiveness of public-
private partnerships and the possible attractors that facilitate collaborative and effective 
public-private partnerships where organizations across sectors move from independent 
actors in local economic development to collaborative organizations building relationships, 
exploring general organizational aspects and adapting unique organizational aspects. This 
conceptual model is presented in figure 3.  
Figure 3: Conceptual Model 
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BACKGROUND 
Affordable Housing Policy 
There is substantial academic and professional literature on U.S. affordable housing 
program success and failure (Katz, Turner, Brown, Cunningham, & Sawyer, 2003). This 
section presents a brief historical summary of major federal programs for the 
redevelopment of urban areas. These programs (i.e., Urban Renewal, Model Cities, 
Community Development Block Grant, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program) demonstrate the need for public-private partnerships.   
Urban Renewal. Between 1949 and 1974, the Urban Renewal program created from the 
Housing Act of 1949, spurred inner city development (Ho, 2008). With the initial idea of 
reversing the decline of the inner cities and replacing existing slums with new affordable 
housing, two key features of the program maximized the role of the private sector and gave 
local governments the ability to initiate and implement renewal projects. 810,000 units of 
new decent, safe and sanitary housing were authorized to replace blighted and dilapidated 
buildings in poor urban neighborhoods. Very little affordable housing, however, was 
actually created (Euchner & McGovern, 2003). Eminent domain was regularly utilized and 
renewal projects yielded prime land in the city center for business and developers 
(Euchner & McGovern, 2003). With substantial subsidy, the private sector had the 
responsibility of rebuilding communities without meaningful community involvement. The 
collaboration entailed government acquiring, demolishing or renovating existing building, 
improving infrastructure, and the private sector redeveloping the area (Ho, 2008). The 
Urban renewal program was terminated in 1974. 
 
Model Cities. Between 1966 and 1974, the Model Cities program created from the 
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 worked to address some 
of the failures of the Urban Renewal program (Ho, 2008). The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), established in 1965, would coordinate urban redevelopment 
efforts, address social and physical development needs, and ensure citizen participation. 
The private sector maintained its role as developer and continued to work and be receptive 
predominately to local government because of the absence of power sharing between local 
government and community (Ho, 2008). The Model Cities program ended because of 
administration changes, lack of power sharing with community supporting a top-down 
approach, and questions regarding program legitimacy (Ho, 2008). 
 
Community Development Block Grant. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
program was created from the Community Development Act of 1974 transitioning federal 
housing policy oversight and control to local government because local housing need did 
not always match the priorities set by federal programs (Ho, 2008). The program required 
community participation and provided developer incentives, however funding was more 
specifically outlined.   
 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. In 1986, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program was created from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and in 1990 the HOME program 
was created under Title II of the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990. These programs 
marked the devolution of the design and implementation of affordable housing to local 
  
 
government, for profit and nonprofit developers, and community (Katz et al., 2003). Both 
programs rely on the nonprofit sector for the delivery (Katz et al., 2003), and community 
development corporations have been working to fill the affordable housing deficit created 
by the government’s retrenchment in housing policy (Silverman, 2009).  
  
Neighborhood Stabilization Program. In 2008, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(NSP) was created from the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 under 
Title III Emergency Assistance for the Redevelopment of Abandoned and Foreclosed 
Homes. NSP is a component of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). The first 
tranche of funding of $3.92 billion (NSP1) awarded grants to a total of 309 grantees 
including the 55 states and territories and selected local governments to stabilize 
communities hardest hit by housing foreclosures and delinquencies. NSP grantees develop 
their own programs and funding priorities (U.S. Housing and Urban Development, 
www.hud.gov, 2009). Under an allocation of funds provided under the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, a second tranche of funding of $1.93 billion 
(NSP2) was awarded to eligible applicants including states, units of general local 
government, nonprofits, and nonprofits collaborations with other nonprofits or for profit 
entities (U.S. Housing and Urban Development, www.hud.gov, 2009).  
As detailed in the above section, affordable housing policy has been critical in providing 
funding for housing development in urban communities. A historical timeline of public 
policy and major federal programs for the redevelopment of urban areas is provided in 
figure 4. Figure 4 summarizes the statute enacted in the top section of the diagram and 
identifies the public policy that directly connects below the timeline to the funded program. 
 
Figure 4: Affordable Housing Policy & Corresponding Programs 
 
 
  
 
 
Community Development Corporations 
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) leverage affordable housing policy 
programs for local economic development. CDCs have been established as a model for the 
revitalization of urban neighborhoods (Frisch & Servon, 2006; Vidal, 1992; Vidal & Keating, 
2004). Since 1992, a CDC “industry” (Frisch & Servon, 2006; Walker, Gustafson, & Snow, 
2002; Yin, 1998) has developed and CDCs have evolved from local community residents 
working to make their neighborhoods better, to a community development “system” with 
relationships with banks, government, foundations, churches (Walker, 2002; Yin, 1998), 
and intermediaries offering training, best practices, and capacity building (Bockmeyer, 
2003; Frisch & Servon, 2006; Glickman & Servon, 1999, 2003). Foundations and 
government have significantly invested in CDCs because unlike government agencies, they 
are more flexible, and unlike private developers CDCs involve residents in their 
governance, planning and development activities (Galster, Levy, Sawyer, Temkin, & Walker, 
2005).   
 
Most CDCs develop housing. Successful CDC affordable housing developments combine the 
aggressiveness of private-sector developers with the public mission of the government to 
build and rehabilitate housing units (Kroopnick, 2008). Three key abilities of CDC versus 
for-profit developers as development organizations include the CDC ability to secure 
support from residents on redevelopment projects and policies, the ability to secure 
support from public agencies, and the ability to coordinate public investments. Weaknesses 
include liquidity or cash-flow problems, substantial political involvement because CDCs are 
the alternative model to local government administrating community development 
programs, and lack of capacity to complete projects cost effectively and efficiently (Walker, 
2002).      
 
Three financial intermediaries: Enterprise Foundation, Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation (LISC), and Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC) now 
NeighborWorks have been seen as critical to building the capacity, growth, development 
and success of CDCs (Vidal, 1997) and communities in general. Since 1980, LISC has 
invested $9.6 billion in communities and CDCs, leveraging $29.5 billion in total 
development (Local Initiatives Support Corporation, 2009). Enterprise has invested $10 
billion in communities since 1982 (Enterprise Foundation, 2008). In fiscal year 2008, 
NeighborWorks provided $8.6 million in direct grants to member organizations, and total 
direct investment leveraged in fiscal year 2009 was $3.9 billion (NeighborWorks, 2009).  
Intermediaries secure resources from foundations, government, and corporations and 
strategically distribute funds to CDCs (Glickman & Servon, 2003). The activities supported 
by intermediaries positively affect CDC performance (Rohe & Bratt, 2003; Walker, 2002; 
Walker et al., 2002) resulting in CDCs, especially larger ones, having an impact in the 
neighborhoods in which they operate (Cowan, Rohe, & Baku, 1999). CDCs are frequently 
the only hope for the many communities that they serve because private developers often 
ignore high-poverty neighborhoods (Knotts, 2006) leaving CDCs as the main organizational 
vehicle for development in urban areas (Stoecker, 2003). Despite impressive work 
completed under difficult conditions and the fact that CDCs are critical in their role as 
  
 
neighborhood change agents (Bratt & Rohe, 2007), CDCs like many nonprofit organizations, 
have remained small, underfunded, and staffed by inexperienced personnel (Euchner & 
McGovern, 2003; Kroopnick, 2008) and their production numbers are limited.   
In 1991 there were 2,000 CDCs in the United States producing 320,000 housing units.  By 
2005 that number more than doubled to 4,600 and production totaled 1,252,000 (NCCED, 
2005). Despite these advances, in 2005, only 44% of CDCs had produced more than 100 
units of housing over their existence, and only 20% had produced more than 25 units for 
four consecutive years (NCCED, 2005). While CDCs that received funding and support from 
intermediaries were the most productive affordable housing providers (Glickman & 
Servon, 2003), even these were only on average producing 24 units per year (Glickman & 
Servon, 2003). Further, community development organizations decreased significantly 
dropping by half from 2002 to 2010 (VonHoffman, 2013).   
 
METHODS 
Methodological Approach   
Qualitative research is an opportunity to increase understanding of affordable housing 
public-private partnerships. Qualitative research looks in depth at experiences and 
viewpoints allowing the leaders to tell their stories holistically focusing on the issues and 
concerns they feel are most salient to their experience. Qualitative methods can impose 
order on disorder and promote, “thinking in terms of complex relationships” (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008: 13). Qualitative research methods also contribute to understanding the 
meaning of experiences, actions, and processes that inform outcomes (Maxwell, 2004). 
 
Sample 
Our sample consisted of 31 participants engaged in 15 ongoing or recently completed 
affordable housing public-private partnerships in ten U.S. states. The collaborations were 
identified with the assistance of two national organizations that secure resources, provide 
management and technical advice, and serve as industry experts on housing and 
neighborhood revitalization. Our respondents included 20 nonprofit (of which 18 were 
CDC Executive Directors), seven for-profit and four government collaboration 
representatives. Six of the 15 public-private partnerships were tri-sector (nonprofit, for-
profit and government participants) and nine were either a nonprofit or for-profit 
organizations in collaboration with government.  
 
Case Studies 
Profiles of four (of the 15) affordable housing public-private partnerships are summarized 
in table 1. Case #4 exhibited exploitative, rigid and transactional attractors while cases 1, 2 
and 3 exhibited explorative, adaptive and relational attractors. 
 
Table 1: Sample Case Study Profiles 
Case #1: Government & Private Sector Organization 
Community did not want more affordable housing in their neighborhood. For profit 
developer created housing that looked and felt exactly like market-rate housing. 
Community didn’t understand affordable housing strategy. For-profit developer held 
  
 
community council meetings with information comparing work with other cities; Identify 
community leaders and sat with them individually to answer detailed questions; Open 
about intentions with community. Developer conducts tours when construction started, 
does not displace any residents, employs minority contractors, and makes local hires. 
Community detractors now supporters.  
State financing agency would not approve two deals submitted by the developer because 
they were in the same submarket. Developer pitched a case outlining the importance of the 
critical mass and comprehensive neighborhood revitalization needed with both deals. State 
agency changed approach, adopting neighborhood revitalization as a criterion for future 
funding. State funds both deals. Because of the economic conditions, couldn’t sell tax 
credits for original pricing creating a financing gap. Developer contacted the City 
requesting additional assistance. Developer also goes after stimulus funds to fill the gap. 
Secured additional funding from both sources to complete the project. 
 
Case #2: Government & Two Nonprofit Organizations 
Because of an outcry from neighborhood residents about building a facility to house 
chronic inebriates, the nonprofit organization does not move forward with the project 
losing the $3 million dollars in funding that had been secured for the site. The nonprofit 
identifies a different site and their nonprofit partner helps them secure $3 million dollars 
in bond funds to complete the development on this second site. To build on the second site 
needed a special permit.  The City denied the permit, but did not do it within their legal 
time frame of 60 days. With support of partner, organization sues the City under both 
violation of fair housing laws (permit denied because of NIMBYism) and violation of the 60-
day rule. Nonprofit organization wins lawsuit. There was a strained relationship with the 
City after winning the lawsuit. The nonprofit apologized to the planning department, 
explained that had to file suit and why it was important. The organization was able to work 
with the City to complete the project. 
 
Case #3: Government, Nonprofit Organizations, Private Sector Organization 
A visioning process was completed with neighborhood residents and stakeholders. A 
location was identified for development. However, the economy was terrible, the nonprofit 
was having a difficult time finding an investor and was fearful the project would fall apart. 
The private sector partner was persistent. The pubic-private partnership successfully 
approached State Farm as an investor (this was State Farm’s first investment in this type of 
deal in the nation). When the partnership reported back to the neighborhood, “it was like 
they had amnesia that they had told us to do the development here… they were up in 
arms.” Both partners attend the community meetings “and we both took the bullets”, but 
were able to persuade the neighbors. Project supported by majority of residents. A small 
group of residents stood against the project. Nonprofit partner made funders feel 
comfortable, reached out to public officials and the media to convey the message that it was 
just a handful of neighbors that did not support the project.  
 
Case #4: Government, Nonprofit Organizations, Private Sector Organization 
A for-profit developer partners with a community based nonprofit housing developer. They 
  
 
have partnered in the past, and the for-profit wants the same structure as developed in 
previous deals. The for-profit has developed a system where they have multiple line items 
in the construction budget (e.g., construction, architectural, planning) because the for-
profit is a vertically integrated development company. The nonprofit wants to take a larger 
role and wants more developer fee. The for-profit does not believe that the nonprofit 
brings real “value to the deal” and thinks the deal is fair. The for-profit has to put up the 
guarantees, and is “taking all the risks” and refuses to renegotiate to a profit split that is 
acceptable to the nonprofit. The nonprofit walks away from the deal, and the for-profit 
finds another nonprofit organization with no housing development experience, but a valid 
501c3 and housing mission to replace the disgruntled nonprofit. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The data suggests despite size, type of partnership, or experience, PPPs for affordable 
housing encountered three common challenges: financing problems, community and/or 
political opposition, and conflict with partners.  In seven of the 15 public-private 
partnerships, financing challenges stemmed from the traditional affordable housing finance 
tool – the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (tax credits). Difficulties included: 1) shortfall 
(value decline) in credits, 2) loss of tax credits, or 3) difficulty securing an investor to 
purchase tax credits. In the remaining eight public-private partnerships the financing 
challenges resulted from additional funding needed for the housing development. Several 
leaders also reported financial challenges for their organizations. 
All the PPPs included in the study experienced community and/or political challenges in 
the early stages of development prior to construction. Opposition to affordable housing is 
commonplace. The data revealed that partners with relationships with the local 
communities targeted for development was critical. Some reported with intensity a 
willingness to take on community and political opposition to ensure that housing for those 
in need, was built.  
Leaders of public-private partnerships experienced conflict with partners. Several leaders 
reported intense negotiations with partners. Leaders reported struggling with personnel 
problems of their partners, including turnover and limited experience and conflict around 
profit sharing and developer fee split. All of the public-private partnerships had previous 
development experience, and all were established organizations. Despite the potential, the 
data revealed sharp differences for overcoming obstacles, between attitudes and conduct 
between successful collaborations and less successful collaborations when facing a 
problem.  
 
Finding #1: Effective public-private partnerships were more explorative then 
exploitative.  
The narratives of the successful collaborations demonstrated problem solving that 
explored new ideas, flexibility, and risk acceptance.  The data revealed solutions to 
challenges discovered through authentic dialogue with politicians, residents and among 
partners.  In several examples solutions to one challenge led to another challenge that the 
successful collaborations considered alternative possibilities to solve.  Examples of 
evidence are provided in table 2.     
  
 
 
 
Table 2: Exploitation vs. Exploration 
 
Finding #2: Effective public-private partnerships were more adaptive then rigid. 
Effective public-private partnerships were adaptive, approached problems with a 
willingness to modify plans and roles, and were able to respond favorably to change and 
unpredictability.  Leaders of effective public-private partnerships moved beyond the 
default solutions available for resolving their problem in an effort to complete the 
affordable housing development. The research revealed that leaders took on detractors, 
difficult populations, and government. This commitment produced results that improved 
conditions for the targeted population through the development of housing (and in many 
Exploration
“…its easy to come into a distressed neighborhood 
and simply take away from the neighborhood…you 
bring in your own crews and… all the money that’s 
made on the job is taken out of the neighborhood. 
You know, basically people, contractors, 
subcontractors who come in from the suburbs or 
whatever, and they’re doing their work.  They’re not 
going to spend it there locally.  They’re going to take 
it out of the neighborhood… we have been very 
conscientious in hiring as best as possible, some of 
the locals… they’re typically used to - I work for a 
day.  I’m going to get paid at the end of the day and 
I’m going to get paid in cash. We don’t do that.  We 
pay them on Fridays, and I pay by check. [But most 
of the people do not have bank accounts.]  I have 
gone to some of the local check-cashing facilities 
and/or convenience stores, introduced myself, tell 
them what I’m doing, that we’re helping build and 
renovate houses in their neighborhood.  Once they 
meet me, the storeowners… they have a very easy 
feeling about cashing my checks.  Because prior to 
that, they don’t know who I am… we’re actually 
working, not only with some of our subcontractors, 
but even with our tenants, to get them to open a 
bank account if [they] don’t have one.” 
“…it was not a good business deal for us to take all 
the risk with acquiring 22 houses and… have them 
in our inventory… The… developer wanted me to 
take all the risk.”
“They felt that we did not have the capacity to get 
houses done. That what they were bringing to the 
collaboration… can get the work done.”
“It’s not just like we’re any other developer… we’re 
a fairly large developer with some significant 
capacity… We want to control the deal.  We want to 
be able to make the decisions that affect the 
financial ramifications of the deal…”
“…the city planning commission voted us down.  
And it [was] truly nimbyism, it was neighbors 
standing up and shaking their heads, and you know, 
calling the people we work with the scum of the 
earth… at public meeting on public television… we 
filed a lawsuit against the city… it was ugly. But we 
did it for all the right reasons…. it was the right thing 
to do, people deserve housing…”
“…we were submitting this deal along with another 
deal that was very close to it and the state finance 
fund pretty much told us ‘we’re not going to fund 
two deals in the same submarket’ and we said we 
understand the need for geographic distribution. 
They let us explain why this was important. We 
went and we took some folks from the city and we 
pitched our case and the state finance agency 
ended up funding both deals… we were able to 
sway them over to our way of thinking and the state 
finance agency has actually adopted… 
neighborhood revitalization and impact as a 
competitive criteria for getting rounds of tax credits, 
which we think makes a lot of sense.”
Exploitation vs. Exploration
Exploitation
  
 
cases supportive services), won design awards, captured the attention of the U.S. Housing 
and Urban Development Secretary, and changed policy. In addition, the effective public-
private partnerships encountered many problems as they worked to complete the 
affordable housing development. The adaptive actions taken by the successful 
collaborations enabled them to move forward. In all of the effective public-private 
partnerships, challenge after challenge was met and resolved until the project was 
completed. Examples of evidence are provided in table 3.     
 
Table 3: Rigid vs. Adaptive 
 
 
  
Adaptive
“We sat down multiple times and discussed 
potential roles for both of our organizations and it 
sort of just became clear that through our 
discussions that [partner] was going to be very 
uncomfortable playing that leadership role…”
Rigid vs. Adaptive
Rigid
[Residents had no where to go if their homes were 
demolished and rebuilt, so nonprofit comes up with 
the idea to build a “holding house” – a house built 
on a vacant lot on the block where families could 
move into so no families would be displaced.  The 
house was completely designed and presented to 
the community] “…and they looked at it and said we 
don’t like it… From an efficiency standpoint, use of 
space, the kitchen was smaller and tighter and 
culturally within that street and that place, kitchens 
are really important. They wanted it to be done in a 
different layout because that’s the way they cook 
and the way they live, and so we respected that, 
redesigned the entire house and there’s nothing in 
the original design that’s in that house.”
“…we’re actually moving our office there because… 
I can’t afford to keep renting my current office and 
paying the mortgage over there so we’re moving our 
office and we’ll- it’s going to cost us a lot more 
money to have an office than it is now but I have to 
deal with this issue. So- it’s things like that are real 
risks that people have taken.”
“…you’re coming back and you’ve just survived a 
storm... You see nothing but despair, heartache, 
pain… They were just paralyzed… when you go in 
and you rip all of that out and throw it out on the 
curb, you tear out all the sheetrock, you empty it 
and when they walk back into that house, there’s 
nothing but 2 x 4’s and some walls.  A strange thing 
happens is that now you get this, ‘You know?  I 
always wanted to open this room up.’  Simple little 
act changed them from, ‘I’ll never be able to 
recover,’ to ‘You know, I see hope. I see 
possibilities,’ and that lifts the spirit.”
“So, our deal was that they were going to do end 
financing. When they couldn’t get their end 
financing my question to them was - what is your 
new role?”
“…they were controlling everything they did the 
proformas, they looked at the house, they did the 
spec, they did everything. They just wanted me to 
bring the money and not ask questions.”
  
 
Finding #3: Effective public-private partnerships were more transactional then 
relational. 
Less effective public-private partnerships were transactional, with a focus on the specifics 
of the deal and were unable to resolve conflict in their partnerships or unable to move 
forward to complete the affordable housing development; were transactional with a focus 
on “fees”, “the deal”, “value” and “money”.  Leaders of effective public-private partnerships 
were relational. Evidence in support of this focus is provided in table 4. 
Table 4: Transactional vs. Relational 
 
 
 
 
Relational
“…affordable housing is a really tough nut to 
crack… So here is an opportunity… we just don’t 
normally get.  And 90 units of affordable housing is 
a big deal for us…”
“I needed a partner that was bringing money to the 
table…”
“The only way that we’ll partner on deals is if we, 
being me… is if I bring them the concept because 
it’s always about, ‘Well, what is your value?’  And 
I’m valuable to people when I bring them a deal that 
they would not have otherwise done had I not 
brought it to their attention.”
“I always would say to [partner], at some point this 
is about money. This is a business relationship…”  
“… we would be most useful if we did what we did 
well, and if we partnered then with organizations 
that could do what they do well, and for us not to 
feel like we have to do everything.”
“The only way that we’ll partner on deals is if we, 
being me… is if I bring them the concept because 
it’s always about, ‘Well, what is your value?’  And 
I’m valuable to people when I bring them a deal that 
they would not have otherwise done had I not 
brought it to their attention.”
Transactional vs. Relational
Transactional
“The problem with that is they also wanted fees. 
They wanted to participate on the developer fees or 
any fees. My question was - what are you putting 
in?”
“We have brought some additional institutional 
money into the neighborhood… we want to make 
an impact in not only just the housing stock, but in 
the community…”
  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH & LIMITATIONS 
 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to this study. This study was a descriptive, non-random, 
qualitative investigation. The sample was small, heavily concentrated in the Midwest, and 
not representative of all public-private partnerships for affordable housing. Further, 
interviewing leaders may have introduced self-reporting bias, and interviewees were 
required to recount past experience. Some recollections may have been incomplete or 
compromised by the effect of time on memory creating the potential for recall bias.  
Finally, qualitative data analysis depends heavily on the interpretations of the researcher. 
The principal researcher has worked in the field of housing and community development 
for over 15 years, and we acknowledge the potential for researcher bias, despite a 
conscious effort to control effects through the use of rigorous methods in designing and 
implementing this study. This is only a preliminary conceptual understanding of success in 
these partnerships and will require further inquiry, particularly quantitative confirmation 
of the conceptual model. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
For practice, nonprofit agencies and private developers may find our results useful in 
guiding actions for responding to the common barriers that confront public-private 
partnerships that build affordable housing. Considerable research has been conducted on 
public-private partnerships concerned with economic development, education, health care, 
the alleviation of poverty, capacity building, and environmental sustainability (Selsky & 
Parker, 2005), but there are few field-based studies on public-private partnerships 
concerned with affordable housing development. This qualitative study adds to the 
growing research on collaborations with research associated with affordable housing 
public-private partnerships. The findings contribute to the limited research available. 
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Public-Private Partnerships: Trends, Issues, and Policy Considerations 
The Newport News Redevelopment Experience 
 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on the public-private partnership oriented redevelopment experiences 
of Newport News, Virginia, a community of 180,000 citizens with many of the challenges 
and opportunities faced by America’s largely built-out, older communities. Local 
governments are turning with increasing frequency to partners for significant 
infrastructure and redevelopment initiatives. Today’s public-private partnerships, often 
called a P3, go beyond business-friendly cooperation and are based increasingly on formal, 
written agreements that commit multiple parties to perform in cooperation over a set 
period of time—what many would call a formal “deal.”  
 
These transactions are rooted in the experiences of communities like Atlanta and Cleveland 
dating back to the early 1980s. These earlier pioneers of public-private partnerships began 
with the big idea that regional economies had to move away from a “them (business) and 
us (government)” type of thinking. The notion of marshaling the strongest possible share of 
a community’s financial and intellectual resources through partnerships in order to be 
competitive and building livable urban places gained salience.  Developing alliances of 
business, non-profits organizations, and government players became popular as a key way 
to move urban communities forward. Atlanta’s boom in the late 1970s and 1980s was 
partially attributed to this philosophy as was Cleveland’s reemergence during the 1980s. 
 
While the potential advantages of partnerships became clear, their proliferation also meant 
that they became more diverse in character and that many would-be partners had limited 
experience and capacity to succeed. As in Atlanta and Cleveland, many of Virginia’s initial 
local government partnership experiences were in the economic development arena even 
as many states establish Public-Private Transportation Acts (PPTAs) and Public-Private 
Education and Infrastructure Acts (PPEAs) to encourage inter-sectorial cooperation to 
finance such projects. 
 
After first reviewing some of the history of American partnerships that have been around 
in various forms for a long time, the experiences of Newport News, Va., which has been a 
leader in deploying public-private partnerships in the redevelopment arena over the past 
quarter century, will be described.  Those lessons then will be considered in the wider 
context of the nation’s increasing use of structured P3s.  
  
With frequent use and changing times, these mechanisms create contemporary challenges 
of process management, proposal evaluation, and staff capacity. Fresh policy options for 
addressing concerns and creating a situation in which smaller organizations and 
communities have the opportunity to benefit from the efficiencies and capital-infusion 
potential of P3s are needed. Vigilance is indicated because high profile partnerships that 
fail or come under scrutiny generate pressure to “reform” P3 rules in ways that could result 
in processes that are indistinguishable from regular government procurement. In addition 
there is some risk that the spirit of practical teamwork so critical to local partnerships will 
  
 
be damaged by partisan forces of gridlock so evident in Washington and some state capitals 
today. 
 
P3s in American History: What Comes Around Goes Around 
P3s were not a new invention when Newport News, and Virginia more generally, deployed 
them for redevelopment purposes over the last quarter century. Nor were they a new idea 
for Cleveland or Atlanta in the 1980s. Government and business have had complex 
partnerships in America since soon after the first English colonists came ashore under the 
auspices of the Virginia Company in 1606.3 The State of New York did a deal to build the 
Erie Canal,4 and the federal government contracted out the national railway system and 
much of the American mining industry by contributing free or nearly free land during much 
of the 19th century.5 
  
These examples and many other partnerships were ubiquitous during much of American 
history. As UVA historian Brian Balogh observes, Americans often prefer their government 
services to be delivered less visibly in conjunction with the private sector.6 These mixed 
arrangements came in many shapes and sizes. They often had many advantages over 
purely governmental actions in terms of the public’s more favorable attitudes toward the 
private sector and political support for major initiatives requiring visible government 
actions. On a more tangible level, P3s of the past also had the positive features of private 
capital financing and access to the human resources talent of private sector actors.7 
 
Progressive Era and Modern Times 
Of course, big projects and complicated public-private transactions can be tracked during 
the industrial and modern era as well. However, with the Progressive Era and the push for 
anti-corruption and clean government, came formal, “rule bound” procurement, 
competitive bidding and suspicion that any government-business partnership not 
established by some type of arms-length process was tainted.  Much of this scrutiny and 
rightful concern that good government uphold values like fairness and equity also 
generated the procedural safeguards that came to be synonymous with plodding and 
cautious government decision-making. This was not an environment in which nimble P3s 
tended to emerge. 
  
Parallel with the push for clean and fair government was the general expansion and 
professionalization of national, state and local governments that accelerated after World 
War II and was widespread by the 1970s. With this growth in size and capacity came more 
                                                          
3 Encyclopedia Virginia, Virginia Company of London, (http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Virginia Company of London). May 19, 
2014. 
4
 Robert J. McNamara, Building the Erie Canal, A Grand Idea and Years of Labor Transformed Early America, 
http://history1800s.about.com/od/canals/tp/eriecanal01.htm). May 19, 2014. 
5
 Richard N. L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves, A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven & 
London,Yale University Press, 2006), 90-99. 
6
 Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight:  The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America, (Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 3. 
7
 Neil A. Morgan, “Public-Private Partnerships:  Trends, issues and policy considerations and the Newport News redevelopment experience,” 
Virginia Issues & Answers, Spring 2014, 25-30. 
  
 
rules, procedures and transparency expectations that tended to render entrepreneurial P3s 
a rare breed. Additionally, until the 1973 oil crisis, there was little perceived lack of public 
financing for any transportation or redevelopment project that one might imagine and 
otherwise enjoyed political support.    
 
Third Way Urban Partnerships and Market Mechanisms 
The 1970s and 1980s featured American communities that were forced to face their 
challenges from a new vantage point. Business as usual wasn’t working with the much 
more greatly restrained national economy and limited national resources. Americans were 
shocked when advanced manufacturing seemed to be taken over by Japanese multi-
national corporations deploying American developed plan-do-check-act techniques.8  While 
subsequent developments make the Japanese seem far less monolithic, their formula of 
teamwork for the greater good made a real impression on many. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, this was the time of the “third way” political economists, such as Lester 
Thurow (The Zero-Sum Society; Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change, 
1980) and Robert Reich (The Next American Frontier, 1984). These “third way” American 
thought leaders generally advocated for greater coordination between government and 
business, as well as targeted investments and human capital development. 
  
During the same timeframe, another strand of American political economy and philosophy 
was labeled as “Neoliberalism.”  Although people advocating divergent policies came to be 
known as “neoliberals,” a unifying theme for many was the value of using market 
mechanisms even for government incented activities. As articulated by Charles Peters, the 
neoliberals promoted a system “in which the excesses of an adversarial, pluralistic system 
were softened by principles of community, democracy, and prosperity.9  
  
It was in this historical and economic context that the stories of Atlanta and Cleveland fit.  
After Andrew Young’s election as Mayor of Atlanta in 1981 with substantial opposition 
from the business community, he famously reached out to Atlanta’s business leadership 
when he said “I didn’t get elected with your help, but I can’t govern without you”.10 Atlanta 
clearly had many things going for it at the time, including its strategic transportation hub 
advantages and “New South” racial climate of the “City too busy to hate.”11 Without going 
into project details, the conscious effort of Atlanta’s civic leadership to approach things in 
the spirit of teamwork and collaboration, while bringing in business leaders with market 
expertise were necessary ingredients in Atlanta’s dynamic development.  
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The case of Cleveland was more dramatic.  As a rust belt city with declining manufacturing 
and population, in many ways the Cleveland of 1980 was still functioning in the post-World 
War II mindset of interest group conflict mode, or Lowi’s “interest group liberalism.”12 
Government, labor, and business were largely operating in isolation from each other and 
without the mindset that all hands needed to be rowing in the same direction. Its 1978 
default and national image of failure and decline represented a low point.13  
  
In many ways Cleveland’s resurgence tracked with the mayoral election of George 
Voinovich who served from 1980 until 1989. While the mayor and his team get much credit 
for changing the style and philosophy of the local government analogous to Andrew Young 
in Atlanta, other factors were also at play.  In Atlanta, the surge of public-private 
investment rode a wave of national trends including the growing airport hub system, 
general dynamism and population growth in the South, a revolution in race relations and 
other factors. In Cleveland perhaps the critical variable beyond the change in city hall was 
the mobilization of the existing corporate leadership structure that had been partially 
dormant during the period of decline.14 In both the Cleveland and Atlanta cases the new 
spirit of teamwork for the greater good took place within the intellectual backdrop of 
market-oriented Neoliberalism and the growing sense that a third way of collaborative 
leadership across all sectors - business, government, labor, non-profits, universities - was 
necessary for community competitiveness not only within the United States but around the 
world. 
  
Cleveland’s flavor of partnerships was particularly broad. In addition to redevelopment-
oriented projects such as the Midtown Corridor and strategic groups like Cleveland 
Tomorrow and more traditional Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Urban 
Development Action Grant (UDAG) leveraged government driven projects, Cleveland also 
had “soft partnerships” in which corporate talent was made available to advise the city on 
upgrading its services, technology, and general use of best practices.15 This is perhaps the 
most unique aspect of the Cleveland experience and illustrates the latent community 
advantages when there are corporate headquarters with both financial and human capital 
available for creative deployment. The reality is that few American cities such as Newport 
News have this luxury. 
 
Contemporary P3s around the Country 
There is no question that interest in Public Private Partnerships continues to grow around 
the United States, as well as internationally.  Groups such as National Center for Public 
Private Partnerships (NCPPP) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
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have created forums to exchange information and best practices targeting a national 
audience. 
 Particularly in transportation, federal policy change beginning with the l998 
Transportation and Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) has accelerated 
project activity and interest in P3s nationally.  However, most P3 work has been 
concentrated in just a few American states and there appears to be far greater potential to 
use P3s at least as an infrastructure financing vehicle than what has materialized to date.16 
 From Jamestown to the Capitol Beltway, P3s are intertwined in American history.  
The formal, structured partnerships of today have a lineage dating to the first English 
settlements and a technical and contractual lineage that is traceable to urban 
redevelopment initiatives going back a few decades. 
 
The Deployment of P3s for Redevelopment in the Newport News Experience 
Many existing Virginia public-private partnerships predate the current Virginia PPEA17 and 
Virginia PPTA.18  Both laws are intended to ease procurement restrictions, move away from 
a simple low-bid mindset, and avoid the lengthy and complicated processes previously 
required for a local government to meaningfully partner with an interested private firm. 
These innovations in public-private partnering rules have come about in part because of 
financial pressures that limit available public capital financing, but also because of the 
demonstrated success of some of the partnerships that predated the contemporary 
PPTA/PPEA format.  
 
With continuing modifications at the state level, the PPTA and PPEA procedures are 
receiving much attention. Some of the most successful and high-profile projects using these 
mechanisms include the Capital Beltway “hot lane” upgrade in the Washington, D.C., area, 
and the expansion of the Midtown Tunnel in Norfolk, Va. Conversely, the proposed new, 
limited-access U.S. 460 highway near Hampton Roads19 has recently suffered a major 
setback resulting in additional scrutiny of Virginia’s P3 regime.20 21 Even with some bad 
publicity and some clear short-comings, on balance these undertakings and others have 
created a sense of momentum and observable progress where, particularly in the case of 
Virginia’s roads, financial limitations resulting in years of limited activity were causing 
frustration.  
 
When citizens, elected officials, and policymakers see bulldozers rolling, the positive 
benefits of P3s are observed, and interest in pursuing more and different kinds of P3s is 
inevitably the result. Thus far, the most well-known Virginia P3s have been undertaken by 
either the Commonwealth of Virginia or larger local governments with significant staff 
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capacity and well-developed oversight institutions. As interest in P3s migrates toward 
smaller agencies and local governments, issues of process management, proposal 
evaluation, and public oversight become more urgent.  
 
Newport News’ Redevelopment Partnerships 
Most of the major partnerships that have occurred in Newport News have been in the arena 
of redevelopment. Three examples implemented over the past 20 years provide a basis for 
identifying several common variables and questions that may be considered when 
effectively structuring P3s. Unlike Atlanta, Newport News had no unusually favorable 
transportation nexus to leverage; and unlike Cleveland, this Hampton Roads community 
has very few corporate headquarters assets upon which to draw.  
 
The “Downtown Partnership”: In the early 1990s, the City of Newport News, its 
Economic Development Authority, and its Redevelopment and Housing Authority, along 
with Newport News Shipbuilding, and in some cases, the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
executed a series of projects that resulted in several hundred thousand square feet of office 
and research space, multiple parking decks, a waterfront park, and more recently, 
residential and retail space. The new Shipyard Apprentice School, which opened in 
December 2013, is the newest element in this longstanding example of redevelopment 
teamwork.22 
 
City Center at Oyster Point: City Center is a dramatic mixed-use development that has 
arisen from what was once a suburban office park in the Oyster Point area of midtown. This 
ongoing partnership links the city and its Economic Development Authority to a private 
consortium led by Harvey Lindsey Commercial Realty. Governed by a master development 
agreement, this strategically directed public and private investment continues to transform 
the midtown area of Newport News.23 
 
Brooks Crossing: Now underway along the Lower Jefferson corridor in the southeast 
section of the city, this partnership has united the city and its agencies with local developer 
Aaron Brooks, as well as Armada Hoffler, a major East Coast developer.24 The ambitious 
effort will bring new private investment to an underserved area of the city by leveraging 
large public infrastructure improvements and incremental private projects, all of which are 
mapped out with a master development agreement, defining the roles of the parties over 
time. 
 
Different Projects, Common Variables 
Each of these projects started with the local government already having acquired some 
critical real estate in the general target area. In each case, it became obvious that the scale 
of site assembly and infrastructure upgrades—and the ultimate potential to create a new 
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built environment—needed the financing, marketing skill, and practical knowledge of the 
private sector to move beyond an idea and get to a “bankable,” well-grounded 
development. 
 
In each case, a pre-existing public policy had targeted a particular area for major physical 
change. To varying degrees, that public policy took the form of comprehensive plan 
guidance, citizen and business advocacy to affect change within a targeted area, 
professional recommendations by staff and consultants, and a political consensus by 
elected officials to move an initiative forward. Moreover, the successful completion of each 
of these partnership projects required strategic thinking, political will, and administrative 
capacity on the part of public partners.  Perhaps even more important than these objective 
factors is the creation of a blended P3 culture featuring executive leadership. These 
endeavors were also extremely labor intensive and underscore the important point that 
similar partnerships should not be pursued without careful deliberation. 
 
While it may have been possible for the city to acquire all the needed land, it was not 
practical for city representatives to design and construct much of the new infrastructure, as 
well as solicit purely private proposals, without linking the early stages of development to a 
specific outcome. With the scale of needed public expenditures (many millions over time), 
it was not possible to mobilize the community to invest so much if the expenditures were 
not linked to a specific outcome. By having a private partner in all of these examples, the 
city was able to show that its public investments were leveraging not only private dollars, 
but also particular kinds of buildings, public spaces, residences, offices, or retail 
construction. It is much easier to justify public investment when pointing to the tangible 
end product rather than speculating about what the private sector might do in the future. 
The need for a private partner with end-product market knowledge also enhanced the 
efficiency of public utility and transportation investments. If what will be built is known, 
engineers can right-size infrastructure to avoid over investments or expensive retrofits. 
 
The need for appropriate public accountability is indisputable when such large public 
investments are made in conjunction with private, profit-oriented partners. Fortunately, in 
the Newport News experience, well-established institutions and structures were available 
to develop, analyze, and monitor major project elements. The elected city council provided 
policy oversight through its senior professional management team while also benefitting 
from the city’s Economic Development Authority/Industrial Development Authority and 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, whose appointed citizens have the energy and 
capacity to properly review the complex work of professional staff. 
 
While subjective policy and political judgments can never be perfectly fortified with 
quantitative performance measures as a local government organization strives to be 
accountable to its citizens and leadership, the most useful technical tool for Newport News 
has almost always been some form of cost-benefit analysis. In all of these redevelopment 
examples, city staff prepared detailed projections of both the tax revenue and the 
employment impacts of the proposed projects relative to public and private investments 
over extended periods of time. Senior management, citizen boards, and elected officials 
  
 
were aware of these calculations at the time recommendations were provided and public 
bodies made decisions. 
 
Admittedly, such projections require many assumptions in cases of complex 
redevelopment. Circumstances always change, and the city’s practice has been to 
periodically update cost-benefit analyses so that projections can be compared with actual 
results. Because of the long-time horizon of many of these projects, the objective reviews 
have generally been more meaningful for staff and management, serving to identify lessons 
learned for future partnerships. In terms of the general citizenry, the principal “metric” 
over time has been whether the redevelopment partnership produced the dramatic 
physical changes that were advertised at the project’s inception. 
 
Among the many challenges of using rigorous cost-benefit techniques, three deserve 
mentioning here. 
First, not all projects should have the same definition of success. A project such as 
City Center, in a vibrant portion of the city, should have a higher public return than a 
project of similar scale in an area with limited private-market activity such as Lower 
Jefferson Avenue. Who decides if more jobs and fewer taxes are acceptable returns? There 
is no scientific way to say a 3-to-1 private to public investment ratio is satisfactory in 
location “A,” while 2-to-1 is acceptable in location “B.” 
 
Secondly, rigorous and transparent analysis opens a proposal to attack by critics who may 
choose to use honest analysis for purposes that do not align with the public interest. For 
example, properly factoring in the negative impact that a new project would have on 
existing businesses may come at the price of introducing a source of opposition that might 
not otherwise emerge. In other words, quality cost-benefit analysis sometimes gets in the 
way of project marketing. 
 
Lastly, the successful use of econometric-type measurement has significant staffing 
implications. Many local governments may not employ individuals with both the skill set 
and the stature to apply such techniques with accuracy, credibility, and integrity. Newport 
News has been in a fortunate circumstance of having a high-capacity staff with a high 
degree of community credibility to advise management, elected officials, and citizens on the 
justification for a complex redevelopment project and subsequently reporting on how the 
partnership performed.  
 
In the Newport News experience and elsewhere, a plan, a political consensus, and a high 
capacity staff are necessary but not sufficient in most cases to manage a successful P3.  
Another very critical aspect is establishing a unique partnership culture dominated neither 
by the government nor private partner.  Such a blended culture allows the P3 team to 
accommodate both the unique challenges of the public side such as transparency as well as 
the equally important private sector drivers such as the required project internal rate of 
  
 
return.  Success in achieving the blended culture usually requires strong participation and 
leadership by senior management of the parties.25 
 
Thus, necessary factors for a successful public-private partnership include a local 
government environment of accountability that combines political leadership prepared to 
act on identified strategic priorities, a high-capacity staff that can function across multiple 
disciplines and various agencies, a culture of partnership among the parties, and a credible 
level of citizen oversight through appointed boards prepared to dig into the project details. 
 
Lessons Learned 
Newport News staff has learned from its partnership undertaking, including some 
unsuccessful ones not discussed in this paper. Clearly, while every opportunity is unique, 
partnership efforts that grow out of well-defined community redevelopment needs are 
more likely to succeed than unsolicited proposals not linked to established priorities. When 
the effort is pursuant to a community consensus—such as strengthening a major employer, 
creating a mixed use center for the economy of the future, or finding a way to encourage 
private investment in an area long suffering from disinvestment—implementing a 
successful partnership remains difficult but worth the effort. Well-written development 
agreements, rigorous cost-benefit analyses, private partners that understand governmental 
processes, a realistic financial strategy, and as much open communication with interested 
citizens as possible, are all factors that correlate with success. 
 
Questions to Raise When a Community is Considering a P3 
 Is the project of sufficient scale to justify the time and energy needed to follow 
through? 
 Does the local government have the capacity to manage such a project? 
 Does the local government have the ability to properly evaluate the potential costs 
and benefits of a project, thereby allowing a form of community accountability? 
 How will the private partner(s) be selected? 
 Can the selection process withstand the political consequences of disappointed 
parties not selected? 
 How will the need for confidentiality be balanced with the transparency requirements 
of government? 
 Does the prospective private partner have the resources, experience, and integrity to 
be a worthy teammate? 
 Should the locality enter directly into an agreement using PPEA/PPTA techniques or 
use a companion agency such as an industrial or housing authority as lead negotiator? 
 Do the updated PPEA and PPTA procedures offer any advantages over traditional 
partnering mechanisms in the redevelopment arena? 
 Can the project’s investment needs be structured in a way that local government can 
afford and the private sector can finance? 
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 Do the partnership’s agreements adequately anticipate all of the contingencies that 
can derail a project despite everyone’s good intentions? 
 
Policy Implications for Future P3s 
Many of the attractive aspects of P3s, such as streamlining governmental procurement, 
taking advantage of the efficiencies of design-build teams, tapping private capital without 
going to the traditional bond market, and being presented with entrepreneurial, unsolicited 
proposals also represent policy challenges as more firms, non-profits, and more 
governmental units are drawn into these types of arrangements. Like any other public 
activity, the need to ensure accountability of process and accountability of result are 
omnipresent concerns. Additionally, will there be sufficient staff capacity and policy 
oversight to ensure that future P3s are procedurally sound and produce the promised 
results?  
 
Some of the annoying inefficiencies of government are the result of procedural safeguards 
put in place over the years to ensure transparency, fair competition, and equity. 
Accountability of process refers to who gets the deal and how. As P3s become more 
commonplace, these same issues arise. State and local laws and administrative procedures 
are evolving with various requirements for public notice, alternative proposal solicitation, 
confidentiality limitations, and appeal procedures. To some extent, these requirements will 
tend to make P3s look more like “regular” government contracting over time. How do 
policymakers find the right balance between maintaining the practical advantages of P3s 
and mitigating the risks associated with the “usual suspects” (i.e., fraud, insider influence, 
political pressure, etc.)? 
 
The concept of accountability of result refers to performance. Did the deal result in what 
was envisioned? Did the road get built at the appropriate design standard in a timely 
manner at the price promised? Did the private investment and toll rates work as 
envisioned? If changes to the deal were necessary due to unforeseen circumstances, were 
the changes made in a manner that resulted in a project that was consistent with the public 
interest? 
 
As the use of P3s grows, the challenge of ensuring fair but efficient public processes, as well 
as developing/assuring governmental capacity to properly analyze whether a project is in 
the public interest, are imperatives that organizations with limited resources will struggle 
to achieve. To optimize the benefits of P3s and ensure that partnerships remain attractive 
options for our communities and agencies in the future, existing institutions must be 
redirected or new capacity must be developed so that unbiased resources are economically 
available to advise and evaluate the P3s to come.      
 
Policy Options as P3s Grow in Popularity 
Organizations with substantial, specialized professional staff and well-established policy-
oversight governance have led the way in deploying P3s successfully in Virginia. For 
example, in the case of the Virginia Department of Transportation, a staff unit focusing on 
design-build and P3s has deployed PPTA procedures under the knowledgeable oversight of 
  
 
the Commonwealth Transportation Board with good results. Larger local governments 
ranging from Fairfax County to Roanoke County to the City of Newport News have led 
successful projects that benefitted from staff capacity and established oversight 
institutions, including local elected officials and appointed boards such as industrial 
development authorities. As in the cases of Atlanta and Cleveland, there are many other 
successful flavors of P3s unique to communities around the country and indeed around the 
world.26 By and large these communities have capacity and sophistication.  How can the 
many smaller agencies and units of government enjoy the benefits of P3 projects, take 
advantage of lessons already learned, and be alert to challenges going forward, particularly 
if the entities are not in a position to employ specialized staff or reap the benefits of a cadre 
of professional, citizen volunteers? 
 
Two specific options, which are not mutually exclusive, are offered. As in the case of 
Newport News, many of the localities and regions have well-developed economic 
development systems that include citizen oversight and experienced staff. These 
institutions and personnel have in many cases already been involved in sophisticated “deal-
making” that included most of the same questions of process and result discussed above. 
For example, there has been a significant evolution in the quality of performance 
agreements that local development officials (and often the Commonwealth of Virginia) use 
with private companies. What were once not much more than statements of good-faith 
intent in exchange for public dollars are now usually very tightly written agreements that 
detail the parties’ obligations and remedies based on cost-benefit analysis or other forms of 
policy analysis. This experience is readily transferable to the contracting phase of Virginia’s 
existing PPTA/PPEA structure. More generally, for communities with limited staffing and 
oversight choices, an existing economic development team may provide either a direct or 
advisory mechanism for evaluating and implementing future P3s. 
 
Another broader policy option on a regional or statewide level is the establishment of one 
or more private advisory boards or centers of excellence that would become a resource for 
those confronted with or considering the possibility of initiating P3 projects. It makes no 
sense to hire permanent staff to undertake the technical work necessary to complete a P3 if 
such work rarely occurs. If the costs of staffing a partnership exceed the benefits, the 
process and the project are not going to happen, nor should they. While the trends are 
similar throughout the country, the differences in state law with regard to the powers and 
limitations of local government suggest the state (not necessarily state government) may 
be the proper level at which to provide public-private expertise to many organizations.   
 
While the use of consultants could also be an option, the impartiality of any third-party 
resource would be highly desirable. A publicly-sponsored center for excellence would 
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provide confidence that any analyses or recommendations flowing back to an agency or 
locality would be unbiased. Over time a “library” of best practices could be built, offering 
guidance on process, alternative means of analysis and procedures for practically 
modifying agreements. The establishment of such an advisory institution could create an 
economy of scale for institutionalizing P3 expertise, build on the hard lessons already 
learned, and extend the benefits of P3s to a much broader group of communities and public 
agencies. 
P3s in the Context of America’s National Political Dysfunction 
 
Public/private partnerships today seem more commonplace than ever before.  The spirit of 
teamwork, creative visioning and third way leadership is alive and well in the local 
government arena. In fact, this is one of the examples cited by International City Managers 
Association (ICMA) Executive Director Robert O’Neill when he observed that we are living 
in the “decade of local government.”27 Local communities are reinventing themselves 
drawing on all of the positive assets within their immediate reach as the resources and 
leadership at the level of national government is missing in action.  
 
Although periodic high profile P3 failures put pressure on communities to establish clearer 
and more transparent agreements, innovation continues and smaller localities and 
agencies are eager to tap into the potential of these win-win strategies demonstrated 
around the country in recent decades. One concern is being alert to the risk of overreacting 
to problems and succumbing to the temptation of “reforming” P3s until they become just 
another form of bureaucratic procurement. Perhaps the greater threat is the partisan 
political posturing now so dominant in Washington and creeping into state capitals. The 
prospects for local and regional public-private partnerships will dim decidedly if the team 
sport philosophy of the P3 is hijacked by the vaporous partisan bickering behavior seen 
elsewhere. Let us hope such behavior is not contagious.      
 
  
                                                          
27
 Robert J O’Neill, Jr., “Local Government in an Era of Creative Destruction,” Governing.com, May 2013. 
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Abstract:  
To avoid fiscal insolvency and modernize municipalities to fit changing population needs, 
the mayors of many legacy cities, such as Cleveland, initiate public-private partnerships.    
This paper focuses on two mayoral-led public-private partnerships in Cleveland:  Mayor 
George Voinovich’s Operations Improvement Task Force (OIT) (1979-1982) and Mayor 
Frank Jackson’s Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF) (2006-2009). The analysis 
identifies the good government management of the OIT that enabled Cleveland to come 
back after the city’s default in 1978. Additionally, the analysis identifies the good 
government management of the OETF that successfully right-sized Cleveland in 
relationship to its much smaller population needs during challenging economic times, 
including the Great Recession of 2008, without disruptions in service.  The paper concludes 
with the lessons learned for sustaining public-private-nonprofit partnerships in legacy 
cities to foster long-term positive urban change. The significance is that the two mayoral-
led partnerships taken together transformed Cleveland into a twenty-first century “city of 
choice.” 
 
 
  
  
 
It may be laid down as a general rule, that [the people’s] confidence in and obedience to a 
government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its 
administration. 
   
 Publius (Alexander Hamilton), Federalist Paper #1 
 
Introduction 
Public-private partnerships, with substantial participation of the nonprofit sector, are 
essential to good governmental administration in twenty-first century America (Kettl, 
2002; Mendel & Brudney, 2012).  Based on a longitudinal analysis of Cleveland, this paper 
shows why mayoral-led public-private partnerships are vital to the good governance of 
legacy cities.   
Legacy cities, such as Cleveland, have long histories as the manufacturing centers that 
drove the American industrial revolution and the nation’s prosperity in the twentieth 
century.  However, these cities have been in transition due to the internationalization of the 
U.S. economy that has shifted American manufacturing companies and jobs offshore. 
Consequently, legacy cities have experienced steep population losses as well as declines in 
tax bases and revenue streams, leaving local officials to grapple with the challenges of high 
unemployment, widespread poverty, service cutbacks, and blighted neighborhoods 
(Mallach, 2012). To avoid fiscal insolvency while modernizing municipal operations to fit 
shrinking municipalities and changing population needs, the mayors of legacy cities are 
wisely initiating public-private partnerships.  Through these partnerships, local officials are 
tapping into business, nonprofit, and community-based resources to help them manage 
necessary urban change as they secure a new and positive future for their residents.  
Based on an extensive review of the literature, Ansell and Gash (2007) identified 137 
partnership cases, most initiated by the public sector.  However, these partnerships vary 
significantly as for their leadership, goals, resources, operations, citizen engagement, and 
impacts (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Mendel, & Brudney, 2012).  For the sake of this analysis, we 
use the definition of public-partnerships formulated by Cleveland Mayor George Voinovich. 
In 1979, he was the first mayor of a legacy city to bring together on a large scale, public, 
private, and nonprofit stakeholders to work cooperatively to restore the people’s 
confidence in city government after a major debacle — Cleveland’s default. Specifically, as 
mayor (and later as governor of Ohio), he acted on a good government philosophy and an 
analytical management style known as “operations improvement” (Steiner, 1999).  
Operations improvement is built on the following public-private partnership premise: 
The need for partnerships must be recognized by both the private and public sectors.  
Business, nonprofit organizations, and foundations must respond to the call for help from 
the public sector or suggest on their own initiative their willingness to support the public 
sector with human capital resources and/or financial resources . . . The opportunity for 
interaction between the public and private sectors allows for progress to be made in 
  
 
improving the city’s government and the community as a whole, and it provides a 
framework for sharing risks in a world of limited resources.  In a time of decreasing 
funding from the federal and state governments, if our cities are to survive and succeed, it 
will take a local public-private partnership effort with cooperative efforts from every 
stakeholder.  The basic formula to the partnership is cooperation; therefore, the parties 
must first and foremost agree that they will come to the table to work together (Voinovich, 
2014).   
Based on a good government philosophy, this partnership premise has inspired many U.S. 
mayors in the twenty-first century, including Shirley Franklin of Atlanta. Mayor Franklin 
transformed Atlanta’s $82 million deficit into a $18 million surplus in her first year in office 
by making good (honest) government built on a biracial public-private partnership the 
centerpiece of her administration (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007).  The success of Franklin’s 
public-private partnership captured the attention of Cleveland’s municipal leaders in 2006, 
who inherited a $30 million deficit left from the outgoing mayoral administration (Brown, 
2014).  
Specifically, this paper analyzes two mayoral-led public private partnerships in Cleveland:  
Mayor Voinovich’s Operations Improvement Task Force (OITF) (1979-1982) and Mayor 
Jackson’s Operations Efficiency Task Forces (OETF) (2006-2009).  Our paper has three 
research objectives. One objective is to identify the distinctive good government 
characteristics of the OITF that enabled Cleveland to come back after the default caused the 
city’s economic engine to sputter (Steiner, 1999). Our second objective is to identify the 
distinctive good government characteristics of the OETF that successfully right-sized 
Cleveland’s government during trying economic times, including the Great Recession of 
2008, without disruptions in municipal services. Third, we use the empirical findings to 
discuss the lessons learned about the challenges and the solutions necessary for sustaining 
a mayoral-led public-private partnership in a legacy city.  
Our paper is divided into five sections. The first section describes five partnership 
management behaviors that frame our analysis of the OITF and the OETF.  The Cleveland 
setting and our research methodology are discussed in the second section.  The third and 
fourth sections show how the partnership management behaviors are evident in 
operationalizing the OITF and the OETF.  The final section discusses the lessons learned for 
weaving mayoral-led public-private partnerships into the twenty-first-century governance 
fabric of the nation’s legacy cities. 
Five Partnership Management Behaviors  
We have grounded our analysis of the OITF and the OETF in the scholarship of network 
theorists Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire.  By definition, the OITF and OETF are 
cooperative partnerships rather than multi-organizational governance networks. 
Nevertheless, we assume that the network management behaviors identified by McGuire 
and Agranoff (2014) are the same for mayoral-led public-private partnerships as in 
collaborative governance networks.  Thus, our research question is as follows: Do the 
public-private partnerships of Cleveland Mayors Voinovich and Jackson involve the 
management behaviors of activating, mobilizing, framing, and synthesizing?  Additionally, 
  
 
our research seeks to identify whether the Cleveland mayors adopted a fifth management 
behavior that we define as sustaining the public-private partnership.  Each partnership 
management behavior is defined briefly in turn.  
First, activation focuses on the mayor’s leadership philosophy, his partnership vision and 
goals, and the urgent conditions requiring speedy action. Activating behaviors also refer to 
the incorporation of key persons and stakeholders, information, money, and resources 
necessary to organize and support the public-private partnership. 
Second, mobilization focuses on how the mayor builds coalitions to develop internal and 
external support for the public-private partnership.  Mobilization activities legitimate the 
public-private partnership by cultivating community support and gaining commitments for 
the resources needed to operate it.  This includes the identification of partnership 
champions and process leaders.  Champions are those who sell the public-private 
partnership idea internally to department heads and employees and to the external 
community, such as funders, unions, civic groups, elected officials, and county officials; 
process leaders are the vision keepers who maintain the partnership commitments 
internally.  In essence, mobilization behaviors facilitate the movement from finding ideas 
and supporters to committing resources and incentives to the partnership volunteers and 
participants.  
Third, framing behaviors translate the partnership ideas and commitments into the 
policies, practices, and decisions that give it operational meaning. Framing also focuses on 
building the capacity of partnership participants through training, retraining, and cross-
training. Furthermore, framing includes the establishment of a partnership office or officer 
responsible for monitoring the partnership’s implementation and reporting on its progress. 
Thus, framing activities embed the practices of professional management into city 
operations based on a service orientation.  
Fourth, synthesizing activities enhance the work conditions that lead to a collaborative 
environment and productive interactions among the partnership members. In other words, 
the mayor and his partnership managers use synthesizing behaviors to remove obstacles 
and create opportunities for participants to build relationships of trust and cooperation so 
that they can focus on the achievement of results. Thus, synthesis leads to the development 
of cross-departmental relationships and a citywide orientation among participants that 
culminate in the successful completion of the partnership’s goals and objectives.   
Finally, sustaining behaviors institutionalize the public-private partnership into the 
governance of legacy cities.  In practice, newly elected mayors may not be eager to embrace 
the accomplishments of their predecessors, especially if the latter are nominally of 
different political parties. Often when the mayor leaves office, the internal conditions 
supporting his public-private partnership disappear. The recurrence of this political 
problem, that Vogelsang-Coombs and Cummins (1982) called the “ancien regime” problem, 
makes it difficult for the leaders of legacy cities to foster long-term change.  In contrast, a 
successfully sustained public–private partnership is one that has been integrated into the 
city’s administrative systems.  The integration of this public-private partnership into day-
  
 
to-day municipal operations makes it less likely for new officials and permanent city 
employees to view it as the “pet project” of a particular mayor.  
Research Setting and Methodology  
Rather than employ a cross-sectional analysis of public-private partnerships in legacy 
cities, our research concentrates on the two mayoral-led partnerships aimed at restoring 
good (city) government in Cleveland, first the OITF in 1979 and then the OETF in 2006. Our 
single-city setting is consistent with Mendel and Brudney’s (2012) argument that this 
method allows us to control for contextual differences better than in a cross-sectional 
analysis. Given our long view of Cleveland’s partnership history, we can differentiate 
between the short-term and long-term (transformational) impacts of the OITF and the 
OETF.  In this way, our analysis deepens understanding of how public-private partnerships 
can adapt to the changing environment of a legacy city — and vice versa.  
Our research uses multiple data sources to provide an inside view of Cleveland’s public-
private partnerships. The first source is the Voinovich Documents Collection in the Ohio 
University Library.  The Voinovich archives reveal a hidden history of the key actors who 
made the OITF work nearly forty years ago. The second source is a document analysis. We 
use information gathered from the private collection of Mayor Voinovich and that of the 
senior authors (Vogelsang-Coombs and Denihan) who served as volunteers on the 
Operations Efficiency Council.  Personal interviews provide the third data source. For 
information on the OITF, we interviewed Mayor Voinovich as well as Ben Bryan, the OITF 
Implementation Coordinator.  For information on the OETF, we interviewed Mayor Jackson, 
Darnell Brown who is the city’s chief operating officer and served as the OETF Chair, in 
addition to Michele Whitlow, the manager of the OETF Project Management Office (PMO).  
Additionally, we interviewed two city council presidents Martin Sweeney and Jay 
Westbrook, who served on the Operations Efficiency Council, the oversight body of the 
OETF.  All hour-long interviews, some in person and others by telephone, took place 
between June and August 2014.     
Finally, our research methodology blends the theory and practice of public-private 
partnerships.  In particular, we build on the “grounded theory” approach developed by 
McGuire and Agranoff (2014). Thus, our research is designed to bring forth theoretical 
propositions grounded in our data. For example, Mayor Voinovich provides the definition 
of public-private partnerships that is the foundation of our research. Furthermore, we have 
organized the empirical analysis around the partnership management behaviors drawn 
from McGuire and Agranoff’s network theory. The lessons learned are presented as 
theoretical propositions for future research on public-private partnerships in legacy cities. 
The Five Partnership Management Behaviors in the Voinovich OITF 
Table 1 provides a summary of the milestone activities that represent Mayor Voinovich’s 
management of the OITF.  The first column is divided into the four phases of the OITF: (1) 
the formation of the partnership concept (1979); (2) the development of the partnership 
(1980); (3) the operations of the partnership (1980-1982); and (4) the partnership’s 
follow-up activities (1982-1989).  
  
 
   <<<Table 1 about here>>> 
Activation  
Studying government through public-private partnerships was inherent in George 
Voinovich’s work ethic.  Steiner (1999) described Mayor Voinovich as a calm and patient, 
management-oriented public servant, who applied a thoughtful, analytical, and nonpartisan 
approach to every challenge. Steiner also observed that Voinovich consistently empowered 
others to help him set a course of action that was best for making a positive difference in 
the lives of citizens and then tenaciously stayed on the direction he set. Voinovich 
summarized his leadership philosophy, “Together We Did It,” as follows:   
I believe government’s highest calling is to empower people and galvanize their energy and 
resources to help solve our problems, meet our challenges, and seize our opportunities.  I 
also believe it’s a leader’s role to reach deep into every individual, draw out the goodness 
that’s inside, and inspire people to use that goodness to help themselves, their families, and 
their communities (Cited in Riffe, 1999, 1).    
Moreover, an unwavering commitment to Cleveland characterized Voinovich’s forty years 
of public service.  His steadfast conviction to his hometown and his work ethic were 
evident in his decision to run for the Cleveland mayoralty in 1979.  At that time, Voinovich 
held the position of Ohio Lieutenant Governor because he was successfully elected on the 
first tandem ticket with Governor Jim Rhodes. Given that Rhodes was term-limited under 
the Ohio Constitution, Voinovich not only wanted to run for governor in 1982, his 
gubernatorial candidacy was widely expected.  However, the Cleveland business 
community organized an intense effort to convince him to return to Cleveland because his 
hometown was imploding.  
The Chairman and CEO of the Eaton Corporation E.M. deWindt (1981) described Cleveland 
as a city that was broke — “in fact and spirit.”  Due to the high inflation of the late 1970s, 
Cleveland’s expenditures increased dramatically. The city’s spending was exacerbated by 
its geographic size that was based on one million residents. Given that Cleveland’s 
population fell to 573,822 by 1980 Census, budget shortfalls were inevitable. Instead of 
addressing these budget issues, the city relied on short-run strategies that included the 
selling of municipal assets, such as its transportation and sewer systems, to receive one-
time revenue and the use of federal program funds, such as the LEAA and CBDG, to pay for 
city operations (Voinovich, 2013).  Moreover, Cleveland residents were suffering due to 
deplorable living conditions with streets strewn with litter, blighted neighborhoods, racial 
polarization in the unresponsive police department, and the “countless breakdowns in the 
machinery of government” (deWindt, 1981; Bryan, 2014).  According to Voinovich, Mayor 
Dennis Kucinich appeared more interested in dividing rather than unifying the city in order 
to address the emergency situation.  
The Mayor and City Council were at war with each other. The administration was at war 
with the neighborhoods. It was reported that a key administration official punched a nun. 
The neighborhood people were at war with the Police Department for a lack of a police 
response and perceived excessive force.  The organization representing black policemen 
  
 
was suing the city for racial discrimination in the department.  The city was up in arms over 
schooling busing, and a federal judge that mishandled it. Neighborhoods devastated from 
the riots of the late 60s [had approximately] 5,000 properties in need of immediate 
demolition.  The city- owned electric company became a public football in spite of being on 
the verge of collapse. Unemployment was about 18%, and the city had a real hunger crisis 
(Voinovich, 2013). 
Besides rejecting attempts by the business community to help the city address these 
problems, Kucinich declared war on Cleveland’s corporate leaders, denouncing them as 
“‘fat cats” who wanted to dictate the destiny of the ‘little people’”(deWindt, 1981).  The 
combination of the city’s hostile business climate, its financial instability, and Kucinich’s 
divisive management style sparked a special election to recall the mayor.  After narrowly 
surviving the 1978 recall, Mayor Kucinich vilified the Cleveland business community in a 
televised presentation at the National Press Club and later in testimony before the U.S. of 
Representatives (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007). When $14 million in short-term municipal 
loans came due, Kucinich was unable to secure credit from the Cleveland bankers, and the 
result was the municipal default on December 15, 1978. The default, in turn, forced 
Cleveland voters to raise the city’s income tax from 1% to 1.5%.   
From the perspective of the business community, the national disgrace of the default and 
the city’s arrogant and inept administration imperiled Cleveland from reversing its dire 
direction (deWindt, 1981).  Thus, as the “dean” of the Cleveland business community, 
deWindt organized an intense campaign to convince Lt. Governor Voinovich to resign and 
run for mayor.  As Voinovich recounted, this decision was a momentous event in his life. 
 I prayed and asked the Holy Spirit for guidance and despite of my ambition to be governor, 
I concluded I could do more as mayor to make a difference and that was what I got into the 
business [of public service] for. And because of the dire situation it could be the most 
significant contribution I could make in my career in government (Voinovich, 2013).  
Before finalizing his decision, Voinovich secured deWindt’s commitment for the business 
community to underwrite and provide the human capital necessary, including the 
assistance of Warren King and Associates, to carry out his public-private partnership for 
operations improvement in city government. [Endnote 1]  Then, Voinovich pledged that he 
would fully implement the OITF recommendations. With this pledge, Voinovich convinced 
the city’s corporate leaders that: 
Cleveland would give birth to a rare animal:  a task force that would result in action rather 
than rhetoric.  Like most big cities, Cleveland had been studied to near death.  In recent 
years, five separate studies, including a Little Hoover Commission, focused on Cleveland.  
Each study ended up with a thick, spiral-bound tome and precious little action.  We had had 
enough pretty pictures and multicolored charts.  This time there had to be action . . .  and 
plenty of it (deWindt, 1981).  
Subsequently, Voinovich, a Republican, decisively defeated Mayor Kucinich, a Democrat, by 
receiving 56% of the votes cast in 1979 in solidly blue Cleveland.  One day after his election, 
  
 
the new mayor went to work with deWindt to develop the OITF partnership (Voinovich, 
2013). 
Within three weeks of Voinovich’s election, deWindt had the OITF’s governing structure in 
place (see Table 2).  At the top was a twelve-member Executive Committee that acted as a 
board of directors, setting the policy objectives and providing the financial and personnel 
resources for the OITF (Bryan, 2014).  Headed by deWindt, the Executive Committee was 
assisted by the twenty-one members of the Ways and Means Committee. The Ways and 
Means Committee was responsible for recruiting the volunteer management specialists to 
staff the task forces. The day-to-day operations of the OITF rested with a five-member 
Operating Committee, headed by Robert Hunter, CEO of the Weatherhead Corporation. In 
effect, the OITF partnership was structured as a “business enterprise of global proportions” 
(deWindt, 1981).      <<<Table 2 about here>>> 
Mobilization 
Mayor Voinovich used his leadership skills to serve as the overall champion of the OITF.  
One day after his inauguration, he sought to determine the true financial condition of the 
city. In January 1980, the Ohio General Assembly placed Cleveland under the supervision of 
the Financial Planning Commission after state auditors discovered that the city’s 
accounting records were “unauditable” (Voinovich, 2013).  Thus, the mayor established the 
Volunteer Financial Audit Task Force.  Led by Ernst & Whinney, this task force was 
comprised of accountants from the big-eight firms along with representatives of Standard 
Oil, Eaton, TRW, and the Chessie System.  After eleven weeks of inventorying Cleveland’s 
financial position, the auditors found that the city was $110 million in debt.  In effect, 
Cleveland’s financial position was much bleaker than the mayor expected. Thus, 
negotiating a debt repayment plan, restoring the city’s positive credit rating, and ending 
the state’s supervision of Cleveland’s finances were the mayor’s fiscal objectives folded into 
the OITF’s scope.   
The external champion of the OITF was deWindt, and under his leadership, the Executive 
Committee raised $794,000, including challenge grants of $150,000 and $100,000 from the 
Cleveland Foundation and Gund Foundation, respectively.  Additionally, deWindt and 
Morton Mandel, a prominent Cleveland entrepreneur and philanthropist serving on the 
Ways and Means Committee, used their networks to raise the balance of $544,000.  Table 3 
shows the widespread community support for the OITF.  Specifically, 264 private firms 
(88%) and 36 not-for-profit organizations (12%) in Greater Cleveland served as OITF 
sponsors.  Among the OITF sponsors were eight (8) labor unions.  The OITF ended up with 
$900,000 in revenues (including earned interest) which was the equivalent to $3 million in 
2014 dollars (Bryan, 2014).   
 <<<Table 3 about here>>> 
Two consulting organizations, the Government Research Institute (GRI) of Cleveland and 
Warren King and Associates (WKA), served as the process leaders of the OITF. GRI 
managed the OITF finances and provided logistical support to the Operating Committee. 
WKA designed the set-up and operations of the OITF by providing the templates for the 
  
 
time frames and the scope of the loaned executive work, the formats of the OITF 
recommendations, and the preparation of the final report (Bryan, 2014). The consultants 
acted in the role of “quarterbacks” because the OITF studies, recommendations, and 
implementation were done entirely by the volunteer task forces (deWindt, 1981).  
Nevertheless, Voinovich (2014) attributed the speed with which the OITF became 
operational and the quality of the final recommendations to the expertise of the two 
consulting firms.   
The Ways and Means Committee successfully recruited 89 loaned executives for twelve 
weeks of OITF duty. These volunteers included “lawyers, accountants, administrators; 
CEOs, and CFOs; engineers experts in computers and human relations and every 
management discipline” (deWindt, 1981).  Four study teams of business volunteers were 
formed to study the 63 agencies within the city, and the chair of each team was a member 
of the Operating Committee. Led by the Vice President of TRW, one team focused on the 
departments of public properties, port control and public service.  Another team, led by an 
experienced FBI executive and Acme-Cleveland Vice President, headed the Protective 
Services team, focusing on police, fire, and emergency management services.  Chaired by a 
former Executive Vice President of Detroit Edison, the third team studied public utilities, 
health, and community development. Led by an Ohio Bell Vice President, the fourth team 
focused on general government, and its scope included the mayor’s office as well as the 
departments of personnel and finance. Every city department and administrative process 
was within the OITF’s purview. Within ninety days, the OITF delivered a comprehensive 
evaluation of city government along with a report containing 650 workable 
recommendations.  These recommendations were not dictated by the city in any way or 
vetted by the Council, the mayor, or the operating departments (OETF, 1980). 
Framing 
Consistent with Mayor Voinovich’s public-private partnership premise, the stated goal of 
the OITF was to help improve the quality of life for the people of Cleveland by making local 
government more responsive to citizen needs (OITF, 1980).  The Executive Committee 
formulated the following three objectives to operationalize this goal: (1) to identify 
immediate opportunities for increasing efficiency and improving cost-effectiveness that 
could be realized by executive or administrative order; (2) to suggest managerial, 
operating, and organizational improvements for immediate and long-term consideration by 
the mayor and the city council; and (3) to pinpoint specific areas where additional in-depth 
analysis could be justified by potential short- or long-term benefits (OITF, 1982).  To carry 
out these policy goals and objectives, the OITF provided funding for the city to hire a full-
time implementation director — Ben Bryan — who worked closely with the Operating 
Committee while reporting progress to the mayor. 
As the mayor, Voinovich established a culture of professional management at city hall. One 
way he did this was to remove the patronage politics that pervaded city administration. In 
particular, Voinovich eliminated the requirement for city employees to kick back a portion 
of their salary by buying or selling tickets to campaign fund-raisers.  He made it clear to the 
employees that he would base their evaluations on their job performance rather than on 
  
 
the number of campaign tickets they sold or their personal relationship to the mayor 
(Voinovich, 2014).  Another way the mayor professionalized the culture was by his 
involving city employees in the OITF process.  In framing the OITF, he approached them to 
find out what they were doing right, and solicit their ideas about what they could do better. 
The message he sent was “how can we help you do your job better, smarter, and in the 
most cost-effective way?” (Voinovich, 2014).   
Within three weeks of taking office, Voinovich sent a memo to all department directors and 
city commissioners (the highest civil service positions) in which he requested an itemized 
list of the status of service in their units using a rating scale of “inadequate,” “adequate,” 
and “more than adequate” service.  In this memo of January 23, 1980, the mayor also asked 
employees to share their thoughts about how to organize their departments to function 
better and more efficiently. The responses of the employees were fed back to the OITF 
study teams. The mayor said these changes helped him gain the trust of employees in the 
OITF process and improve employee morale. Without using these changes to frame the 
OITF partnership, the mayor felt that operations efficiency could not succeed (Voinovich, 
2014).  
Synthesizing 
Unlike the strife characterizing Mayor Kucinich’s relationship to the council, Mayor 
Voinovich restored civility and pursued a bipartisanship approach with the legislative 
branch. Shortly after assuming office, he met with George Forbes, the Council President, to 
persuade him that the OITF partnership agenda was aimed at making Cleveland a better 
place for everyone to live. According to Voinovich (2014), the Council President was 
impressed that the Greater Cleveland Roundtable supported the mayor’s OITF agenda. By 
securing the support of the Roundtable, the OITF tapped into “our United Nations that dealt 
with jobs, economic development, and education, labor, and race relations” because “its 
membership included CEOs, elected officials, religious leaders, union officials, 
neighborhood activists, and the leaders of the African-American, Hispanic, and ethnic 
communities” (Voinovich, 2013).   
Mayor Voinovich (2014) also informed the City Council that his administration would be “a 
new ball game — no patronage contracts; the focus was to do right.”  For example, the 
mayor proposed legislation to increase the salaries of department directors after the OITF 
studies found a dearth of experienced managers at city hall.  Despite Cleveland’s budget of 
half a billion dollars in 1980, the city’s low compensation failed to attract highly trained 
managers (deWindt, 1981).  The council rejected this compensation proposal but later 
approved an OITF recommendation for a wage and salary study. Eventually, the Council 
enacted sixty OITF-related ordinances that focused on operations, management, and 
service delivery (Bryan, 2014).  It is important to note that the mayor excluded tax policy 
and city council operations from the OITF’s scope.  In this way, Mayor Voinovich respected 
the City’s Council’s prerogatives. By doing so, the mayor developed the critical political 
support necessary to synthesize and ultimately to institutionalize the OITF’s 
recommendations.      
  
 
After the OITF studies produced 650 recommendations, Mayor Voinovich required his 
department directors to develop written implementation plans for their units, and he 
evaluated their performance heavily in terms of their progress. The mayor also met weekly 
with the Operating Committee and the Implementation Coordinator, whose sole 
responsibility was to track and facilitate the implementation of OITF recommendations 
(Bryan, 2014).  Once a month, the mayor devoted time at his cabinet meeting for the 
department heads to report to their peers their progress in implementing the OITF 
recommendations in their units. Informally, the mayor conferred “eagle” and “jackass” 
awards to those department heads that made an outstanding or a limited effort, 
respectively, in carrying out the OITF recommendations (Voinovich, 2014).  
  
In 1981, the supervision of the OITF implementation was transferred from Ben Bryan, an 
OITF-funded contract employee, to Tom Wagner, the city’s law director, a successful 
corporate attorney.  As the in-house Implementation Coordinator, Wagner tracked and 
reported on the OITF’s progress. More significantly, Wagner established working 
relationships with each department director and city commissioner, thereby interacting 
with the management personnel of sixty-three operating units.  After serving as the OITF 
Implementation Coordinator for two years, Wagner was appointed the mayor’s chief of 
staff and served another three years with a wider range of responsibilities (Bryan, 2014).   
At its conclusion in March 1982, the OITF leadership delivered the second and final report 
to Mayor Voinovich. The mayor used this report to direct the attention of city employees to 
middle- and long-term strategies for the professional management of Cleveland’s finances 
and service delivery.  In fact, Mayor Voinovich and the OITF Executive Committee identified 
fourteen improvement projects because they had long-term operational and financial 
potential.  Key projects included an enhanced computer-aided dispatch system for the 
police department; a wage and salary administration study; a building maintenance 
system; EEO program assistance; a fire location study; and a payroll system (Bryan, 2014).   
Much has been written about the immediate outcomes of the OITF, so we will only present 
some highlights. By the end of 1981, Cleveland was no longer in default, and the city 
achieved an investment grade for its credit rating; fiscal control was returned to the city 
when the state’s supervisory commission disbanded in June 1987. Overall, 94% of the OITF 
recommendations were implemented that reduced the city workforce by 4% and saved 
$200 million collectively (OITF, 1982). Additionally, the city reorganized ten departments, 
instituted an accounting system with internal auditing capabilities, and achieved savings of 
$57 million annually. The city also set controls on police overtime and adopted a 
computerized communication system to speed up the response time of safety forces, 
streamlined purchasing transactions, instituted a city-wide vehicle control and 
maintenance system, revamped the snow removal process, upgraded data processing 
capabilities, and improved personnel procedures (deWindt, 1981; OITF 1982).  As a result 
of the OITF, the city secured $149 million in Urban Development Action Grants that 
leveraged $770 million in private investments, including projects for neighborhood 
revitalization (Mendel & Brudney, 2012).  
  
 
Beyond achieving operational efficiencies, an important synthesizing feature of the OITF 
was that it fostered professional relationships between the loaned private sector 
executives and their city counterparts.  As deWindt (1981) noted, unlike previous studies, 
the OITF recommendations were integrated into city operations for two reasons.  On the 
one hand, the employees embraced the challenges that the private sector studies 
generated, and, on the other hand, they participated in making the decisions about what to 
change. Consequently, the employees championed the OITF recommendations.  The study 
teams found that most city employees were dedicated, hard-working, and willing to go 
beyond the call of duty, despite laboring under inefficient practices, untrained managers, 
inadequate resources, outdated equipment, and faulty technology. As the OITF leadership 
reported: 
This project has expanded vital channels of communication between the public and private 
sectors.  Without the cooperation of the city’s employees, the progress achieved would not 
have been possible.  In addition, task force members have developed a better 
understanding of the complex problems of municipal government management through 
their work with agency officials (OITF, 1982) 
In other words, business leaders recognized the special problems of governing a large city 
and replaced their initial apprehension to get involved with an eagerness to assist the 
mayor.  In fact, many loaned executives stayed involved with their city counterparts on 
their own time long after the study period ended, and a number of loaned executives joined 
the city’s work force on a temporary or a permanent basis (Bryan, 2014).  Strategically, 
Mayor Voinovich used the expansion of these vital channels of communication between the 
public and private sectors to sustain the partnership. 
Sustaining 
The mayor, in partnership with the City Council, institutionalized the OITF’s governmental 
legacy.  In 1981, the Council placed onto the ballot two OITF-inspired charter amendments. 
One amendment lengthened the terms of the mayor and council members from two to four 
years in addition to strengthening the mayor’s executive powers; the other clarified the 
prevailing wage requirements for city workers.  Both charter changes were approved by 
the voters. In addition, the voters approved an earnings tax earmarked for debt repayment 
and capital improvements (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007).  
To sustain the work of the OITF partnership internally, Mayor Voinovich, assisted by 
Morton Mandel, created Project MOVE — the Mayor’s Operation Volunteer Effort.  In March 
1982, the OITF Coordinator hired a Project MOVE Coordinator to implement two programs. 
One MOVE program drew loaned executives to work under the direction of city officials to 
implement solutions to difficult issues; the other program channeled individual citizens or 
volunteers drawn from local placement agencies to help city officials on a specific issue 
(Garda, n.d.).  Overall, Project MOVE channeled 8,000 volunteer business and community 
leaders into most levels of all city departments. Furthermore, 5,600 volunteers worked 
under the banner of Cleanland Ohio to beautify major corridors throughout the city. Under 
the direction of a small staff, these volunteers planted 9,000 trees and shrubs as well as 
48,000 perennial flowers; they also cleaned up 7,000 tons of trash and debris. 
  
 
Subsequently, the business community took over the responsibility for cleaning and 
maintaining prominent vacant areas through Cleveland’s City Side Gardens and the 
Summer Sprout program for youth (Voinovich, 2013).  
To assist in the recruitment and management of volunteers, Project MOVE staff developed 
two handbooks, one for the supervisors of the volunteers and the other for the volunteers.  
To recognize the contributions of the volunteers, Mayor Voinovich established the Mayor’s 
Award for Volunteerism that was administered by a committee of volunteers and funded 
by American Greetings.  The mayor also designated “a wall of fame” in Cleveland city hall, 
where plaques still hang to honor the MOVE volunteers (Voinovich, 2014).   
Additionally, Mayor Voinovich worked with the Greater Cleveland Roundtable, an early 
supporter of the OITF, to help the city improve race relations. To ameliorate the 
destruction of neighborhoods during the 1960 riots, the mayor worked with Council 
President Forbes for the enactment of fair housing legislation.  After the organization 
representing black police officers won their discrimination case in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the mayor integrated the Cleveland police and fire departments. In addition, he created 
Police Community Relations Boards in each of the six police districts and a Police Review 
Board.  Furthermore, the Voinovich administration set up a minority development center 
that became a national model (Voinovich, 2013).    
The OITF leadership noted that future productivity gains in Cleveland depended on the 
establishment of new fiscal priorities for capital investment and maintenance.  Given the 
constraints of limited tax revenue and limited debt financing, Mayor Voinovich established 
a cooperative relationship with the Greater Cleveland Growth Association. Specifically, he 
adopted the Community Capital Investment Strategy developed by the Growth Association 
to address capital rehabilitation and replacement needs of the city’s bridges, highways, and 
water and waste water systems. This strategy resulted in Build-Up Greater Cleveland that 
generated $1.6 billion to renew the city’s aging infrastructure (Voinovich, 2013).  
Building on the OITF’s recommendations to improve the city’s economic base, George 
Dively, the honorary chairman of the Harris Corporation, established Cleveland Tomorrow.  
Cleveland Tomorrow consisted of CEO’s from forty-four major Cleveland-based 
corporations who raised $850,000 in seed money for two economic development 
programs.  One program coordinated the development of new companies throughout the 
Greater Cleveland region, and the other one assisted budding entrepreneurs in creating 
funded business plans.  Among Cleveland Tomorrow’s accomplishments was that it 
promoted cooperation between labor and management especially in the area of advanced 
manufacturing processes.  Aided by funding from Cleveland Tomorrow, the Voinovich 
Administration established Cleveland Neighborhood Development Corporations (CNDC). 
These CNDCs provided economic development and training programs that touched all the 
groups and regions in the city, and the number of neighborhood nonprofit organizations 
grew from twelve to thirty-five during the Voinovich administration (Voinovich, 2013).  
The presence of these nonprofit organizations in Cleveland’s neighborhoods had a positive 
impact because their efforts improved the residents’ quality of life.  
  
 
Finally, the OITF laid the groundwork for the creation of physical partnerships that 
transformed downtown Cleveland into a destination location. The North Coast Harbor 
partnership raised $10 million to develop land to create a promenade and a park in 
downtown Cleveland; subsequently, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, the Great 
Lakes Science, the Cleveland Aquarium, and other landmark attractions chose to locate at 
this harbor point (ECH, 1997).  Other partnerships developed Playhouse Square, 
redeveloped the east and west banks of the Cuyahoga River, and built upscale hotels 
around Public Square. According to Voinovich (2013), there was more construction during 
his administration than any other time in Cleveland’s history.   
All in all, the implementation of Mayor Voinovich’s public-private partnership vision and 
the sustained effects of the OITF partnership enabled Cleveland to rise from the ashes of 
the municipal default into the “comeback city.” Cleveland received national recognition by 
winning the prestigious All-America City Award from the National Civic League three times 
in the ten years of the Voinovich administration.  On retiring from the Cleveland mayoralty 
in 1989, Voinovich (2013) had a proud moment because USA Today wrote an article about 
him and Council President Forbes “as the short white Republican mayor and the tall 
African-American [Democratic] Council President that worked together to bring about the 
Cleveland Renaissance.”  
It is important to note that the OITF leadership identified four critical areas that required 
ongoing attention by city officials — personnel management; data processing/information 
technology management; management organization; and capital investment and 
maintenance (OITF, 1982).  Three issues — personnel management, data 
processing/technology management, and management organization — resurfaced in 2006 
as the priorities of Mayor Frank Jackson’s Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF).   
The Five Partnership Management Behaviors in the Jackson OETF 
Table 4 provides a summary of the milestone activities that represent Mayor Jackson’s 
management of the OETF.  The first column divides the OETF into four phases: (1) the 
formation of the OETF partnership concept (2006); (2) the development of the OETF 
partnership (2006); (3) OETF operations (2006-2008); and (4) the follow-up activities 
(2008-2014).   
   <<<Table 4 about here>>> 
Activation 
Pundits described Frank Jackson’s character as “honest” and “contemplative,” a self-
effacing politician without “ego or ambition” (Roberts, 2012, 11).  His council colleagues 
perceived him as a man of high integrity, an exceptionally good listener, and an excellent 
reader of people (Westbrook, 2014). Given three decades of service at city hall, Jackson 
developed extensive technical knowledge of Cleveland’s operations that he combined with 
political savvy and common sense. Throughout his public service career, Jackson skillfully 
mobilized broad-based, bipartisan coalitions to work with him to do what he felt was right 
and necessary (Trickey, 2013).   
  
 
Despite his successful career, Jackson, a stalwart Clevelander, retained in his boyhood 
home located in the Central neighborhood, one of the city’s poorest sections. He said that 
after he made a decision, he remained steadfast and consistent as he followed through with 
it. He described himself as a “servant-leader” with a social equity mission to make a 
difference in the lives of citizens, especially “for those among us who have the least.”  In his 
view, government was different from the private sector. Although government, he said, 
benefitted by applying business-oriented efficiency practices in its operations, its bottom 
line was quality service to people, not returning profits to stockholders (Jackson, 2014).  
Council President Frank Jackson made history in November 2005 because he was the first 
sitting council member elected mayor since 1867 (Roberts, 2012).  After thirteen years on 
the City Council, Jackson’s legislative peers elected him the president in 2002, and he took 
charge of the Finance Committee. His cooperative relations with Mayor Jane Campbell 
deteriorated in 2004 when she failed to keep the Council informed about the city’s 
operating deficit and her plans for layoffs and an income tax levy. Jackson felt compelled to 
run for mayor because, as the chair of the Council’s Finance Committee, he clearly 
understood Cleveland’s fiscal problems and knew what had to be done (Jackson, 2014).  
Consequently, Mayor Jackson had first-hand knowledge of the city and its finances when he 
assumed his new office. At that time, Cleveland’s population was 406,427, and the U.S. 
Census Bureau identified Cleveland as the nation’s poorest (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan, 
2008).  Despite losing approximately one-third of its 1980 population, Cleveland’s service 
delivery infrastructure had changed little since then.  Moreover, few Fortune 500 
companies remained headquartered in the city, Cleveland’s steel mills were closed, and 
local manufacturing companies were struggling. City operations were inefficient because 
few administrative processes were automated.  Also, city employees lacked up-to-date 
hardware, software, and basic computer training. Labor relations at the city were tense 
because of the layoffs done under the Campbell administration, and the staff downsizing 
disrupted service delivery. Given these losses and the widespread inefficiency in city 
operations, budget shortfalls were inevitable. Jackson decided that the only way to end the 
recurring fiscal emergencies was for him as the mayor to provide the leadership for 
rightsizing Cleveland’s government while maintaining quality essential city services 
(Jackson, 2014).    
In 2006, newly elected Mayor Jackson inherited a deficit of $30 million from his 
predecessor. However, Jackson refused to sell city assets or use one-time revenues to 
balance the city’s budget.  Instead, his plan was to do what was necessary for him to 
achieve a structurally balanced budget (Jackson, 2014). Based on a suggestion from COO 
Darnell Brown (2014), Jackson embraced the analytical approach of operations efficiency 
as the means by which he could eliminate the city’s recurring budget shortfalls and restore 
its financial stability. For Jackson, good government meant efficient government, and 
efficient government, in turn, was one that created a positive future for Cleveland citizens, 
businesses and visitors (Jackson, 2009). Thus, operations efficiency gave the mayor a 
platform from which to launch his vision to make Cleveland a great city again. Within a 
month of taking office, Jackson activated the Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF) to 
  
 
create the model for how good government operated and develop the road map for 
Cleveland to become a “City of Choice” (OETF, 2006, 9).    
Before carrying out the OETF partnership, Mayor Jackson consulted with Tom Wagner, the 
second OITF Implementation Coordinator under Mayor Voinovich; meanwhile, COO Brown 
consulted with the Atlanta officials responsible for implementing Mayor Franklin’s more 
recent public-private partnership.  In the end, Mayor Jackson chose not to adopt a cookie-
cutter approach to activate the OETF because Cleveland’s environment had changed 
substantially from the time of Mayor Voinovich and was very different from that of Atlanta. 
Consequently, he formed the OETF partnership as a broad-based coalition, drawing 
members from government, business, academia, nonprofit organizations, neighborhood 
groups, law firms, and former cabinet officials (OETF, 2006). In effect, the mayor structured 
the OETF partnership to fit Cleveland as he found the city in 2006. Moreover, he was firm 
that the OETF’s business-analytical approach would be driven by government and public 
sector values (Jackson, 2014).  
The structure of the Jackson public-private partnership was flatter and more diverse in its 
membership than that of the OITF.  At the top of the OETF Partnership was Mayor Jackson 
as the sponsoring executive who empowered the Operations Efficiency Council (see Table 
5). The Operations Efficiency Council provided strategic direction to the partnership’s work 
teams in addition to serving as the oversight body. The council’s chair was COO Brown. 
Besides him, seven volunteers (including the two senior authors), the chief technology 
officer, and three mayoral assistants served on the Operations Efficiency Council.  These 
volunteers were prominent community and business leaders, information technology 
experts, as well as leadership development faculty and staff from Cleveland State 
University’s Levin College of Urban Affairs. It is important to note that an active member of 
the Operations Efficiency Council was Jay Westbrook, a highly respected councilman and 
former council president. The Westbrook appointment insured that the city council had 
significant input into the OETF process and up-to-date knowledge of Cleveland’s financial 
condition. This financial transparency led to the City Council’s willingness not only to 
support the OETF initiative but also to serve as the mayor’s strategic ally (Westbrook 2014; 
Sweeney, 2014).    
  <<< Table 5 about here>>> 
Similarly, the city’s labor unions became the strategic allies of the mayor. In March 2006, 
Mayor Jackson and COO Brown briefed the union leadership about the mayor’s OETF plans. 
After sharing the realities of the city’s fiscal condition and the bleak financial forecasts, the 
mayor discussed how operations efficiency gave him the means to address the city’s urgent 
situation. In particular, he communicated his intent to have city employees apply the 
analytical methods of operations efficiency to provide better service to residents with less 
money and greater integration of technology into administrative processes. In a bold move, 
the mayor asked the labor leaders for temporary contract concessions so that he could 
balance the city’s budget without disrupting service to citizens. Furthermore, Mayor 
Jackson pledged that if the unions made concessions to help him achieve a budget in 
structural balance, then he would maintain the city’s employment levels and not lay off 
  
 
staff. All but one union leader agreed, and the roll backs in the labor contracts saved the 
city $30 million (Jackson, 2014).  Mayor Jackson succeeded in gaining labor’s cooperation 
because the union leaders knew him and believed in his integrity.  
As shown in Table 5, the OETF partnership had a Communications Advisory Team whose 
membership included public relations professionals from business, government, and the 
media as well as mayoral assistants and the city’s press secretary. This team was 
responsible for keeping stakeholders and the general public informed about the work of 
the OETF.   
Mobilization 
Although Mayor Jackson was the executive sponsor of the OETF, the overall partnership 
champion was COO Brown. Under COO Brown’s leadership, the Operations Efficiency 
Council recruited approximately 400 volunteers from the Greater Cleveland Partnership 
(the regional business chamber) and its affiliate, the Cleveland Leadership Center. 
Volunteers were also the alumni of the MPA Program and the Leadership Academy of 
Cleveland State University’s Urban College. This recruitment effort yielded subject-matter 
experts including public administrators, small business owners, neighborhood leaders, 
community activists, retired attorneys and corporate executives, former city employees, as 
well as interested citizens. The volunteers participated on twenty-four Action Teams, and 
they contributed more than 12,000 hours of service worth approximately $1.7 million in 
expertise (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan, 2008).   
Furthermore, the Greater Cleveland Partnership funded loaned executives who assessed 
the city’s fleet of motor vehicles.  Whereas the OITF leadership raised approximately $1 
million to fund and execute Mayor Voinovich’s public-private partnership, Mayor Jackson’s 
partnership existed entirely on the donated time and in-kind services of the OETF 
volunteers. 
The OETF process leader was Michele Whitlow, an employee with the Cleveland Water 
division, who had a mobility assignment to head the OETF Project Management Office 
(PMO). A small team of city employees and interns staffed the PMO (see Table 5).  The PMO 
staff standardized formats for the Action Teams to gather, analyze and share critical 
information; developed the templates for tracking performance measures; and provided 
technical assistance during the implementation of the OETF recommendations. The PMO 
staff also had the daily oversight of the Action Teams and reported monthly to the 
Operations Efficiency Council.  
Finally, the OETF leadership reached out to inner-ring suburban mayors. Three mayors, all 
of whom had chaired the Cuyahoga Mayors and Managers Association, participated in a 
focus group.  Republican Mayor Bruce Akers of Pepper Pike, Republican Mayor Deborah 
Sutherland of Bay Village, and Democratic Mayor Martin Zanotti of Parma Heights offered 
suggestions to increase operational efficiencies with a special emphasis on inter-local 
service agreements. They also encouraged Mayor Jackson to participate in the development 
of regional strategies for job creation and retention and for marketing the city’s image (and 
brand) (OETF, 2006).  During the Jackson administration, Cleveland joined the Northeast 
  
 
Ohio City Council Association (NOCCA).  Additionally, the mayor supported a “no poaching” 
economic development strategy, whereby municipal officials agreed not to lure businesses 
to relocate from one Greater Cleveland location to another (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan, 
2008).    
Framing 
In April 2006, the mayor held his first meeting with all OETF participants, where he 
unveiled the OETF Partnership’s charter (see Figure 1). This charter established the OETF 
partnership’s urgent purpose and its overarching goals, and it was signed by each member 
of the Operations Efficiency Council.  Additionally, the charter expressed the OETF’s 
guiding principles that included Mayor Jackson’s commitments to value the expertise of 
employees, provide them with opportunities for retraining, and enable them to share their 
learning. The charter also clarified the structure of the OETF partnership in addition to the 
roles and responsibilities of the participants. Thirteen critical success factors were cited in 
the charter, including the elimination of service gaps across city departments, the use of 
innovative solutions in service delivery, and the utilization of technology to enhance data 
collection and guide decision making. Thus, the OETF charter framed the mayor’s plans to 
foster a citywide culture of excellent performance and customer service.      
   <<< Insert Figure 1 here >>> 
To reinforce his commitment to the OETF principles, Mayor Jackson held meetings with 
city employees and stakeholders, including the unions, to reiterate the purpose of good 
government and efficient service delivery, to share information about the city’s financial 
condition and revenue projections, and to recommit to his pledge to maintain employment.  
The mayor continued these annual meetings to renew the employees’ confidence in the 
usefulness of operations efficiency and to maintain morale during the OETF-driven change 
process.   
Also, as a part of the framing process, Mayor Jackson informed his directors that he 
expected them to live within their budgets. Accordingly, Mayor Jackson ended the practice 
of padding one department’s budget to pay for cost overruns generated in another 
department. He also informed his directors that the cost savings generated by their 
departments and divisions would be redistributed to those city operations where they 
would produce the greatest efficiencies, customer service improvements, and productivity 
(Jackson, 2014).   
The OETF Partnership operated from April 2006 through December 2008, but 
implementation of the OETF recommendations continued through 2010. The OETF Chair 
and the PMO staff divided the work of the partnership into two phases: eight Action Teams 
operated in Phase 1 (2006-2007) and sixteen action teams operated in Phase 2 (2007-
2008).     
Phase 1 teams focused on four departments — Public Health, Building and Housing, Public 
Service, and Parks, Recreation and Properties — and on the following citywide services: IT 
service delivery, human resources, procurement and purchasing, and citywide customer 
  
 
services.  Concurrently, the Department of Public Safety conducted an internal assessment 
and identified fifty improvement opportunities for implementation. Phase 1 Action Teams 
reported their findings to the Operations Efficiency Council in October 2006, and the 
implementation of their recommendations took place mostly in 2007.     
Phase 2 of the OETF incorporated the remaining city departments, with sixteen Action 
Teams focusing on Aging, City Planning, the Civil Service Commission, Community 
Development, Consumer Affairs, Economic Development, Port Control and Public Utilities, 
Cleveland Public Power (formerly Muny Light), Water and Water Pollution Control.  
Another four Action Teams focused on the general support functions provided by the 
Departments of Finance and Law, as well as the Mayor’s Offices of Communications and 
Equal Opportunity (OETF, 2007).  Phase 2 Action Teams reported their findings to the 
Operations Efficiency Council in December 2007 and the implementation of their 
recommendations took place mostly in 2008.  Taken as a group, the OETF Action Teams 
covered all aspects of city operations.  
Each Action Team was co-chaired by a department director and a volunteer expert (called 
the external lead).  The PMO oriented the Action Team members, gave them an OETF 
handbook, and briefed them on the methodology of operations efficiency. The Action 
Teams were given the following four objectives: (1) to reduce operating costs by at least 
3%; (2) to enhance city services by using performance indicators and targets; (3) to 
increase employee productivity through better use of technology; and (4) improve 
customer service to internal and external customers (OETF, 2006 & 2007). The mayor and 
the Operations Efficiency Council met with the Action Teams at the beginning of their year-
long terms to frame their work (and at the end to recognize their successes).  
To build the capacity of the Action Team members, the PMO organized several training 
programs at the beginning of each OETF phase. Technical training on the PMO’s operations 
efficiency methods was delivered jointly by the Chief Technology Officer, Dr. Melodie 
Mayberry-Stewart, and the PMO Manager Michele Whitlow. All team members, including 
the volunteers, received training in performance measurement and customer service 
applications delivered by two members of the Operations Efficiency Council from the Levin 
College of Urban Affairs. These training and development activities were essential to the 
success of the OETF partnership because they fostered camaraderie among the city 
employees who worked in different departments and good will between the city employees 
and the outside experts. 
Subsequently, the Action Teams applied the PMO’s performance methodology by assessing 
the current or “as is,” work process for their assigned department or citywide service.  
After mapping these work processes, the teams proposed recommendations that contained 
performance targets and customer service standards designed to achieve the four OETF 
objectives.  In addition, the loaned executives from the Greater Cleveland Partnership 
assessed the city’s motor vehicle pool and recommended a fleet reduction of 25%.  
Collectively, the Action Teams produced 394 recommendations for improving more than 
100 city processes operations from the inside out (OETF, 2007).     
  
 
In effect, the framing behaviors gave meaning to the partnership’s urgent purpose and 
guiding principles as specified in the OETF charter. Given their common training 
experience, city employees felt comfortable in opening their units up to the outsiders on 
their Action Teams, and they willingly used the operations as learning opportunities. 
Feedback from city employees revealed how much they gained from the perspective and 
expertise of the volunteers; the volunteers reported that they had developed a “newfound 
respect” for the professionalism and competence of city employees (OETF, 2007). Based on 
their success in producing workable improvement recommendations, city employees 
developed an identity as learning-oriented change agents. In fact, they became the internal 
champions of operations efficiency. Because these OETF employee-participants were 
scattered throughout Cleveland’s departments and divisions, they informally facilitated a 
shift in the city’s work culture. This shift to a citywide culture of excellent performance and 
customer service occurred without an incident because it was driven by a bottom-up, 
employee-centered approach.  
Synthesizing 
Mayor Jackson delegated the supervision of the OETF Action Teams to COO Brown as the 
chair of the Operations Efficiency Council. The mayor monitored his department heads only 
if they were not meeting their OETF expectations; then, he would forcefully “get into their 
business,” demanding to know when and how they would change their lackluster 
performance (Jackson, 2014).  In fact, the mayor removed one intransigent division head 
that blocked the implementation of the OETF recommendations at the city. In effect, he 
made it clear that the implementation of the OETF recommendations was a priority, and he 
was serious about seeing results (Jackson, 2014).  
In assessing the OETF partnership in 2014, Mayor Jackson attributed the smooth 
implementation of the OETF recommendations to COO Brown and his PMO team.  
Specifically, they combined data-driven decision making and management by walking 
around. The PMO staff developed performance dashboards built on the performance 
targets identified in the OETF recommendations. The PMO staff collected and tracked these 
data and reported progress to the Action Teams. Additionally, the COO and the PMO staff 
met with the Action Teams, including the community volunteers and line employees, in the 
city’s departments and divisions. This practice gave line employees an opportunity to 
engage with the COO about their operational needs and aspirations.  Interestingly, this 
practice was replicated by some department directors that opened up opportunities for 
their employees to contribute ideas for operations efficiency and improved customer 
service (Westbrook, 2014).  Furthermore, a “city of choice” hotline and an email address 
were set up as other channels of safe communication between line employees and the city’s 
top leadership. This propensity for openness among the highest city officials reinforced the 
validity of Mayor Jackson’s employee-centered approach to operations efficiency.  
The OETF leadership also extended this propensity for transparent government to the 
general public.  During Phase 1, Chief Brown, the city’s communication director, and Dr. 
Vogelsang-Coombs of the Operations Efficiency Council met with the Editorial Board 
members of the Cleveland Plain Dealer to brief them about the OETF partnership and report 
  
 
on the early accomplishments of the Action Teams.  At the end of Phase 2, the OETF 
Communications Team published the 2008 Mayor’s Annual Report to the Citizens of 
Cleveland that highlighted improved performance stemming from the OETF Partnership, 
and the city has continued publishing an annual performance report since then.  
The OETF partnership concluded in 2010 because the city had implemented 94% of the 
OETF recommendations. Collectively, the Action Teams saved $71 million between 2006 
and 2009.  Given the substantial savings produced by the OETF process, the mayor 
balanced the city’s budget in every year of his first term (2006-2010), including 2008 and 
2009 during the Great Recession, all without disruptive staff layoffs and with better service.    
  
Besides achieving significant cost savings, the OETF partnership improved the quality of 
life for citizens, including more timely snow removal, street repair, and waste collection, 
and more frequent sweeping of residential streets.  The city also instituted a recycling 
program.  The Departments of Parks & Recreation and Public Service (which were 
successfully merged) collaborated to clean more than 30,000 lots in one year, and 
neighborhood residents reported feeling much safer (OETF, 2007).  With no new additional 
resources, the city reopened its neighborhood-based recreation centers on Saturdays and 
added a new recreation center.   
The OETF partnership facilitated opportunities for employees to develop a citywide 
perspective. For example, feedback from the Action Teams in Phase 1 led to the 
establishment of the city’s Strategic Information Technology Council.  This council had the 
oversight of the deployment and utilization of IT systems across the departments to insure 
the city’s technology aligned with the OETF’s strategic goals.  As a result, the city adopted 
web-enabled interactive portals for citizen access, established a system of e-permitting, 
and provided field personnel with handheld computers with direct access to their 
operational systems.  In 2008, the city launched a “3-1-1” communication system that 
allowed residents to report and receive faster service in non-emergency situations.    
In addition, the city established two noteworthy cross-departmental initiatives to serve 
older and younger residents. On the one hand, the Senior Initiative involved the 
Departments of Aging, Building & Housing, Consumer Affairs, Community Development, 
Public Health, and Law. This initiative provided funding and technical assistance to help 
older residents (persons aged 60 and over) upgrade their homes to meet housing codes.  
On the other hand, the youth initiative, called “One Voice, Zero Tolerance,” involved the 
Mayor’s Office, Community Relations, Health, and Parks, Recreation, & Properties. This 
initiative developed a package of education, prevention, intervention, and workforce 
training services to serve the young people of Cleveland.  Both initiatives were still working 
in 2014.  
City officials also worked with their state and county counterparts to advance the mayor’s 
social equity agenda.  One intergovernmental initiative coordinated services for the reentry 
of men who were returning to Cleveland from prison. The city received state funding to 
convert previously unused property into temporary housing where reentry residents 
  
 
received job training and mental health services. Another initiative provided Permanent 
Supportive Housing as an alternative to homeless shelters. Thus, by 2009, the city had 
more than 350 permanent housing units to help reentry residents live stable and 
productive lives (Jackson, 2009).  The city’s actions were significant because they 
substantially reduced the recidivism of former prisoners.  
Finally, the OETF process extended the cooperation between the city of Cleveland and 
suburban jurisdictions.  As a result of some OETF recommendations, the city established 
agreements with contiguous jurisdictions related to overlapping functions, such as snow 
removal and street repair. The mayor also worked with the Cuyahoga County Mayors and 
Managers Association to develop joint economic agreements tied to Cleveland water 
service, in which participating cities shared taxes from relocating industries (Jackson, 
2009). 
Sustaining 
Although Cleveland business leaders were nervous when Mayor Jackson was elected in 
2006, he captured their support due to his implementation of operations efficiency 
(Trickey, 2013).  While the OETF was operating, the mayor decided to deposit $100 million 
in local banks that did their best business in Cleveland.  Also, the mayor and city council 
crafted a zoning compromise that kept alive a redevelopment project of $230 million on the 
East Bank of the Cuyahoga River (Vogelsang-Coombs & Denihan, 2008).  Moreover, the 
OETF results gave the business community confidence in Mayor Jackson’s stewardship of 
Cleveland. In particular, business leaders were impressed that Jackson’s fiscal discipline 
and the OETF cost savings and productivity improvements enabled Cleveland to survive 
the Great Recession better than many other cities in the nation (Trickey, 2013).    
Mayor Jackson — who was reelected in 2009 and 2013 — used the respect he earned from 
the business community to work with the Greater Cleveland Partnership (GCP) on his 
visionary “Cleveland Plan” to transform the city’s underperforming and insolvent school 
district (GCP, 2014).  This Plan integrated the city’s network of charter schools into the 
municipal school district so that Cleveland families living in neighborhoods with 
underachieving public school could have high-quality options available for their children’s 
education.  The Cleveland Plan also established greater accountability standards for 
evaluating and compensating teachers and principals, and empowered the mayoral-
appointed Board of Education to close failing schools.  Then, in 2012, Mayor Jackson 
mobilized prominent business leaders, the teachers’ unions, teachers, parents, as well as 
key state and county officials in a bipartisan coalition that gained the approval of the 
Cleveland Plan from the Ohio Governor and the General Assembly’s leadership. By securing 
state legislation, the Mayor insured the sustainability of the Cleveland Plan (O’Donnell & 
Guillen, 2012). Subsequently, Mayor Jackson led the campaign built on public-private 
cooperation that persuaded the city’s voters to accept a 15-mill levy to underwrite the 
Cleveland Plan (GCP, 2014). With 57% of the votes cast, Clevelanders approved operating 
funds for the municipal school district for the first time in more than twenty-five years 
(SOS, 2012; Trickey, 2013). 
  
 
To sustain the OETF improvements internally, the city invested in CitiStat, a data-driven 
work management system that was developed in Baltimore.  In 2011, the PMO staff (who 
had returned to their home units) converted the OETF performance data into the CitiStat 
system, thereby creating a citywide performance dashboard. By merging the CitiStat and 
the “3-1-1” systems, employees had up-to-date data on their response time to citizen 
complaints, while department directors gained information about under-served areas of 
the city. The general public had access to these performance data because the city 
published the citywide performance dashboard in the mayor’s annual report to the 
citizenry (Whitlow, 2014). The mayor also used CitiStat data to appraise the annual 
performance of his directors (Jackson, 2014).   
As a result of the OETF, the city made staff training and development priorities in order to 
sustain the OETF efficiency and productivity gains.  Cross-functional training, mobility 
assignments, and internships were used to develop in-house talent and helped establish 
career paths for city employees. In a partnership with the Levin College’s Center for 
Leadership Development and the Cleveland Foundation, the city established the Cleveland 
Management Academy (CMA) in 2009 (Starzyk, 2009).  Fifty-nine employees graduated 
from the year-long management development program that was aligned with the OETF 
objectives. [Endnote 2] Mayor Jackson (2014) reported that he promoted eight CMA 
graduates into positions of department directors and city commissioners (without knowing 
they were CMA alumni) because they were the best candidates. Thus, the OETF facilitated 
the creation of a citywide cadre of emerging leaders who successfully competed for upper-
level leadership positions.   
Finally, Cleveland received national attention for its success in implementing the “new 
urban renewal” (Hyra, 2012). Using the OETF’s culture of collaboration and performance, 
Mayor Jackson developed a sub-cabinet cluster to focus on the economic development of 
the city’s neighborhoods. Working with the private sector, this development cluster 
generated the extensive renewal of the city’s neighborhoods in addition to transforming 
the city’s aging downtown into a thriving residential district. Cleveland also experienced a 
“brain gain,” as young professionals made Cleveland their “city of choice.” Trickey (2013) 
attributed these transformational effects to Mayor Jackson’s leadership: 
A mayor from Cleveland’s poorest neighborhoods is presiding over a downtown population 
boom, and a surge of vitality attracting young professionals to the city’s near West Side. 
Jackson helped those changes along with reliable services, a rejuvenated economic 
development department, strategic spending at key moments, and the more tangible 
aspects of his sustainability effort, from bike lanes to support of the local food movement. 
Additional evidence that Cleveland was a city of choice as envisioned by Mayor Jackson 
occurred in 2014.  Besides hosting the international Gay Games, Cleveland was chosen in a 
highly competitive selection process as the venue for the Republican Party’s 2016 
presidential nominating convention. The transformation of Cleveland into a city of choice 
would not have occurred without the results of Mayor Jackson’s operation efficiency 
partnership that were reinforced by his vision of good government and his philosophy of 
servant-leadership.  
  
 
Lessons Learned 
Newly elected Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson took considerable risks in using the 
OITF and the OETF partnerships to study city operations.  Both public-private partnerships, 
though structured very differently, produced significant improvement recommendations 
that transformed Cleveland first in the 1980s and again in the 2000s.  This section presents 
the lessons learned based on the similarities and the differences of the OITF and the OETF.  
Eight similarities were evident. First, both mayors took office during challenging economic 
times that lent a sense of urgency for them to change the way Cleveland’s government 
operated.  Second, both mayors established their public-private partnerships to facilitate 
changes in accordance with their vision of how good government should operate in 
Cleveland.  Relatedly, Mayors Voinovich and Jackson made serious commitments to the 
people in their partnerships, and they stood firm in implementing the significant changes 
that emerged from them. Third, both mayoral-led partnerships used technical training and 
technology enhancements to enable their study teams to engage in data-driven decision 
making. Fourth, Mayors Voinovich and Jackson built the trust of city employees in 
operations efficiency by involving them in analyzing their own work processes and in 
participating in the change efforts. Fifth, both public-private partnerships changed the 
city’s work culture. The Voinovich administration facilitated a transition from patronage 
operations to a professional management culture; the Jackson administration facilitated a 
transition from complacent operations to a performance culture of customer service.  Sixth, 
Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson established cooperative relations with the City 
Council, thereby securing legislation to sustain the operational changes that emerged out of 
their partnerships. Seventh, both partnerships were successful because the 
implementation coordinators gathered data to kept track of progress and held employees 
accountable to meet the partnership objectives. Finally, the volunteers who participated in 
both mayoral-led partnerships had positive experiences, and city employees impressed 
them with their dedication and professionalism.      
There were four significant differences in the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships.  
First, Mayor Voinovich’s partnership used a top-down, corporate structure developed by 
Cleveland-based CEOs; these CEOs, in turn, generated approximately $1 million in private 
funding and mobilized high-level business executives on a short-term basis. Mayor 
Jackson’s partnership used a bottom-up, employee-centered approach driven by public 
sector values, and it operated without external funding; his partnership recruited a diverse 
group of volunteers who stayed engaged with city employees for one year or longer as the 
latter implemented the OETF recommendations. Second, the mayors faced different labor 
climates. During Mayor Voinovich’s time, the unions were small and active sponsors of his 
OITF public-private partnership.  In contrast, Mayor Jackson inherited a tense labor-
relations climate from his predecessor, but he secured the cooperation of the city’s unions 
by inviting them to the OETF table at the outset and by keeping his commitments to them. 
Third, Mayor Voinovich’s partnership utilized training primarily in the OITF’s study phase, 
while Mayor Jackson’s partnership provided multiple training opportunities to frame, 
synthesize, and sustain to the work of the OETF.  The OETF’s emphasis on training and 
development led to the establishment of an internal management academy that fostered an 
effective leadership succession process at the city.  Finally, while both mayors “put the NP” 
  
 
(i.e., nonprofits) into their public-private partnerships, they utilized nonprofit 
organizations differently. In particular, Mayor Voinovich made extensive use of volunteers 
and nonprofit organizations to extend the OITF improvements internally, revitalize 
Cleveland’s neighborhoods, and anchor the city’s economic development in the Greater 
Cleveland community.  In contrast, Mayor Jackson’s partnership engaged nonprofit 
organizations during all phases of the OETF, and then mobilized coalitions including 
nonprofit leaders to advance his social equity agenda, meet the needs of vulnerable 
populations, and reinvent K-12 public education in Cleveland.  
The last lesson shared by both mayors was that the implementation of another operations 
efficiency partnership would benefit the city of Cleveland.  In Mayor Voinovich’s view 
(2014), people get stale after six years because their “good habits disappear.”  By renewing 
a public-private partnership every six years, Cleveland, he said, can take advantage of 
innovations in the technology field so that employees can find new ways to operate 
efficiently. In addition, he recommended that Cleveland train city employees in Lean Six 
Sigma approaches that use statistical tools and quality management techniques for process 
improvements.  In this way, city employees can apply the latest and best business 
approaches to implement sustainable operational changes (Voinovich, 2014).    
According to Mayor Jackson, the city would benefit from another round of operations 
efficiency by extending the OETF’s culture of excellent performance and customer service.  
In his view, another partnership would keep people from “going back to their old ways” 
because “someone was watching” (Jackson, 2014).  He also said that he would use his next 
public-private partnership to incorporate up-to-date performance measures that merged 
the timeliness and the quality of city services into day-to-day operations. His goal would be 
to move the city from its current complaint-based operations emphasizing the response 
times of city workers to a technology enabled, data-driven, work management system 
emphasizing quality performance from the perspective of Cleveland’s residents.      
In conclusion, this paper provided an inside view of the public-private partnerships led by 
Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson in the legacy city of Cleveland.  This study revealed 
that no algorithm existed in the design of a mayoral-led public private partnership, even in 
the same city.  The empirical analysis showed that each mayor structured his public-private 
partnership to address the environmental conditions that Cleveland faced when he 
assumed office and to fit his particular leadership style.   
If no single partnership model can address the needs of one city at different points in time, 
then a mayor interested in using a public-private partnership should pay close attention to:  
(1) who is invited to participate; (2) how to arrange the volunteer-participants; (3) how to 
foster strategic alliances with the city council, labor representatives, the business 
community, neighborhood development corporations, and the leaders of nonprofit 
organizations; (4) how to integrate training and development to instill a learning 
orientation among the participants; and (5) how well employees are empowered to shape, 
implement, and own the results. Finally, a mayor must focus on the management of public-
private partnerships.  In fact, the five partnership management behaviors — activating, 
mobilizing, framing, synthesizing, and sustaining —  used as the backdrop in the empirical 
  
 
analysis of the OITF and OETF can serve as guidelines for any mayor interested in leading a 
public-private partnership in the future.     
In summary, this paper documented how Mayors Voinovich and Jackson used their public-
private partnerships to restore good government in Cleveland in the wake of serious 
financial crises. Both Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson concluded that public-private 
partnerships are not just for newly elected mayors. The dynamic environment of a legacy 
city makes a mayoral-led public-private partnership indispensable to the successful 
management of urban change in twenty-first century America.  
Endnotes 
1.  Mayor Voinovich modeled the Cleveland Operations Improvement Task Force on the 
successful public-private partnership that Governor Ronald Reagan implemented in 
California with the assistance of Warren King and Associates (Voinovich, 2013). 
2.  Each CMA participant was part of a team that engaged in an improvement project 
approved by city supervisors. For example, one project team stabilized a Cleveland 
neighborhood by using “Defensible Space” methods to restructure street traffic patterns, 
increase neighborhood awareness, and organize a neighborhood clean-up.  Another project 
team consolidated information about city services and amenities in a handbook available to 
Cleveland residents in hard copy or electronically. A third project team preserved the 
institutional knowledge of Cleveland employees by codifying protocols, processes, and 
procedures within and between organizational units. Collectively, the projects 
implemented in the first CMA class (October 2009-2010) saved the city $355,000 in 
consultant fees. Moreover, twenty-three participants (or 76%) opted to continue their 
education by enrolling in the academic programs of CSU’s Levin College of Urban Affairs 
(Tyler, 2014).  
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Table 1 - OITF Implementation Phases by Partnership Management Behaviors  
Table 4 - OETF Implementation Phases by Partnership Management Behaviors 
 
OITF 
Phases/ 
Manageme
nt 
Behaviors 
Activating Mobilizing Framing Synthesizing 
OITF 
Partnership 
Concept 
 Formation 
(1979-
1980) 
*GV PPP premise 
*Urgency - Default 
*GV recruited by 
business 
community 
*Business support 
for PPP premise & 
OITF 
*GV elected mayor 
*PPP Overall Champion -
GV 
*PPP External Champion 
- deWindt 
*Cleveland Foundation 
Challenge Grant of 
$150,000 
*Gund Foundation 
Challenge Grant of 
$100,000 
*OITF Goal 
*Exec. Committee 
policy objectives 
*GV elimination of 
patronage 
 
*Support of 
Greater Cleveland 
Roundtable 
*Support of City 
Council 
OITF 
Partnership 
Developme
nt 
(1980-
*deWindt, Eaton 
Corp. Chair & CEO 
*OITF Executive 
Committee 
*Ways & Means 
*deWindt & Mandel 
raised $544,000 from 
264 sponsors 
* PPP Process Leaders: 
Warren King & 
* Ways & Means  
set time frames & 
formats 
*GV memo to 
directors & 
*GV required dept. 
heads to write  
OITF  plans  
*GV met weekly 
with OITF funded 
  
 
OITF 
Phases/ 
Manageme
nt 
Behaviors 
Activating Mobilizing Framing Synthesizing 
1981) Committee Associates & 
Government Services 
Institute 
*Ernst & Whinney  
commissioners 
 
staff 
OITF 
Partnership 
Operations 
(1980-
1982) 
*Centralized & 
top-down 
governance 
structure 
*Operating 
Committee 
 
 
*Financial Audit Task 
Force 
*89 loaned executives 
for 12 weeks 
* Four OITF study teams  
*Objectives: to 
reduce expenses 
by 5-10% & find 
productivity 
improvements 
*Study teams 
produced 650 
recommendations 
*Hiring of full-
time OITF 
Coordinator 
*Directors 
evaluated on OITF 
progress 
*Saved $200 
Million 
*Workforce 
reduced 10% 
*Default ended 
*Council passed 
60 OITF 
ordinances 
OITF 
Partnership 
Follow-up 
(1982-
1989) 
Project MOVE; 
Mandel & other 
business leaders 
recruited 
volunteers & 
raised funds 
*OITF supervision 
transferred to Law 
Director; 
*Project MOVE 
Implementation 
Coordinator hired 
*Culture shift 
from patronage to 
professional 
management 
*14 additional 
study teams 
formed 
*Original loaned 
executives stayed 
involved 
OETF 
Phases/ 
Managemen
t Behaviors 
Activating Mobilizing Framing Synthesizing 
 
OETF 
Partnership 
Concept 
Formation’ 
(2006) 
*FJ became mayor 
*Operations 
efficiency as good 
govt model 
*FJ Social equity 
mission 
*Budget deficit 
*Executive Sponsor- FJ 
*PPP Champion -COO 
Brown 
*Suburban mayors 
 
*OETF Charter 
*Mayor’s annual 
budget meeting 
with employees 
*Fiscal discipline 
required of dept. 
heads 
*Plain Dealer 
briefing *Mayor’s 
Annual Report to 
Citizens 
OETF 
Partnership 
*OEC Council 
*OETF 
*Volunteer Recruitment: 
-Greater Cleveland 
*PMO 
Methodology 
*OETF 
Performance 
  
 
OITF 
Phases/ 
Manageme
nt 
Behaviors 
Activating Mobilizing Framing Synthesizing 
Developme
nt 
 (2006-
2007) 
Communication 
Team 
*City Council as 
ally 
*Union 
cooperation 
Partnership 
-Cleveland Leadership 
Center 
-CSU Levin College 
*Process Leader: 
Whitlow 
* Technical 
Training 
*Customer Service 
& Performance 
Measurement 
Training -
Cleveland 
Foundation 
*City employees 
as internal 
champions 
Dashboards  
*COO 
Management by 
walking around 
*City of Choice 
hotline & email for 
employee input 
 
OETF 
Operations 
(2007-
2009) 
*Public sector 
driven 
*Bottom-up, 
employee- 
centered structure 
*400 volunteers - 
donated time 
*24 Action Teams 
 
*Phase 1 - 8 teams 
*Phase 2 - 16 
teams 
*Work Process 
Mapping 
*394 
Recommendations 
*94% 
implemented 
*Saved $71 
million 
*Balanced budget 
*Strategic IT 
Council  
* Q-O-L for 
citizens 
*3-1-1 System 
*Social equity 
initiatives 
OETF 
Partnership 
Follow-up 
2008-2014 
 
 
*CNDCs 
revitalized 
neighborhoods; 
thriving 
downtown 
residential district 
 
*Regional economic 
development strategy 
*Participation in NOCCA 
*Shift to a 
Performance 
Culture of 
Customer Service 
*Transparent 
Government 
*Citywide 
perspective  
*Inter-local 
agreements 
*Regional 
cooperation 
 
 
Table 2 - OITF Structure (OETF 1980, 1982) 
  
 
Executive Committee Job Title Company
E.M. De Windt, Chairman Chairman of the Board Eaton Corporation
Claude M. Blair, Vice President Chairman of the Board National City Corporation
Carole Hoover, Vice Chairman President Greater Cleveland Growth Association
Stanley C. Pace, Vice Chairman President TRW Inc.
Frederick K. Cox Vice-Chairman Ameritrust
Dr. Nolen M. Ellison District Chancellor Cuyahoga Community College
Fr. Marino Frascati Priest Our lady of Mt. Carmel Church
Robert E. Hunter Ret. Chairman of the Board & CEO Weatherhead Company
Joseph A. Kocab Vice President/Principal Czech Catholic Union, Asst./South High School
Sebastian Lupica Executive Secretary Cleveland AFL-CIO
Charles McDonald Chairman Council of Smaller Enterprises
Dr. Ruth Miller News Analyst WBBG Radio
John W. Hushen, coordinator Vice President-Corporate Affairs Eaton Corporation
Ways and Means Committee Job Title Company
E.M. De Windt Chairman of the Board Eaton Corporation
Claude M. Blair Chairman of the Board National City Corporation
Harry J. Bolwell Chairman and CEO Midland-Ross Corporation
John T. Collinson Chief Executive Officer Chessie System, Inc.
William H. De Lancey Chairman and CEO Republic Steel Corporation
John J. Dwyer President Oglebay Norton Company
George J. Grabner President and CEO The Lamson and Sessions Company
Robert D. Gries Founder and Managing Director Gries Investment Company
Ray J. Groves Chairman Ernst and Whinney
Roy H. Holdt Chief Executive Officer White Consolidated Industries, Inc.
Allen C. Holmes Managing Partner Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue
William E. MacDonald President and CEO The Ohio Bell Telephone Company
Morton L. Mandel co-founder and Chairman Premier Industrial Corporation
Charles McDonald Chairman Council of Smaller Enterprises
Arthur B. Modell Owner Cleveland Browns, Inc.
Stanley C. Pace President TRW Inc.
Patrick S. Parker President, Chairman and CEO Parker-Hannifin Corporation
Samuel K. Scovil President and CEO The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company
Herbert E. Strawbridge President The Higbee Company
Hays T. Watkins President and Co-CEO CSX
M. Brock Weir President Ameritrust
Alton W. Whitehouse, Jr. Chairman and CEO The Standard Oil Company (Ohio)
Operating Committee Job Title Company
Robert . Hunter, Chairman (1980) Ret. Chairman of the Board and CEOWeatherhead Company
Stanley S. Czarnecki Special Agent in Charge FBI
Robert W. Hartwell President Cliffs Electric Service Co.
James J. McGowan, Chairman (81-82)General Manager Ohio Bell Telephone Company
  
 
Table 3 – Overview of OITF Organizational Sponsors 
  
• 264 private organizations/businesses* 
o 88 heavy industrial 
 Ford & General Motors 
 6 steel companies 
 5 chemical companies 
 1 railroad system 
o 36 service providers 
o 36 light industrial 
o 29 financial institutions 
o 13 accounting/ auditing firms 
o 16 retailers 
o 7 real estate agencies 
o 10 law firms 
o 5 utilities 
o 5 transportation firms 
o 4 construction firms 
o 3 publishing/press organizations 
o 2 restaurants 
o 2 hotels 
o 1 sports team 
 
• 36 nonprofit organizations 
o 8 labor union chapters 
o 9 foundations/ charitable trusts 
o 6 professional organizations 
o 5 economic development organizations 
o 4 community associations 
o 2 religious organizations 
o 1 hospital 
o 1 university 
 
• 1 public organization 
o The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
 
*7 businesses could not be found 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5 - The OETF Structure (OETF, 2006, 2007) 
Executive Sponsor Job Title Organization 
Frank G. Jackson Mayor City of Cleveland 
Operations Efficiency Council Job Title Organization 
Darnell Brown, Chair Chief Operating Officer City of Cleveland 
William M. Denihan Chief Executive Officer 
Cuyahoga Co. Community Mental Health 
Board 
Lee Friedman President & Chief Executive Officer Cleveland Leadership Center 
Fred Nance Managing Partner Squires, Sanders, & Dempsey LLP 
Charles Phelps Director of Leadership Programs Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU 
Dr. Vera Vogelsang-Coombs MPA Program Director Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU 
Jay Westbrook Councilman, Ward 18 Cleveland City Council 
Ron Woodford, PMP Senior Program Manager VW Group 
Natoya J. Walker 
Special Assistant to the Mayor, Public 
Affairs City of Cleveland 
Barry Withers 
Special Assistant to the Mayor, Employee 
Srvs. City of Cleveland 
Michele C. Whitlow OETF PMO Program Manager City of Cleveland 
Dr. Melodie Mayberry-Stewart  
(2006 ) Chief Technology Officer City of Cleveland 
Communications Advisory Team Job Title Organization 
Natoya J. Walker, Chair 
Special Assistant to the Mayor, Public 
Affairs City of Cleveland 
Montrie Rucker Adams  (2006-
2007) President Visibility Marketing, Inc. 
Carol Caruso (2006) Senior Vice President, Advocacy Greater Cleveland Partnership 
Marie Galindo (2006) Owner Luchita's Restaurant 
Wayne Hill, APR (2006) President Edward Howard & Co. 
Mary Ann Sharkey (2006-2007) Chief Executive Officer Mita Marketing LLC 
Tom Andrzejewski (2007) President Oppidan Group 
Scott Osiecki (2007) Director, External Affairs 
Cuyahoga Co. Community Mental Health 
Board 
Sheila Samuels (2007) Former Development Director Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU 
Erica Chrysler (2006) Deputy Press Secretary City of Cleveland 
Jason Wood (2006) 
Special Asst. to the Mayor, Boards & 
Commissions City of Cleveland 
Michael House (2006-2007) General Manager, Channel 23 City of Cleveland 
Francis Margaux (2007) Special Assistant to the Mayor City of Cleveland 
Maureen Harper (2007) Chief of Communications City of Cleveland 
Ossie Neal (2007) 
Marketing Manager, Division of Water 
Pollution Control City of Cleveland 
OETF Project Management Office City of Cleveland Employees City of Cleveland Employees 
  
 
Michele C. Whitlow, Program 
Manager Gwen Bryant (2006-2007) Hollis Crump (2006-2007) 
Eduardo Romero (2006) Shahid Sarawar (2006) Cynthia Sullivan (2006-2007) 
Elaine Woods (2006-2007) Valencia Wright (2006-2007) Phyllis Fuller Clipps (2007) 
Bertha lover (2007) Ossie Neal (2007) Celeste Ribbins (2007) 
Vinita Bose (2007) Tyeshia Minniefield (Intern) Jeremy Taylor (Intern) 
 
  
 
 
  
Figure 1 – The OETF Charter 
  
 
  
  
 
Luncheon Speaker 
Hunter Morrison 
Hunter Morrison is the Director of the Center for 
Urban and Regional Studies at Youngstown State 
University. The Center was established for the purpose 
of understanding applied research addressing issues of 
urban and regional development and providing 
technical assistance to local government, social service 
organizations, and businesses. Prior to this he was 
Director of the Cleveland City Planning Commission 
and was responsible for Civic Vision 2000, a $3 million 
initiative that resulted in the comprehensive updating 
of the City's Downtown Plan, Citywide Plan, and Zoning Code. Civic Vision received the 
1992 American Planning Association National Planning Award for Comprehensive 
Planning. Under his direction, the department was responsible for the development of 
master plans for North Coast Harbor District, site of Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and the 
Cleveland Browns Stadium; the Playhouse Square Theatre District, site of the country's 
second largest performing arts center; and the Gateway Sports District, home of Jacobs 
Field and Gund Area. The Gateway project was awarded an Urban Design Citation from 
Progressive Architecture in 1990, an Honor Award for urban design from the American 
Society of Landscape Architects in 1991, and the AIA Urban Design Award in 1996. Prior to 
joining the City of Cleveland in 1980, he worked for the Hough Area Development 
Corporation, a neighborhood development organization in Cleveland; for private consulting 
firms in Boston, and for the cities of Nairobi and New York. He holds degrees in city 
planning and political science from Yale College, city planning from the Harvard Graduate 
School of Design, and business administration from Cleveland State University. He served 
on the Cleveland Landmarks Commission and the Ohio State Historic Site Preservation 
Advisory Board. He has been a member and served as president of the Northeast Ohio 
Areawide Coordinating Agency, the 5-county Greater Cleveland metropolitan planning 
organization. He has taught at the Harvard Graduate School of Design and at Cleveland 
State University's Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs. 
  
 
  
  
 
Afternoon Q&A Discussion 
Session Chairman: David C. Hammack 
David C. Hammack is Haydn Professor of History at Case Western 
Reserve University; for nearly thirty years he was also among the 
faculty leaders of CWRU’s interdisciplinary Mandel Center for 
Nonprofit Organizations.  His books include A Versatile American 
Institution: The Changing Ideals and Realities of Philanthropic 
Foundations, with Helmut K. Anheier (2013); American 
Foundations: Studies on Roles and Contributions, edited with 
Helmut Anheier (2010); Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil 
Society: Projecting Institutional Logics Abroad, edited with Steven 
Heydemann (2009); and Making the Nonprofit Sector in the 
United States: A Reader (1998, paperback 2000).  At the moment 
he is completing an edited volume, Foundations in America’s 
Regions.  He has also published articles and more than fifty book reviews in journals 
including The American Historical Review, the Journal of American History, Reviews in 
American History, Urban Affairs, the Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Voluntas, and 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership.   
A past president of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary 
Action and the 2012 recipient of the association’s award for distinguished achievement, 
David Hammack has been a Guggenheim Fellow, a Visiting Fellow at the Yale Program on 
Non-Profit Organizations, and a Resident Fellow of the Russell Sage Foundation.  At Case 
Western Reserve he has won the Diekhoff Award for Distinguished Graduate Teaching.  His 
earlier work includes Power and Society: Greater New York (1984), involvement and on-
screen appearances in several televised films on the history of New York City, and 
contributions to the comparative history of New York and Budapest.  He earned a B.A. in 
Government at Harvard, a Master of Arts in Teaching at Reed College, and a Ph.D. in History 
at Columbia; before coming to CWRU he taught at the City University of New York, 
Princeton, and the University of Houston.  His students teach at Oberlin, Michigan, 
Cleveland State, and other colleges and universities, and work for the Educational Testing 
Service, United Way of Greater Cleveland, etc.  In Northeastern Ohio civic life, he served for 
three years as president of the board of Greater Cleveland Community Shares; and he and 
his wife Loraine Shils Hammack instigated and consulted to “The Struggle for Integration in 
Shaker Heights,” a documentary project on the Cleveland suburb that has been broadcast 
nationally on PBS. 
  
  
 
  
  
 
Stuart C. Mendel 
Dr. Mendel currently serves as the President of the Nonprofit 
Academic Centers Council (NACC), the national association for 
nonprofit academic based research centers.  His permanent position 
is as the Assistant Dean, Director of The Urban Center, and Director 
of the Center for Nonprofit Policy & Practice (CNP&P), Maxine 
Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University. 
Since 1996, his duties have included work as chief of operations for 
the Levin College and for a time, work as a special assistant to the 
President of the University.  He is founder of the CNP&P, an applied 
research, community service and academic education center.  He 
also serves on the graduate faculty of the University and has been the academic Director of 
the Master of Nonprofit Administration and Leadership degree program.  Dr. Mendel has 
raised over $1.5 million in project funding and provided technical assistance with over 200 
nonprofit organizations.   He is currently writing a book as lead author for Indiana 
University Press with Jeffrey L. Brudney entitled “Partnerships the Nonprofit Way:  What 
Matters, What Doesn’t.” 
From 1992 through 1996, Dr. Mendel served as the Director of Graduate Programs, Mandel 
Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Case Western Reserve University.  From 1989 to 1992, 
he served as Director of Development for the Beck Center for the Cultural Arts, a 
comprehensive community based arts organization, were he raised approximately $1 
million over 27 months.   
Dr. Mendel received his Master of Nonprofit Organizations and Doctorate in Social Policy 
History from Case Western Reserve University in 1991 and 2000 respectively.  His research 
interests include the nature and importance of civil society in America; philanthropy; 
fundraising and leadership; management of nonprofit organizations; public/private 
partnerships; the role of nonprofit organizations in public sector decision-making and 
social policy history.  He has also taught graduate level courses and advised many nonprofit 
boards and executives in these topical areas.  
Dr. Mendel has served as primary investigator or consultant in numerous grant and 
contracts underwritten by among others,  the Cleveland Foundation, St, Luke’s Foundation 
of Cleveland, Nord Family Foundation, William J. and Dorothy K. O’Neill Foundation, Billie 
Howland Steffee Fund, Cuyahoga County department of Justice Affairs, Urban League of 
Greater Cleveland, Resident Empowerment Organization, Empowerment Center (formerly 
Welfare Rights) of Greater Cleveland, and numerous faith and community based 
organizations.  The total of these grant funded projects exceeds $1,500,000. 
Over the past 20 years, Dr. Mendel has established an expertise in working with nonprofit 
organizations in the areas of organizing, planning and implementation.  He also performs 
project, program and organizational assessments with numerous funded projects to his 
credit. 
  
 
Jeffrey L. Brudney, Ph.D. 
Dr. Jeffrey L. Brudney is the inaugural holder of the Betty 
and Dan Cameron Family Distinguished Professorship of 
Innovation in the Nonprofit Sector at the University of 
North Carolina Wilmington.  Dr. Brudney is the Faculty 
Director of Quality Enhancement for Nonprofit 
Organizations (QENO), a partnership between UNCW, 
funders, civic leaders and other community organizations to 
build the capacity of nonprofit organizations and increase 
philanthropy in southeastern North Carolina.  He is the 
author of Fostering Volunteer Programs in the Public Sector: 
Planning, Initiating, and Managing Voluntary Activities, which received the John Grenzebach 
Award for Outstanding Research in Philanthropy for Education, and the co-author of 
Applied Statistics for Public and Nonprofit Administration, now entering its ninth edition, 
which has been used for instruction in more than 120 colleges and universities.  Dr. 
Brudney is the Editor in Chief of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, the premiere 
journal in nonprofit studies.   
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“Cross Sector Collaboration and Public Private Partnerships:   
A perspective on how Nonprofit Organizations create Public Value in an archetypical city in 
the United States” 
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PPPs:  How Nonprofit Organizations Create Public Value 
 
by 
 
Stuart C. Mendel, Ph.D., M.N.O.  
and 
Jeffrey L. Brudney, Ph.D. 
 
Abstract 
 
The scholarship on public value has emanated largely from the perspective of government 
and public management. As valuable as this conceptualization may be, we suggest that 
public value in the United States can be created by a combination of government, business 
and nonprofit actors. We argue that nonprofit organizations have been overlooked in the 
public value literature – an unfortunate reality that does not accurately reflect the 
nonprofit sector’s significant contributions. In many respects, creating public value is a 
primary raison d'etre for the American nonprofit sector. To elaborate and support this 
argument, we present an in-depth analysis of five case examples of public private 
partnerships (PPPs) involving nonprofit organizations in Cleveland, Ohio. The five PPP 
cases explored offer insights to public policy-makers, who might apply new, yet familiar 
strategies to make use of the nonprofit sector’s ability to create public value.  
 
Keywords:   nonprofit organization role in public value; Cleveland public private 
partnerships; civil society, public value, nonprofit, public private partnerships, PPP. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the term “public value” was coined (Moore, 1995) and refined as “public values” 
(Bozeman, 2002, 2007), scholars of public administration and related fields have 
  
 
considered the concept primarily from the perspective of the public sector and for the 
purpose of public management (Williams and Shearer, 2011; Benington, 2011; O’Flynn, 
2007; Alford and Hughes, 2007).  From the public sector perspective, public value is 
advanced when government makes contributions to society to benefit the public good. 
These contributions might be tangible – infrastructure or tax collections – or intangible – 
increased citizen participation or awareness (Stoker, 2006).  In his original conception, 
Moore also suggested that public may also align with the sensibilities of public 
administrators, managers and policy makers, whose aspirations, vision, and strategies to 
manage relationships with nonprofit organizations to serve the public during unsettled 
times (Moore, 2000).  According to Jorgensen and Bozeman (2007, p. 361-362), public 
values are principles guiding public managers that contribute to the common good and 
possess elements of altruism. Public values are sustainable environmentally and financially 
and stimulate the public to perceive government as stable, dignified and trustworthy 
(Alford and Hughes, 2007; Stoker, 2006). An extensive literature review on the topic by the 
Warwick Business School’s Institute of Governance & Public Management (Williams and 
Shearer, 2010, 2011) confirms these observations.  
Although we recognize these contributions of the public administration/management 
literature, in this essay, we argue that nonprofit organizations create public value in 
important ways that have been largely overlooked by scholars and policy makers.  
 
In making the case that nonprofit organizations have an important role in creating public 
value, we suggest public value is weighted less toward financial performance, efficiency 
and the “good that government can do through policy and public management innovation 
and entrepreneurialism” (O’Flynn, 2007; Levi, 1996; Roberts, 1992) and more toward the 
facilitating, intermediary and partnership contributions nonprofits make in their 
interactions with government, the private sector and individuals (Thomson and Perry, 
2006).  We also suggest that the work that nonprofit organizations perform can induce a 
more engaged citizenry and the inter-connections that strengthen social capital and a 
stronger civil society, (Mendel, 2010; Smith, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Berger and Neuhaus, 
1996).  By bridging the gap between public policy formulation and practical 
implementation (Mendel, 2003), nonprofits generate public value and honor the public 
values that underpin a vibrant American civil society. 
 
In this article we suggest that nonprofit organizations contribute to the creation of public 
value in at least three ways: mission fulfillment, involvement in public-private 
partnerships, and assumption of a stewardship role. Through mission fulfillment, a 
nonprofit organization can produce impacts on the rest of society (Bryson, 2011; Salamon, 
2002; Rojas, 2000; Herman and Renz, 1999). Public-private partnerships are a special class 
of relationships that nonprofits can form with government and business to pursue societal 
goals (Mendel and Brudney, 2012; Wettenhall 2003; Squires, 1989; Swanstrom, 1985). 
Finally, the stewardship role allows nonprofits to provide institutional space and 
constructive tension through which collaboration can incubate and thrive (Stone and 
Ostrower, 2007; Powell and Steinberg, 2006; Van Til, 2000; Drucker, 1990). 
 
  
 
Although our cases emanate from a single municipality, we believe that they are 
representative of nonprofit activity throughout the U.S. (Mendel and Brudney, 2012).  To 
understand the role nonprofit organizations play in public value creation, we offer a 
framework derived from mission achievement outcomes, involvement in PPPs that include 
public and private members, and nonprofit organization stewardship in providing the 
“third space” essential to inter-sectoral collaboration.  We also consider the literature and 
relevant scholarly attention devoted to nonprofit organizations with respect to creating 
public value.    
 
The argument for the participation of nonprofit organizations in creating public value is 
supported by an in-depth analysis of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Cleveland, Ohio. 
These case examples involve public, private and nonprofit players in order to produce 
public value outcomes.  Each case illustrates the role of nonprofit organizations in creating 
public value and provides lessons for public policy makers in their attempts to amplify 
public tax dollar investments to the greatest degree possible, insure best practice for public 
oversight of government-nonprofit contractual arrangements, and craft evaluative 
measures for nonprofit organization performance and fiscal accountability.  
Public Value and the Nonprofit Sector 
 
Although “public value” is not often recognized by this name, students of the nonprofit 
sector and civil society in the United States will likely recognize it as a familiar concept. In 
the context of the nonprofit sector, “public value” arises as an outcome of the intermediary 
and facilitating processes nonprofit organizations employ as they strive to achieve their 
organizational missions (Mendel 2003).  Public value also results as nonprofits perform 
their work and serve constituents, form and strengthen social networks, sustain social 
capital, build community and nurture the bonds of trust that comprise civil society 
(Mendel, 2010, Bozeman 2007; Salamon 2002 and 1995).  In many respects, creating public 
value is a primary raison d'etre for the American nonprofit sector. 
 
Nonprofits also contribute to the conditions and attainment of public value (and values) 
through their relationships with the public sector.  As Dennis Young (2000) explains, 
nonprofit organizations operate independently as supplements to, complements of, or in 
opposition to government. These relationships might include partnerships or mutual 
accountability. Through their relationships with government, nonprofits are likely to 
stimulate unanticipated public values and benefits in the form of “intangibles,” such as 
positive participant feelings, improvements in the environment, or re-directed public 
dollars through advocacy (Benington, 2011; Mendel, 2010; Jorgensen and Bozeman, 2007; 
Stoker, 2006).   
 
Nonprofits can also generate public value by serving as mission or values guardians in 
public-private collaboration processes.  In public-private partnerships (PPPs), nonprofits 
often provide the formal “institution” or “home” of the endeavor, creating a “third space” 
for meetings and collaborative PPP arrangements (Mendel and Brudney, 2012; Van Til, 
2000). Unlike public bureaucracies, nonprofit organizations can deliver contracted services 
to fulfill the partnership, negotiate with public and private parties, and operate in a less 
  
 
hindered way to attain public values. In doing so, the nonprofit enables stakeholders whose 
“day jobs” are in government or businesses to engage more freely in thinking, planning and 
implementing collaborative endeavors.  This stewardship role allows nonprofits to take 
responsibility for inter-sectoral collaboration processes and facilitate the incubation, 
development, vetting and experimentation of policy innovation in ways that better advance 
public value (Mendel and Brudney, 2012).   
 
Finally, in the nonprofit literature on civil society in the United States, government, 
business, and nonprofit organizations advance public values by participating in the 
decision-making process regarding public and private resources (Benington, 2011; Mendel, 
2010).  If we accept Bozeman’s (2007, p. 13) belief that  “public values” arise through the 
normative consensus of individual rights and obligations, then public value is also created 
when public, private and nonprofit actors establish conditions for individuals to follow 
their interests. When nonprofits engage in and utilize advocacy to influence the creation of 
public policy and hold public and private actors accountable, this “push-and-pull” is a 
manifestation of stewardship and a public value in itself (Boris, 2006, Salamon, 1995).   
 
Nonprofit origins of public value in the U.S. 
To understand the implications for twenty first century policy makers predisposed to 
stimulate public value through public-private partnership with nonprofit organizations, we 
draw attention to the historical threads of connection between present day and the origins 
of the nonprofit sector in the United States (Powell and Clemens, 1998 pp. xiii-xvi; 
O’Connell, 1983).  Beginning with the first days of European settlement on the North 
American continent, collaboration among individuals arose because of an urgent common 
purpose in physical survival. Soon after, as life in the rough countryside attained routine, 
the goal of achieving an economic profit directed the shared endeavors of individuals. In 
the absence of both local government and legitimate officially sanctioned public authority, 
individuals pooled resources and responsibilities for the benefit of the larger community.  
Although they did not refer to it in the same way we do today, the early colonists created 
public value in the collaborative, protected space they crafted to gather the materials 
needed for business enterprise, commerce and the achievement of personal wealth 
(Mendel, 2011; Hammack, 1998).  
  
Over time, the traditions of informal association and collaboration became essential for 
land-owning and enterprising residents of colonial North America in order to make 
decisions in the pursuit of their self-interests and a perceived public value. Public value of 
this era was marked by two characteristics. First, although individuals preferred to self-
sustain, they would band together for the public good when it was in their best interest. 
Second, early Americans would seek public value through the actions and policies of 
government that rewarded individual efforts, encouraged the pursuit of wealth, and limited 
public authority, size, and expense (Hall, 1992; Hartz, 1955; Hofstadter, 1955).  
  
Tracing the historical thread of connection through the 1800 and 1900s, informal private 
cooperation and association bridged the gap left by public policy directed institutions that 
were not up to the task of fulfilling the political, social and economic needs of communities 
  
 
of the American frontier and later, in the fast growing twentieth century American cities 
(Bailyn, 1992; Bremner, 1960).  Individuals recognized that public governance mediated by 
voluntary association or what we today refer to as “social capital,” was a good policy that 
supported the conditions to create private wealth. This combination of public and private 
authority comprised what we might today consider a distinctive “civil society” (O’Connell, 
2000).  Today, we recognize these processes as outputs of public social, economic and 
political policies that drive nonprofits toward the public good and the creation of public 
value.  
 
Conceptual ambiguity of public value  
The range of scholarship considering “public value” and “public values” is dense and not 
always clear. A comprehensive appraisal of 78 examples of published scholarship on the 
“public value” literature by Iestyn Williams and Heather Shearer (2011, 2010) 
acknowledges this problem. Williams and Shearer point out the heavy reliance on non-
empirical case studies and vignettes as source material in research on the public value 
phenomenon, rather than use of more rigorously designed studies. Williams and Shearer 
(2010, p. 9) conclude that future research will require the development of theoretical and 
empirical foundations to increase understanding of “public value.”   
 
Williams and Shearer (2010) highlight that most of the public value scholarship originates 
from the perspective of public administration and public management.  Despite the public 
administration-focused literature and the absence of competing theories from the for-
profit and nonprofit sectors, public administration scholars have found little consensus on 
definition for “public value” or “public values” beyond the original, rather imprecise, 
concepts conceived by Mark Moore (1995, p.10) and elaborated by Barry Bozeman (2007, 
p. 13).  
 
Common to the public value literature (Benington and Moore, 2011; Alford and Hughes, 
2007) is emphasis on government as the primary actor and instigator in public value 
(Horner and Hutton, 2011).  A noteworthy exception is Benington’s (2011) explanation of a 
more complex system of public value creation that involves the overlap of civil society, the 
state, people, and the market, identified as “three nodes of networked governance” 
(Benington, 2011 pp 34-35).  Aside from Benington, the literature casts nonprofits, 
businesses, and individuals as “second place” to government in the creation of public value. 
These subordinate actors make adjustments or changes in their behavior to align with 
government’s policy motives and actions (Crouch; 2011; Mulgan, 2011; Hartley, 2011).   
 
The little scholarship rooted in other fields such as business management and the nonprofit 
sector suggests different explanations of what public value may be and how it is generated. 
Business theory observes public value as those values that enable business enterprises to 
generate wealth in a setting of quality public services, low costs, and minimum regulations 
(Sabidussi, Bremmers et., al., 2012, p. 121).  In this literature, the role of the public sector is 
to enable the generation of privately held wealth by creating a stable environment where 
the economy might allow business owners to meet the demands of the marketplace 
(Domhoff, 2005; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Public values are realized by rewarding 
  
 
individual effort, the pursuit of wealth, small government, and business enterprise – 
principles of American political tradition (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Greenberg, 1998; 
Chandler, 1977; Hofstadter, 1948). 
 
Nonprofit sector theory observes public value as less in the domain of government and 
more in the province of individuals (Salamon, 2002).  Public value is created when 
individuals trust public policy makers and public institutions, have faith in the economic 
and justice system and thus participate to achieve a measure of wealth from their own 
labors (Mendel, 2003; Hartz, 1955).  Nonprofit scholarship suggests that nonprofits can 
generate and nurture public value in both specific and general ways, via certain programs 
or as standing institutions. For example, nonprofits act as advocates on behalf of 
constituents.  In the most positive perspective of advocacy work, the nonprofits are feeding 
information back into the cycle of public policy-making and performing a checks-and-
balances function on the power-brokers of the public and private sectors. In performing 
advocacy, nonprofits create a tension that comprises an over-sight and accountability 
function.  Through this lens, advocacy by nonprofits creates the conditions for trust in 
policies by public authority and creates public value through the action of safeguarding the 
rights and responsibilities of the nonprofit’s constituents (Powell and Steinberg, 2006). 
 
Nonprofits and the creation of public value 
It is well accepted that nonprofits enter into collaboration and partnership in their roles as 
intermediaries and facilitators with public institutions, private businesses and other 
nonprofits to seek effective mission achievement (Boris, 2006; Powell and Steinberg, 2002; 
Salamon, 2002; Smith, 2000; Young 2000).  Nonprofit organizations form to accomplish 
specific purposes, creating temporary or permanent voluntary institutions and associations 
through which productive energy is marshaled. Nonprofit organizations make use of 
volunteers and, where resources permit, paid staff under the authority of an 
uncompensated board of directors. These actors together are able to create a public-civic 
value of camaraderie and fellowship, which also yields qualitative results within the scope 
of the organization’s mission. Public value is created in this “third space” (Anheier, 2005; 
Salamon, 2002, 1995; Van Til, 2000) 
 
Although we argue that nonprofit organizations create public value through mission 
fulfillment, public private partnerships, and stewardship of a “third space,” we believe that 
a useful approach to understand and define “public value,” and how it may differ from 
“public values” in the United States, lies in examining the way nonprofit organizations 
create public value through public-private partnerships  PPPs describe a distinctive class of 
relationships involving government, businesses, and philanthropic institutions in the 
United States (Wettenhall 2003; Squires, 1989; Swanstrom, 1985).  
 
The concept of PPP is closely aligned with the American political tradition in which 
government institutions foster an economic, political, legal, and social environment of 
collaboration supportive of public purposes, wealth generation, individualistic effort and 
smaller government (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Greenberg, 1998; Hofstadter, 1948).  PPPs 
offer a way to focus and amplify the powers and resources of government, while mitigating 
  
 
the financial risks of investing in large-scale undertakings outside of the private, profit-
making sector. For example, PPPs have been noted for providing a way to stimulate urban 
revitalization, enable complex actions such as changes in private land use and zoning, 
finance large public works projects using publicly-backed investment bonds, and leverage 
private business resources and the penchant for innovation (Jacobson and Choi, 2008; 
Carroll and Steane, 2000; Keating, Krumholz, Metzger, 1995). In the U.S., PPPs include 
contract-based service delivery. The partnerships are an expression of power: private 
business and civic and nonprofit leaders work in concert with government officials to plan 
and implement initiatives, which benefit the public good and private enterprise and build 
social capital (Powell and Steinberg, 2006; Putnam, 2000; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
 
Young (2006) argues that the private collaborative partners of the public sector can 
complement, supplement, and inform government through the delivery of services.  Other 
research, however, portrays partnerships as a form of leadership by public sector officials 
engaged in large-and small-scale projects with private business (Savas, 2005; Salamon, 
2002; Waddock, 1988). To those in the private sector, PPPs offer an opportunity to shape 
public agendas (Glasbergen, 2007; Crane and Matten, 2004; Austin and McCaffrey, 2002). 
Public sector officials may justify the return-on-investment of PPPs with respect to 
increased business activity, employment opportunities and taxable wealth.  Officials also 
acknowledge the sense of collective accountability and teamwork that can arise across the 
community through a joint participation of public, private and nonprofit interests, 
especially when the nonprofit organization plays a vital role in the process (Mendel, 2010 
and 2003; Anheier, 2005; Himmelman, 1996).   
 
Nonprofits, Public Private Partnership and Public Value  
To substantiate our argument concerning the contribution of nonprofit organizations to 
creating public value, we provide a detailed analysis of five case examples of PPPs in 
Cleveland, Ohio. The cases involve a central nonprofit participant and demonstrate how 
this organization played a critical role in the attainment of public values.  We focus on the 
activities of nonprofit organizations: in mission accomplishment, involvement in public-
private partnership; and in the creation of a “third space” wherein the nonprofit provides a 
sanctuary retreat of time and place for public and private sector actors to engage in work to 
benefit individuals and their institutions. A more detailed description of the case examples 
can be found in Mendel and Brudney, 2012.  
   
The Cleveland Development Foundation (CDF) provides the first case. CDF was established 
in 1954 by local business leaders to assist urban renewal and slum clearance efforts. 
Working closely with local government and the business establishment, the CDF  provided 
financial and planning assistance for a number of urban projects in the 1950s and 1960s.   
 
The second case example, University Circle Development Foundation/ 
University Circle Incorporated (UCDF/UCI), was formed in 1957 as the result of a study 
focusing on the need for future collective planning by University Circle neighborhoods and 
organizations in Cleveland. That same year, the nonprofit UCDF created a land bank to buy 
and assemble properties with the intent to turn them over to existing University Circle 
  
 
institutions, new organizations and private developers for retail, commercial, and 
residential projects benefiting the community. UCDF worked closely with the City of 
Cleveland and Cuyahoga County; the nonprofit assumed an important facilitating role in the 
administration of the region’s Phase II Urban Renewal project, arising from the Housing Act 
of 1949, for these metropolitan governments. 
  
The third case example was born under Cleveland Mayor George V. Voinovich. Facing 
default of bank loans in 1979, Mayor Voinovich organized a Task Force of local private 
industry executives to reduce administrative costs. These individuals donated the time, 
funds, and expertise of their companies to advise and reform the city bureaucracy and 
processes.  The City re-organized ten departments and implemented a new accounting 
system with internal auditing capability.  Tens of millions of dollars were re-allocated, and 
operating costs reduced.   
 
The Task Force contributed directly to the founding of our fourth case example, Cleveland 
Tomorrow (CT), a private nonprofit civic organization that included chief executive officers 
of the largest companies of the greater Cleveland area. Drawing from the Task Force’s 
influence and visible impact on pressing civic matters, CT was created to improve the long-
term economic health of Cleveland. Capitalizing on the direct involvement of its members 
in local and regional economic development initiatives, CT served as an incubator for novel 
ideas and growth.    
The fifth case, Neighborhood Progress Incorporated (NPI), was created in 1988 by 
Cleveland Tomorrow and area foundations.  NPI is a nonprofit agency designed to focus 
attention, dollars, and other resources on Cleveland's neighborhood development projects, 
with an emphasis on housing. NPI worked closely with city and county government, private 
local and national funders, and businesses to preserve existing housing and to re-develop 
older housing stock in the urban community.   
 
These five case examples constitute large-scale PPP initiatives in Cleveland over the past 
six decades. Involving public, private, and nonprofit participants. Table 1 places these cases 
within the framework of the three aspects of public value creation in relation to nonprofit 
organizations discussed above:  mission fulfillment, participation in PPPs, and stewardship 
of a  “third space.” 
 
Place Table 1 about here. 
 
Analysis of the Case Examples   
The executive leadership of Republic Steel Corporation set the terms and definition for the 
mission of the Cleveland Development Foundation (CDF). The CEO’s intention was to 
provide clean and affordable housing for employees in a portion of the City that was 
riddled by crime, substandard housing, poor health, and polluted land (Encyclopedia of 
Cleveland History, 1996, pp 233-234). Cleveland’s Mayor at the time, Anthony J Celebrezze, 
encouraged policies that supported the private initiative. In forming the nonprofit CDF, 
Republic Steel and other private business owners convened local government leaders, and 
devised plans, raised funds, obtained private property through market purchases and use 
  
 
of the City’s power-of-eminent domain. In stewardship of the working relationships 
between local and federal government, corporations and other stakeholders, CDF 
performed planning, convening, and coordinating work that no other public or private 
entity had the capacity, ability or mission undertake.  CDF created public value through the 
platform it established for its partners, but also for city residents and businesses that 
benefited in future endeavors beyond the scope of its original mission.  
In a similar manner, the UCDF/UCI case illustrates the power of nonprofit 
organizations. Like the CDF, the University Circle Development Foundation performed 
many functions in the pursuit of its mission, which led to the production of public value. 
The central feature of the University Circle neighborhood is a grand park open to the public 
in a part of Cleveland otherwise known for urban decay. In the course of mission 
achievement, the nonprofit UCI organization assumed many public sector responsibilities, 
such as land banking, institutional planning, coordination of facilities expansion, public 
safety, tax collection, and public works. In driving toward mission achievement, UCDF/UCI 
created a third space for collaborative efforts that included planning and implementing 
land use and acquisition, raising funds from private and public sources, and leveraging 
resources held by the region’s major private, nonprofit, cultural, education and health 
institutions. 
  
In the case of Mayor Voinovich’s operations improvement Task Force, public value arose in 
a manner that scholars might easily recognize, through changes in public sector operating 
dollars, bureaucracy, procedures and program allocations. Like his predecessor Celebrezze, 
Voinovich encouraged policies that supported the initiative. Public value was also created 
through the formation of a “project team” of senior Cleveland corporate CEOs, who then 
used the experience to take on other major challenges such as regional economic 
development.  Cleveland Tomorrow became their formal organization as a result of the 
work they performed on the Mayor’s Task Force.  
 
Using the model established by Cleveland Tomorrow, which demonstrated to the local 
philanthropic community the power of concentrated financial resources and the benefits 
that collaboration among local business leaders could bring, the Cleveland Foundation and 
the Premier Industrial Corporation Foundation created Neighborhood Progress 
Incorporated (NPI).  NPI utilized the same principles implemented by senior executives in 
the Mayor’s Task Force.  Through Cleveland Tomorrow, NPI convened corporate leaders, 
city and county public sector officials, and national thought-leaders in housing, urban 
redevelopment, and the banking industry to address residential disinvestment in the City 
of Cleveland.  
 
In each of the cases presented, a nonprofit served as a mechanism or third space through 
which motivated parties performed the work none could accomplish alone. Public policy 
setting authorities were active participants in each endeavor.  Each cases offers examples 
of leveraged local resources with those of the national government, a locally implemented 
application of  federal policy and demonstrable outcomes of public value creation.   
 
  
 
Our analysis shows that public value arises from the joint activity of all three sectors of civil 
society, and that the actions of one sector can carry benefits for the others.  The PPP case 
examples demonstrate public value creation through strategic alliances between business 
and government that are guided or “stewarded” by a nonprofit intermediary. The case 
examples demonstrate the importance of the partnerships in achieving public value 
outcomes when previously fallow or damaged land is renewed, public dollars produce 
infrastructure that spurs business opportunities and economic development, social 
services are more precisely targeted, and government operations are optimized.   
 
In sum, our analysis suggests that public value may achieve its highest aspiration when the 
interests of public, private and nonprofit organizations unite in collaborative fashion to 
make best use of the policies, practices, and resources contributed by each member of the 
partnership. This view offers a departure from Moore’s “Strategic triangle” (Moore, 1995, 
pp 70-72; Williams and Shearer, 2011 p. 5, and 2010, p. 16) in which he identifies the realm 
of public value confined within the intersection of strategic goals, the authorizing 
environment, and the operations capability of government.  Rather than suggest public 
value arises and is realized through government actions alone, based on the case examples, 
we conclude that public value stems from the joint involvement of public, nonprofit and 
private for-profit actors. This view departs from Benington’s (2011, pp. 34-37) conception 
of networked governance in which “civil society” is not differentiated from its nonprofit 
component. To the contrary, our analysis demonstrates the facilitating and intermediary 
roles nonprofit organizations can play in creating public value through mission 
achievement, participating in public-private partnerships, and offering a third space for 
interaction among the sectors.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In understanding the limits on American government set in place in its earliest years and 
distinctive aspects of political tradition, we suggest that public value in the U.S., like civil 
society – an equally difficult concept to define -   can arise through a combination of 
government, business and nonprofit actors and actions.  We also note that if, as Mark 
Moore described, public value is an outcome of improved strategies and tactics employed 
by public managers (Moore, 1995, p. 4) or, as Bozeman suggests, it arises through a 
normative consensus (Bozeman, 2007, p 13), then defining and understanding public value 
theory may best be advanced if we take into account the differing perspectives of the 
phenomenon from all three sectors – public, private, and nonprofit.   
  
“Public value” lies beyond the sole province of the public sector.  It emanates from the 
allocation of public and private resources that are amplified in intended and unintended 
ways well beyond their original purpose through the actions of the other sector. Public 
value is achieved most fully when public, private and nonprofit sector players work 
together in making the best uses of the resources and contributions of the others in ways in 
which benefits arise to all.  
 
The Cleveland public-private partnerships case examples that we have analyzed 
demonstrate the three aspects of the nonprofit-centric framework for the creation of public 
  
 
value consisting of mission achievement, involvement in PPPs, and stewardship of a third 
space. framework. Several features of public value are found consistently in the five PPP 
cases that have implications for public policy makers. First, the process of forming and 
carrying out the work of an initial partnership endeavor can stimulate the creation of 
additional successful associations uniting the actions of the public, profit, and nonprofit 
sectors in public value. The succeeding associations became formal nonprofit organizations 
in themselves that went on to carry out projects that created public value outside of the 
public sphere.  Second, the creation of formal private, mission-driven nonprofit 
organizations led to the employment of dedicated professionals who served as the 
stewards of the PPP. The hiring and retention of staff had the concentrated technical 
expertise and knowledge in the PPP in ways that extended its work beyond its original 
aspirations. Third, the PPP enabled public sector leaders to delegate to private actors 
important public functions, such as land use planning, public safety, public works projects, 
and reforms of government bureaucracy that were important outcomes of the partnership. 
Fourth, as tracked by the participants and promoted in the local press, the amplification of 
resources by the nonprofit PPP member produced a “leveraged” return on investment for 
the public and private funding well in excess of the invested resources. 
 
This discussion suggests implications for policy makers, who seek ways to amplify or 
leverage public tax dollar investments to the greatest degree possible, insure best practice 
for public oversight of these government-nonprofit contractual arrangements, and devise 
evaluative measures for nonprofit organization performance and fiscal accountability. 
First, we suggest that requests for proposals (RFPs) from all three sectors take into the 
circumstances that can help to foster PPPs. RFPs might include, for example, recognition of 
the importance of alignments of operational culture among organizations; needs for 
mission fulfillment on the part of each nonprofit partner organization; and the balance of 
organizational self-interest that move collaboration to successful outcomes. Second, these 
funding proposals might be conceived as a cooperative strategy to achieve some long-term 
public value, rather than as an isolated service delivery event or transaction. Third, we 
suggest that public value can serve as an over-arching outcome for nonprofit organizations 
and their partners, presenting a way that organizations and their funders can claim the 
work performed leads to a larger, observable and measureable impact. A connection can 
thus be established that traces public investment in a private nonprofit entity leading to a 
large-scale contribution to the benefit of the nonprofit, its constituents, and the larger 
community. As demonstrated by the case examples, such linkages can stimulate additional 
private investments in the form of funding and volunteer expertise and support that would 
not otherwise occur to pursue and attain public value outcomes. 
  
 
Table 1.  Analysis of Case Examples of Nonprofit Organizations Contributing to Public Value 
 
Public Value 
Arising 
Through 
Mission Fulfillment Involvement in Public 
Private Partnership 
“Third Space” Stewardship Role Public Value created 
Cleveland 
Development 
Foundation 
Succeeded in stimulating 
planning and 
concentration of $2 
million of private funds to 
leverage federal urban 
renewal funds and 
creating conditions for 
private development of 
downtown Cleveland 
Private (business) sector 
initiative using the powers 
of government to create 
opportunities for 
development that neither 
the market or the public 
sector might create alone. 
Independent organization that raised 
private funds, obtained public urban 
renewal dollars, fostered the 
development and facilitated 
implementation of first phase urban 
renewal plans in the City of 
Cleveland. 
Improved public infrastructure 
such as roads, water and sewer 
and health; substandard housing 
demolition and assembly of 
parcels for future residential and 
commercial development. 
University 
Circle 
Incorporated 
Succeeded in creating a 
private land-bank using 
the authority of the public 
sector to accumulate 
properties and leverage 
public resources for the 
creation of  privately own 
space enjoyed by the 
general public 
Private (nonprofit) sector 
initiative using the powers 
of government to create 
opportunities for 
development that neither 
the market or the public 
sector might create alone. 
Independent organization that 
courted philanthropy, performed 
land use planning/acquisition, 
negotiated between independent 
nonprofits and private landowners; 
performed public safety services. 
Preservation and development of 
community assets in the form of 
cultural, health and higher 
education institutions; 
preservation of urban parklands; 
flood prevention and improved 
water drainage.  
City of 
Cleveland 
Operations 
Task Force 
Succeeded in attaining 
greater operational 
efficiency and costs 
savings of public 
bureaucracy arising 
through the voluntary 
work of senior leadership 
of the business community 
Public sector initiative 
requiring the expertise 
and resources of the 
private sector to over-
come problems of long 
established bureaucracy 
and limited political 
flexibility. 
Informal association of senior 
corporate civic leaders who came to  
institutionalize their volunteerism in 
a private nonprofit to further their 
work of strengthening the public 
institutions of Cleveland to stimulate 
economic development.  
Lower costs of local govern-
ment; improved public services; 
greater access to public services 
by residents, business owners 
and others; improved social 
capital through participation of 
civic leadership and other 
constituents in planning and 
process implementation.  
Cleveland 
Tomorrow 
Succeeded in creating 
formal  programs to 
stimulate regional 
economic development by 
building and sustaining a 
practice of government- 
Private (business and 
nonprofit) sector initiative 
leveraging public 
resources to  identify and 
implement opportunities 
to advance regional 
Served as institution that incubated 
ideas and plans for regional 
economic development, then 
repeatedly served to convene key 
players, plan initiatives, provide 
intermediary and facilitator 
Improved conditions for 
economic performance of local 
and regional business endeavors.  
Established framework for 
planning and collaboration 
between public and private 
  
 
business leveraged dollars 
and planning for large-
scale projects and 
endeavors. 
economic develop-ment 
by research of issues, 
planning and convening 
public and private sector 
players. 
functions to realize those plans.   players. 
Neighbor-hood 
Progress 
Incorporated 
Succeeded in planning and 
coordination of neighbor-
hood stabilization 
initiatives, housing 
rehabilitation and new 
construction by linking 
public, private and 
nonprofit organizations on 
a large scale. 
Nonprofit sector initiative 
of the Cleveland 
philanthropic community 
to plan and coordinate 
neighborhood 
stabilization, housing 
rehabilitation and new 
construction by linking 
public, private and 
nonprofit organizations on 
a large scale. 
Provided leadership in urban 
neighborhood stabilization, 
revitalization and new development. 
Facilitated collaboration among local 
community development 
corporations, philanthropy, lenders 
and the public sector. 
Improved housing options and 
property values, opportunities 
for commercial business 
endeavors serving residents. 
Greater choices for citizens of 
Cleveland. 
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Service Award in 2007.  A member of the Executive Committee of the  Council for the 
Administration of General and Liberal Studies, he served as its president, 2001-2002, and 
as its Executive Director, 2004 to 2006. 
 
Dr. Jenkins has published two books: Steel Valley Klan: A History of the Ku Klux Klan in the 
Mahoning Valley  and  Mahoning Memories: A Bicentennial History of Youngstown and 
Mahoning Valley.  Each of them sold out the first edition.  He has also published articles on 
the Klan, Mayor Joseph Heffernan who followed the Klan mayor in Youngstown, 
Representative Robert Bulkley from Cleveland, Ohio, and a number of articles on Ernest J. 
Bohn, the Executive Director of Cleveland Public Housing, and Chair of the City Planning 
Commission starting in the 30s and lasting until 1968.  The Bohn articles include: “Ohio, the 
Birthplace of Public Housing,” Proceedings of the Ohio Academy of History: 2002  (Ohio 
Academy of History, Marion, Ohio, 2002);  “Before Downtown: Cleveland, Ohio, and Urban 
Renewal, 1949-1958,” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 27, No.4, May 2001, 471-96;  and “The 
Ku Klux Klan in the Midwest”, and “Youngstown” (Ohio) in the Encyclopedia of Midwestern 
History, published by  Indiana University Press, 2007.  
 
Presently, Dr. Jenkins is finishing his research on the career of Ernest J. Bohn and 
Cleveland’s efforts to stem its decline as a major city between 1930 and 1970.  This 
research led to the discovery of the Cleveland Development Foundation Papers located in 
the Western Reserve Historical Society and to the writing of a paper on the CDF activities 
for this conference. 
  
  
CLEVELAND DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION:  A PARTNER IN DECLINE 
Former mayor, governor and senator George Voinovich has been a consistent advocate of 
public/private partnerships since he faced Cleveland’s default upon becoming its mayor in 
1979.  Although the defeated mayor, Dennis Kucinich, was responsible for the default, 
Voinovich took charge by calling on 89 businessmen to form an Operations Improvement 
Task Force.  Their job was to make “local government more efficient and more responsive 
to the needs of our citizens.”   Over the next three months they developed 650 
recommendations, 75% of which the city implemented in the following 18 months.  This 
experience would lead Voinovich to create other ppp’s, such as MOVE that encouraged 
people to volunteer for civic projects, or Cleveland Tomorrow, sponsored by the Greater 
Cleveland Growth Association, to set long-range plans for Cleveland’s economic 
development. There were also efforts to improve neighborhoods through the Cleveland 
Neighborhood Partnership Program, which helped set up 35 Local Development 
Associations to promote rehabilitation programs underwritten by federal funding.  There 
were more projects and partnerships than I have just mentioned, but, as a result, Cleveland 
received three awards as an All-American City in the 1980s.    
These awards generated an invitation for Voinovich to speak before the National League of 
Cities, where he contended that Cleveland was no longer the “mistake on the lake,” but the 
Comeback City.  This turnaround, according to Voinovich, “…was the crux of why I believe 
public-private partnerships are the soundest philosophical and economic principle a city 
can have.  Public incentives that decrease the immediate risks to an entrepreneur’s spirit 
can only strengthen the sense of faith and commitment by community businesses and 
residents to the overall development and growth of a city.”  According to Voinovich city 
government could not dictate “a policy of economic growth to its constituents, but it must 
provide effective leadership to collectively create and administer policies most beneficial to 
the majority of the community.”   Underlying his policies was a belief that harmonizing the 
activities and desires of all groups would work best in restoring Cleveland.    
It is interesting to note that when Voinovich was considering running for mayor, his wife 
Janet, some friends and Governor James Rhodes told him he was crazy to leave the 
lieutenant governorship.  To Rhodes’ criticism that people in Cleveland could not get their 
act together, Voinovich responded “And I said to him, ‘governor, I believe that, with the 
right chefs and recipes (I knew what a great town this was with a great corporate and 
caring community) and with leadership that understands you’re only as good as your team; 
with leadership that understands that if you are going to get something done, you have to 
work with other governmental agencies; and with leadership that understands you have to 
work with the private sector to get something done – Cleveland can really be a turnaround 
town.”   Clearly, Voinovich was successful in generating enough of a turnaround to enable 
him to return to the governor’s office and eventually to the U.S. Senate.  
 
The study of public/private partnerships, as advocated by Voinovich, is a relatively recent 
development.  At present this field seems to lack sufficient in-depth historical research on 
  
the actual operation of such partnerships.  Some of the literature also has a tendency to be 
overly positive about such operations.  Although there are examples of successes in this 
field – the Voinovich administration being one -- this paper will examine the Cleveland 
Development Foundation as a partnership that was generally unsuccessful.    
The Cleveland Development Fondation was founded in 1954 – a combination of 86 
Cleveland firms interested in urban renewal and slum removal.  Its founding resulted from 
the Housing Act of 1949 that encouraged cities to renew themselves by providing federal 
support to pay for 2/3rds of the cost of acquisition of slum properties through the use of 
eminent domain.  The city could then sell the land for private development at1/3d the 
price. Cleveland was slow to respond, however, because of a lack of planning monies and a 
provision in the 1949 Act requiring the availability of alternative housing, possibly public, 
for the displaced residents from urban renewal areas.  CDF came to the rescue when 86 
business corporations contributed $2M to a fund underwriting loans either to the 
government or to a private company to start projects.  CDF hired Upshur Evans, from 
Standard Oil, as executive director.  PHOTO  
Lester Salamon, Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Societies Studies, has written 
extensively on the interconnection between the government and private enterprise, 
including non-profit organizations.  Although he highlights the conflict between the 
conservative desire to limit government and to encourage voluntarism, and the liberal 
emphasis on regulation of business and the expansion of government to provide public 
services, Salamon argues that the intermixing of government and private enterprise has 
grown dramatically in the last 100 years despite the suspicion each side has of the other.  
He notes that earlier government activity emphasized only direct delivery of goods or 
services via government bureaucrats, but has evolved into a wide mix of loans, loan 
guarantees, grants, contracts, social regulation, economic regulation, insurance, tax 
expenditures, vouchers, etc.  He labels these tools as “highly indirect” and utilized by 
commercial banks, private hospitals, social service agencies, industrial corporations, 
universities, day-care centers, financiers, construction firms and local/state governments.  
They are deliverers of publicly financed services for public purposes, thus constituting a 
third-party government.    
Salamon has analyzed the different types of non-profit organizations that have cooperated 
with local, state or federal governments mainly since the rise of the New Deal.  Using the 
fact that most such organizations seek tax exemption, Salamon consulted with an IRS 
document that identified foundations as one such organization.  What they provided for 
government programs was funding.  Specifically, a foundation like CDF could extend loans 
to the city government for planning or setting-up operations, or to private companies 
engaged in tearing down and rebuilding a designated slum.  Salamon points out that some 
of the foundations enabled members to hide their assets and escape inheritance taxes, but 
that ended with the passage of a regulatory act in 1969.  CDF did not operate in that 
fashion.  
In their 1993 book on nonprofits, David Hammack and Dennis Young have offered some 
examples of such organizations -- a mutual benefit association being one.   Although 
  
technically not a mutual benefit association, CDF possessed similar characteristics in 
limiting its membership to the business community and advocating programs that would 
benefit that community.  It arose because the government had entered a market area 
formerly reserved for private enterprise – housing.  The advent of public housing in the 
1930s frightened businessmen, such as realtors, builders, and contractors, who viewed 
such a development as socialistic.  They fought back in the 1940s with the suggestion that 
the federal government provide funding for private enterprise to clear and rebuild areas 
designated for urban renewal by local government, but not for public housing.  The 
National Housing Act of 1949, however, did permit a very limited amount of public housing 
thanks to Senator Robert Taft, a strong conservative who nonetheless admitted that there 
were some individuals for whom private enterprise could not build an affordable house or 
apartment.  Thus, control of the marketplace for housing to protect private enterprise was 
a critical reason for the rise of CDF.  
A critical figure in the founding of CDF was Elmer Lindseth, President of the East Ohio Gas 
Company.  Three years earlier he had made a speech to the Rotary Club highlighting the 
need of urban renewal if the city were to become a magnet for more industry.  Lindseth and 
his company were well known for their involvement in attracting industry to the “Best 
Location in the Nation,” a company sponsored slogan.  During World War II local 
businessmen had created the Committee on Industrial Development to plan for expansion 
of industry and jobs after the war. Not much happened in Cleveland, but Pittsburgh was 
taking off.  In 1948 Lindseth was inspired to try the same approach, thereby leading him to 
talk with Paul Bellamy of the Plain Dealer, Curt Smith of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Mayor Thomas Burke.  The Plain Dealer sent a reporter to Pittsburgh, who wrote a number 
of stories for the paper highlighting its successes, and creating local interest in emulating 
Pittsburgh.    
In one of his first speeches as Director, Evans denied that his interest was in welfare, as 
charged by some of his colleagues at Standard Oil.  Rather he asserted that “It is a business 
proposition, and only by business methods can we accomplish our purpose.”  According to 
Evans, industry had a direct interest in rebuilding the central area of Cleveland – keeping 
workers nearby.  Better looks could also attract other industries and people back into the 
city.  His goal then was create a stronger economy by making the area an attractive place to 
live.  Since little had been accomplished by Cleveland since passage of the Housing Act, 
Evans “realized that the problem could not be ducked by trying to turn it over to the City, or 
passing the buck to the Federal Government.  The responsibility would have to be taken by 
private enterprise.  In short, the industrial leaders of Cleveland, on behalf of the futures of 
their own companies and the future of the city as a whole, and motivated primarily by 
business motives, decided to take this situation in hand and work it out.”   
An even more important indication of the business orientation of the CDF was its 
leadership.  John Virden, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, became the 
first president of the CDF Board.  Seth Taft, a prominent Republican lawyer from the 
corporate-oriented firm of Jones, Day, and eventual Republican candidate for mayor, 
served as the corporate counsel for CDF. PHOTO  Thomas Patton, a vice-president of 
Republic Steel, was also on the Board.   
  
The key problem, of course, was the potential decline of Cleveland.  As the upper and 
middle classes moved in increasing numbers to the suburbs, leading to an expansion of 
slums and blighted areas and a decline in city revenues, civil and economic leaders became 
concerned about its revival.  During the depression and World War II Cleveland had 
constructed some public housing and created a strong City Planning Commission.  
However, lack of money and agreement among various factions delayed its response to 
urban renewal in the 1950s.  CDF became then the potentially catalytic agent.  Its mission 
was to “furnish assistance to projects and undertakings for the improvement of the public 
peace, health, and safety, civic development and public welfare in the Cleveland 
metropolitan area of northeast Ohio and to participate in programs for the elimination of 
slum conditions and in urban redevelopment and other projects conducive to the progress 
of the community…”  Thus, it would serve as a liaison between local and federal 
governments, and also provide the financing that would enable planning to go forward.    
What is important to note about CDF is what it represents politically.  Most businessmen 
are Republicans concerned about lower taxes and less government regulation.  Yet in 
Cleveland where many offices and plants were located, Democrats controlled most of the 
city offices.  To counter Democratic control, businessmen formed the Chamber of 
Commerce that offered studies and advice on city issues.  The advent of the New Deal 
brought a new challenge – urban legislation.  As a result, Republicans began fostering 
independent candidates for mayor, men who would support lower taxes and work toward 
making Cleveland more attractive to industry and business in general.  Frank Lausche, 
Thomas Burke and Anthony Celebrezze were examples of their success.  In addition, they 
would have liked to change the form of county government so that it had more power, and 
thereby gave Republicans a bigger say in local issues.  Thus, CDF represented an extension 
of the Republican efforts to influence local politics. It presented itself, however, as 
something that could bring the talents and skills of businessmen into the public arena for 
the benefit of the city, and not as part of a political party.  
Between 1954 and 1969, when CDF went bankrupt, the organization engaged in the 
promotion of three different approaches to urban renewal.  The earliest was the building of 
public and private housing and took place in the later fifties.  The second approach was the 
renewal of downtown with Erieview as the central project.  The last approach in the later 
60s was an effort to rehabilitate substandard housing, especially in the Hough area.  CDF 
approached each case with great enthusiasm, but faced much public criticism for all three. 
The first program involved finding housing for those who would be displaced by the 
Longwood project – Area B in the central area of the East Side.  PHOTO There were three 
builders anxious to purchase the urban renewal land in the Longwood Area and build new, 
private housing that might attract more homeowners back into the city. PHOTO The city, 
however, had been unable to identify any land on which to build public/private housing 
that might accommodate the displaced.  Republic Steel Corporation, a strong supporter of 
CDF, came up with an idea.  It owned land in Kingsbury Run, well-known for the Torso 
Murders, and located near E. 71st and Kinsman avenues.  That land served as a dump heap 
for Republic slag and for the community, but Republic was willing to donate it.  PHOTOS  
  
Despite the reputation of the area and its numerous drawbacks, CDF and the City Planning 
Commission (Ernie Bohn was the Chair PHOTO) praised its possibilities and ironically 
named it Garden Valley.  His explanation of industrial involvement was the fact that 
numerous African Americans would be displaced, but would have no place to go because of 
the limits imposed on their movement.  Bohn bragged that Garden Valley would be a place 
of racial and economic integration.  CDF purchased the land, provided fees for the 
architects and engineers, and financed contracts for the utilities needed in the area.  Bohn 
characterized the effort as teamwork.  “This is men of good will in industry and 
government working together.”      
Evans was just as optimistic.  Pleased by the fact that urban developers were labeling this 
project a “Moses-in-the-wilderness operation,” Evans praised the people involved --    
In this case, industrial and business leaders banded together and transformed their 
position from that of impotent side-line critics into the role of active participants to bring 
the best community thinking to bear upon the problems that seemed insurmountable 
stumbling blocks to a couple of generations of Clevelanders.  And I am sure that it has been 
demonstrated in this city that the private businessman can and should have a definite role 
in urban renewal. 
Evans also predicted that “On this reclaimed land will be built, by public and private funds, 
new, soundly-integrated residential neighborhoods of moderate and low rental housing 
and attractive individual homes served by adequate community facilities and convenient 
retail enterprises.”  Garden Valley would provide 700 public housing units, while private 
enterprise would build 480 homes that might attract various individuals from higher socio-
economic levels.  Evans was ecstatic about the actions of the city government when it 
created “a city-wide workable program for redevelopment, framed an urban renewal plan 
for the Garden Valley Project, passed all required ordinances, vacated streets, and to save 
time, risked $400,000 for new sewers for the project.”  Part of his thinking was predicated 
on the premise that the major producers of city taxes, the businessmen, should play a major 
part in spending those dollars on urban renewal.    
Despite the optimism, these projects floundered beyond their finishing dates of 1964. The 
public housing portion suffered from an inability to complete the project as originally 
intended.  The sewer lines laid by the city collapsed when Republic and the city dumped 
slag and dirt on Garden Valley, and flooded numerous residences.  The filling of the land 
took years to complete and delayed the building of a play field.  And then there was the 
money problem.  Although the city had originally budgeted $900,000 for recreational and 
playfield development, for ten years it could not find any such money in its yearly budget.  
In 1966 they finally found $400,000.    
Private housing presented additional problems.  The projects at Longwood and on E.71st 
and Kinsman were costly, and resulted in rents that were above the level of those living in 
the area. Of course, the intention was to build housing that would attract those who could 
afford the rent to return to these areas, but there were few takers. Racial and social 
prejudices continued to influence where people located in Cleveland despite the 
  
enticement of new private housing.  Thus, lower income families flooded these projects, 
particularly at Longwood, in the belief that their rents would be subsidized, as in the public 
housing projects.  Once in the housing, they complained about the high rents, and even 
began rent strikes.  A 1958-59 recession and the rising tide of automation hurt residents of 
Longwood even further.   Owners of these projects soon found themselves in arrears and 
unable to repay the Cleveland Development Foundation.     
By 1959 CDF would decide to rescue such projects.  To do so, CDF had to buy out original 
developers at a loss, and set up two non-profit corps -- “a result not anticipated in forming 
the Foundation and a situation which it finds regrettable.”  CDF had learned that private 
enterprise could not build cheap housing even with a land subsidy, and that people were 
reluctant to move back into the city.   Although either of these conclusions could have been 
reached prior to construction,XX  Evans would finally admit the difficulties involved in 
these projects to Mayor Ralph Locher PHOTO when opposing the adoption of a similar 
program for the E. Woodland area in 1966.  Citing the loss of $750,000 in Longwood and 
Garden Valley, and the cost of rehabilitation that would make rents rather high, Evans 
concluded that … “such units would be unattractive to anyone not receiving rent 
supplements and the theory that rent supplements will permit the ‘mixing’ of lower income 
families with those of moderate income is unworkable and impractical.  Units will have to 
be fully occupied by rent supplement tenants or those able to pay their way.” PHOTO OF 
TRASH Thus, Evans’ background in business did not afford any special insights that 
enabled him to identify those difficulties prior to implementation of the projects.      
CDF then turned to the restoration of Downtown Cleveland as its major hope.  That section 
was also experiencing a downturn.  Although previously serving well as a retail center, 
administrative and government location, a convention home, and a source of entertainment 
and dining, each of these areas was now on the decline.  The department stores were facing 
serious competition from suburban outlets that offered free parking.  Although Cleveland at 
one point had the biggest convention center in the country, other cities had begun to build 
even larger facilities.  Equally important to the convention business was hotel space.  
Cleveland did not have a major hotel, and had not built a new one in over 20 years.  As a 
result, many conventioneers had to find space in motels located outside the downtown 
area.  Considering that downtown businesses and real estate provided a major share of the 
tax revenue, there arose a serious concern that its decline would add to Cleveland’s 
problems.  
Upshur Evans and Seth Taft had begun beating the drum for downtown redevelopment as 
early as 1957.  They met with Tony Celebrezze PHOTO who commented in agreement:    
I have said repeatedly, and I say again today, that our number one job is to broaden the 
present tax base by working together to encourage and help make possible new growth 
and development downtown and throughout the city so that a reasonable tax rate will 
produce additional revenue to meet expanding needs.  
Mayor Anthony Celebrezze’s attitude toward taxes was representative of the business 
community.  In a 1960 memo he talked about his firm stance on keeping property taxes 
  
low.  The rate was 12.55 mills, one of the “most favorable” in the country, and “we want to 
keep it that way.”  However, revenue had declined $90,000 between 1959 and 1960.  The 
state of Ohio was adding nearly $500,000 in additional costs for workmen’s compensation, 
pensions, and auditor’s/treasurer’s fees.  Meanwhile, the city had negotiated new contracts 
with the police and fire forces that added further costs.  Celebrezze had only one answer to 
this problem – the Downtown plan.   These financial stringencies that limited the ability of 
Cleveland to act on urban renewal would continue under Ralph Locher.  PHOTO 
Together Celebrezze, Evans, and Taft issued a call for a study plan that would hire some 
recognized planners; CDF would underwrite the cost.  They turned to the City Planning 
Commission, Ernie Bohn as Chair, and Eric Grubb as Director, to recommend the planners 
to create a study plan for the Downtown area.  Grubb hired a number of nationally known 
planners, including Walter Blucher.   This process began in 1957 and culminated with a 
CPC sponsored public report in May of 1959 that attracted 1500 spectators.  Bohn was the 
emcee and had an exhibit prepared to highlight the suggestions.  
The report PHOTO OF DOWNTOWN PLAN called for Cleveland to emphasize full-scale 
redevelopment.  The first recommendation focused on the convention center.  It called for 
an expansion that would compete with other cities, and the possible addition of “modern” 
hotel space.  The second was an effort to revitalize the retail center through construction of 
a subway to facilitate entrance into that center by connecting Public Square stores to those 
on E. 9th and Euclid.  Public Square would be remodeled as a transportation center with 
multiple levels and the possible removal of the Soldier’s and Sailor’s Monument.  The 
report also called for additional downtown parking to meet the needs of shoppers.   
The third recommendation called for the expansion of office space.  The trend in both 
industry and government was location of their offices in large buildings close to or in the 
downtown area.  Cleveland needed to profit from this trend by encouraging the growth of 
office space.  Closely related to this development was the need to provide downtown living 
spaces for those working in those offices.  It was estimated that Cleveland would need at 
least 6500 units for those workers by 1975.  Not only would they benefit from closeness to 
work, but they would also make purchases of the many goods and services available in the 
downtown area.  Fourthly, the report cited the need to create better access to the 
downtown via improvement of the transportation system.  Particular emphasis would be 
placed on finishing the freeway system, and enhancing throughways around the city.  
Finally, the Report called for a more sparkling downtown that eliminated drabness and 
“inappropriate signs.”  Only in this manner could it compete more effectively with 
suburban malls.  
These plans were widely accepted and praised, but not completely detailed.  Hence, it fell to 
the CDF to do so.  By the late 50s Upshur Evans had established a close relationship with 
Jim Lister, PHOTO the Director of Urban Renewal, and with the Mayor.  He was encouraged 
to move forward with more specifics, as the City Planning Commission became a second 
fiddle.  Ernie Bohn’s bout with alcoholism during these years was a further factor in the rise 
of CDF.   
  
CDF, Upshur Evans, and their supporters were quite enthusiastic about their opportunities.  
So much so that they identified over 6000 acres that would undergo urban renewal, nearly 
two times as much as its next rival, Philadelphia (3586), and three times that of Boston 
(1906).  Overall, they had selected 14 different projects, and would ultimately complete 
only 6.  They considered that big plans were needed if Cleveland was to regain its position 
as a major American city.  Ultimately, this goal would prove to be beyond their capabilities.  
As the Little Hoover Commission would later charge, Cleveland was “overextended.”    
The most important component of their emphasis on significant creativity was the 
Erieview project PHOTOS  --  a section of the city located between the Lakefront and Euclid 
Avenues, north to south, and between East 9th and E. 14th.  CDF wanted the city to 
designate it an urban renewal area wherein land and buildings could be taken over by the 
city and offered to private enterprise to develop.  Within this area, considered to be an 
extension of the downtown, would be government and business office buildings, parking, 
and apartment buildings housing the workers.  Making the area hospitable via parks, 
recreation areas, stores and restaurants was also a goal.  CDF believed that it could level the 
entire area and get private companies to invest in its rebuilding.    
The initial plans for Erieview were not well received by the federal government.  The GAO 
thought that leveling the entire area, as originally planned for a grand scheme, was too big 
and too expensive.  The Cleveland Press responded with an article accusing the author, 
Marion R. Beeman, of prejudice.   According to the Press,Beeman had observed that  
The boys in the office and myself commented on the Erieview project.  We thought the 
project too big in size….  We questioned whether the Erieview project would attract the 
private development and the interest for downtown living as the plan proposed.  We had 
talked to real estate men and property owners and there was a lot of violent thinking about 
the project.  We questioned the magnitude of the project and the wisdom of tearing down a 
lot of buildings on the city’s hope that developers would rush in overnight and redevelop 
the area with new apartment and office buildings. 
The Comptroller General of the United States also agreed with Beeman.  In a letter sent to 
Congress, the CG complained about the fact that the URA accepted without investigation 
the condemnation of all of the properties in the Erieview area.  He noted that many of the 
buildings were not substandard, and could serve well in the area.  The city had proposed 
that 84 of the 118 buildings were substandard, but the Comptroller General’s office found 
only 24 substandard with the additional 60 able to be rehabbed.  Moreover, the 
government was skeptical of large-scale demolition because of its cost when rehabilitation 
might work just as well.   He was recommending then a reevaluation of the project’s 
buildings to determine how many might be demolished.   
Accompanying the letter was a report that condemned the initial plan of the Foundation.  
The Foundation, it accused, wished to find a site in downtown Cleveland that could be 
cleared of existing structures and then rebuilt as a business center with office buildings, 
stores, and apartments.  The initial 1960 plan recommended “demolishing 224 of the 237 
existing buildings in the area, most of which were being used for retail, office, and light 
  
manufacturing purposes.”  From submitted paperwork, they found that many of the 
buildings had only minor violations that could have been corrected by enforcement of the 
building code.  They also inspected some of the buildings and found the same results.  
Finally, the report pointed out that the 1949 Housing Act had a provision that no more than 
30% of an urban renewal project could be used for non-residential purposes.    
The CDF strongly disagreed with the federal evaluation.  Erieview, it was suggested, was 
part of a dynamic plan “revitalizing Cleveland’s downtown, strengthening existing property 
values, attracting substantial investment in new construction, and employment, and 
providing an environment that will attract people back to the central city.”  CDF argued that 
…”in order to achieve a creative revitalization of our most important areas in our urban 
centers, it may not be sufficient action if limited to rehabilitation and a limited amount of 
clearance.  This is particularly true where the plan expresses as its fundamental objective 
the achieving of dynamic redevelopment.  This is exactly what our cities so urgently need 
today.”  Its conclusion was that Erieview was a sound plan that deserved federal approval.   
One has to wonder how much worse Erieview might have been had CDF been able to 
proceed on its vision. 
Despite the objections, Cleveland was forced to adopt a smaller plan within the financial 
limitations imposed by the federal government.  The city hired I.M. Pei, nationally known 
architect, to provide the overall plan.  John Galbreath, a Columbus developer, constructed 
the centerpiece of the area, a 40 story office building with a large reflecting pool nearby.  
Adding on parking spaces and a debate over how far it would be set back delayed 
construction, but it was the first completed and offered an impressive view of Lake Erie.  
The second project was a 30 story federal office building constructed on E. 9th St. and 
named after Mayor Celebrezze.  The addition of apartments for downtown workers was 
delayed because of questions about the location.  Ultimately, the 20 story Chesterfield 
PHOTO  was constructed on Chester Avenue with over 400 units and a small urban park 
nearby.  Within the Erieview area a number of companies, like Addressograph-Multigraph 
and the Cleveland Press, upgraded or expanded their holdings.    
But that was the extent of it.  From the first granting of federal support in 1961 to late 1966 
the city acquired 75% of the properties approved for demolition, but sold only 12% with 
few prospects of selling more.  The Little Hoover Commission blamed it on a lack of staff 
and lack of activity by the Urban Renewal Department. It noted that the city had developed 
an $800,000 debt from its purchases that was increasing by $50,000 each month.    
Robert Weaver wrote in early 1967 to express his impression of the Erieview I project.  
Since there was clearly inadequate progress on land acquisition, land disposition, site 
improvements and supporting facilities, he would have to consider defaulting on the 
project if it continued.   Cleveland’s  Department of Community Development, however, saw 
only success in Erieview I – which contained mainly marginal businesses before, but now 
had a 40 story Erieview Tower, a 32 story Federal Building, a 14 story Cuyahoga Savings 
Building and the 20 story Chesterfield Apartments.  These buildings had stimulated other 
construction – the Regency Apartments, a Hollenden House Hotel, and Public Hall addition 
making it the largest indoor exhibition hall in country.     Mayor Locher PHOTO XX also sent 
  
a letter covering all 16 points, and indicating more progress than Weaver admitted.  Locher 
boasted that “I for one am not prepared to join the ranks of the defeatists so busily seeking 
scapegoats and so eagerly pointing their fingers at Urban Renewal’s every little failure 
while completely ignoring its successes.”    
Meanwhile, other parts of the Downtown Plan faced serious opposition. A downtown 
subway that would link Public Square along Euclid Avenue and a few blocks south on E. 9th 
St. had secured bond funds back in 1953, but the County Commissioners kept delaying their 
approval.  Meanwhile, the County Auditor, Albert Porter, issued a report and spoke publicly 
on his opposition.  A strong supporter of a freeway system as the answer to Cleveland’s 
transportation problems, Porter predicted an adverse impact on the retail district while the 
subway was being constructed; he also questioned the stability of the buildings located on 
the route of the subway.  Porter was successful when the County Commissioners refused to 
proceed in late December of 1959, several weeks prior to the expiration of the bond issue.  
This defeat also assured a scuttling of the plans for the Public Square.    
A second defeat came regarding the need for a modern hotel.  Jim Lister came up with the 
idea of approaching Conrad Hilton about building such a hotel on a corner of the Mall. 
Hilton agreed, and the passage of a bill allowing the location of the building on what had 
been considered a public area was placed on the ballot for the fall election in 1959.  CDF 
supported the measure and campaigned on its behalf.  The measure was controversial, 
though, because of its violation of an area previously dedicated to public use.  This ballot 
issue also lost.    
These defeats masked the lack of progress on other plans.  As indicated by the Little Hoover 
Commission, Cleveland had other areas, such as E. Woodland, Gladstone and St. Vincent, 
that were hardly progressing at all.  Partially, it was a result of the lack of staff to do the 
implementation of the plan.  But in all areas there was a delay brought about by the time 
required to assess, negotiate and acquire the properties, as well as the need to relocate 
families from demolished properties.  Once acquired, these properties were slow to sell to 
private developers.  The designation of the area as a slum and blighted area led to a decline 
in property values, and the departure of stable homeowners.  What was happening was the 
purchase of properties by the city led to an accumulation of debt on the part of the city, and 
an inability to repay loans.  Financially, urban renewal was a mess in Cleveland.  According 
to the Little Hoover Commission, “All projects reveal an apparent lack of phasing and 
scheduling of acquisition, relocation, rehabilitation, disposition and redevelopment.”  Thus, 
projects were behind 1-4 years which was causing an interest overrun of $1,400,000 per 
year.     
As mentioned earlier, in April of 1966 Evans sent a letter to Ralph Perk indicating his 
observation that private enterprise could not produce new housing within cleared slums 
that would be affordable for the low income family.  In particular, he was no longer behind 
the East Woodland project because of the high rents and the poor location.    
All of this activity fell apart in December of 1966 when the federal government indicated 
that it was fed up with the lack of overall progress and unwilling to continue funding.  The 
  
letters of Mayor Ralph Locher and Urban Renewal Director Jim Lister were to no avail.  
Locher then turned to the Little Hoover Commission to study the status of urban renewal in 
Cleveland.  He had created the commission a year before because of an unbalanced budget 
caused by the Board of Tax Appeals decision cutting Cleveland’s property values by $120M.  
Most of the 24 participants were once again businessmen.   According to a Plain Dealer 
editorial,  “Surely men experienced in large-scale land and construction could do better 
than those city workers Locher can hire at limited city salaries.  Business savvy is sorely 
needed at the Hall.”  It said nothing about the influence of CDF.     
The report on urban renewal done by Wallace Chapla explained the problems facing 
supporters.  Although city officials estimated that the city would gain from its 1/3rd 
expenditure on property by a 2/3rds federal subsidy, and a resultant increase in the tax 
base, the reality was further city expenditures creating a need to increase taxes.  According 
to Chapla, 
New buildings require new public service additions such as sewers, streets and parks, and 
new structures such as required by Metropolitan Housing Authority and other public 
institutions are non-taxpayers.  As a result, the city can end up with an additional capital 
cost and less on the tax duplicate than when the Plan began.  Moreover, the mere 
classification of a geographical area as Urban Renewal accelerates the deterioration of 
property (no incentive for maintenance) in the area; and demolition of homes without 
adequate provision for housing for displaced people creates overcrowding in other areas, 
thereby creating new slums.  While Urban Renewal is a method for rebuilding the city, in 
practice it becomes a catalyst accelerating the deterioration of existent structures until the 
plans are completely executed.  In short, the Urban Renewal can open a Pandora’s box of 
trouble, unless the plans are well developed and quickly executed, which means that the 
projects undertaken must be only of the size that can be executed by the available 
competence of the Division.    
After the resignation of Jim Lister as Urban Renewal Director in 1965, CDF turned in a third 
direction – rehabilitation of existing housing.  Actually, CDF had worked on rehabilitation in 
Garden Valley and in the Munroe, East Central, Glenville, Hough, and Near South Side 
neighborhoods back in the 1950s as part of Cleveland’s Neighborhood Rehabilitation and 
Conservation Program.  In those early years no federal funding was available, but the 
availability of such funding in the 1960s encouraged CDF to work more directly with 
rehabilitation.   But now it was to be the only method it would use for renewal. 
PATH (Plan of Action for Tomorrow’s Housing), formed in 1966. was an inspiration for the 
new approach.  This committee, financed by the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation, 
had studied Cleveland housing for six months and had traveled to 11 other cities for 
information.  Although lacking support from Ralph Locher, PATH recommended adding 
planning staff, a target of 10,000 new houses to replace the substandard, creation of a 
housing court to enforce the building code, state action on behalf of housing, including the 
creation of a commission, and finally an attack on housing segregation. It also labeled labor 
costs as too high and called for the employment of apprentices in rehabilitation who would 
work for less than union wages, and be supervised by a journeyman who would earn union 
  
wages.  James Houston, the head of PATH, who admitted at a congressional hearing that the 
cost of rehabilitation would not permit much rebuilding, called for more federal subsidies.   
It suggested the formation of a Community Housing Corporation bringing together 
government, businesses, and foundations to coordinate urban renewal rather than follow 
the piecemeal and fragmented Lister approach.  It recommended the raising of $6M over 
five years with half from the business community and half from foundations.  CDF would be 
the organizer.    
With the election of Carl Stokes as mayor in 1967, this Community Development Approach 
gained momentum.  In a press release in May of 1968 Cleveland: Now, the Stokes program, 
announced the formation of a Community Housing Corporation to undertake the 
rehabilitation of 4600 homes.    
Somewhat discouraging, though, was a recent CDF report that concluded that “So far 
nothing has worked.  After fifteen years of housing experience, effort and considerable 
money; perhaps all we can do is learn to lose money properly.”  In spite of its admission 
that it had not learned much, the CDF report called the new Community Development 
approach a key.  In short, they might lose money in a planning stage that could take three 
years, but bringing it all together (perhaps through a super developer) was the solution.   
“In short, we are not just proposing a bigger and better rehabilitation or new construction 
program – but a massive program of such dimensions that it will respond to the economic, 
social, political and institutional changes of our community.  There is no guarantee that 
even this effort would be successful; but if all elements of community development are 
directed in a single thrust, the social and physical deterioration of the central city might be 
reversed.”     
John Fockler, a vice-president for CDF and former local editor for Business Weekly, was the 
man assigned the task of handling the rehabilitation of housing for CDF.  Fockler had come 
to Cleveland in 1957.  Possessed of an uncanny ability to analyze and evaluate CDF efforts, 
he was the rare person  able to learn the lessons of CDF’s experiences.  In a speech to City 
Council in 1966 he admitted the limitations of urban renewal – the extent of substandard 
housing within the city, the inadequacy of lower class incomes, and the social problems of 
the residents.  Most significantly, he recognized that “… the costs of new construction are so 
high that private enterprise, motivated by a profit aim, cannot economically supply the 
needs, and the same is true of the cost of much rehabilitation.”    
Hough, of course, was a flashpoint for Cleveland in the 1960s.  Riots in 1966 and again in 
1968 led to an effort to reshape that area.  Fockler noted in particular the economic 
changes.  From people pouring into Hough in the 1950s and crowding into substandard 
housing with high rents, there was a reversal in the 1960s that led to a departure of 13,000 
people (decline of 17.5%) by 1965, and a 25% decline in rents.  Many of those remaining 
were unemployed.  According to Fockler, “Some (landlords) abandoned their property 
early.  Others cut back on maintenance and let their buildings come apart.  A few have tried 
to maintain their investments in spite of what has been happening around them.”    
  
In spite of this downturn, rents in apartment buildings on E. 90th was $75, well above what 
many could afford.  If properly rehabbed, which Fockler estimated at $10,000 per unit, 
rents would rise even higher to $140 per unit. There was, though, a recently passed 
government program – 221(d)(3)—that would offer a 3% mortgage for forty years, and 
produce a rent of $108 per month for tenants that merited a public housing subsidy in such 
housing, still too high.   A further problem was the opposition of Cleveland Metropolitan 
Housing Director, Ernest Bohn, to such a program.  There was also strong competition from 
all of the substandard housing in Hough that rented at $75-$80 per month.  According to 
Fockler, “families with incomes haven’t been clamoring for housing at rents they can afford 
when substandard units have been available at such distressed prices.”     
In particular, Fockler blamed the federal and state governments for his dilemma.  The 
federal government did not have the type of program that would work.  According to 
Fockler, “the Federal government, critical of Cleveland’s progress, has failed to update its 
programs to meet changing needs.  Federal programs now available just aren’t enough to 
solve Cleveland’s housing problems.  Federal officials can criticize and chastise all they 
want, but until they quit dealing in theoretical relationships and understand the practical 
problems of housing as they really exist, they won’t be giving cities the help the cities 
need.”  Worst of all, however, was the fact that Ohio state government provided no 
assistance or aid.  It also refused to pass a bill that would allow a city to take over property 
that a landlord refused to rehabilitate to meet city building standards.   
In spite of the obstacles, Fockler believed that it was essential to do something in the Hough 
neighborhood in spite of the fact that no organization – CMHA, private enterprise, or 
church groups – favored rehab.  Hence, he advocated a limited rehab program located on a 
portion of E. 90th street that would serve as a potential model.  CDF would learn how to 
make it work economically, and then share its lessons.  Through formation of Hough 
Housing Corporation, CDF would focus on four properties, move families undergoing 
rehabilitation within the neighborhood, and provide social services to assist during the 
adjustment.  Eventually, this project would lead to the rehabilitation of over 100 apartment 
units on E. 90th.     
The Hough Housing Corporation benefitted from five different forms of subsidy --  Federal 
payment of 2/3ds of the land cost, the 221 (d)(3) provision of a forty year mortgage at 3% 
interest, public housing leasing of large units for low-income families, grants for social 
services from Cleveland Foundation and Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation, and the 
payment of his salary and expenses by CDF.  Fockler was positive about these subsidies, but 
realized that they were still not enough to reach low-income families.  Understanding that 
small town and rural conservatives dominated Congress and state assemblies, he called on 
businessmen, whom he classified as conservative, to end their opposition to government 
subsidies and to federal/state expenditures in urban areas.    
Within the next year, 1969, CDF folded.  It was financially bankrupt from unrepaid loans 
and investments.  Upshur Evans had quit as executive director a year earlier, and now John 
Fockler and his staff had to leave as well.  As an example of private-public partnership, it 
  
had failed to bring about a restoration for Cleveland that it had described in glowing terms.  
Despite the insights of John Fockler, Community Development did not work.    
What can be concluded from the experience of the CDF is that inclusion of private 
enterprise, as represented by businessmen, does not guarantee success.  Nor, of course, 
does the inclusion of politicians, planners, and government officials either. Factors that 
CDF, as well as others, needed to consider before beginning any project were the level of 
funding available, the sufficiency of staff to handle the tasks involved, how to speedily 
navigate the multiple levels of government, and whether their underlying assumptions 
were correct.  CDF confidence that private enterprise could produce cheap housing and/or 
cheap renovation of older housing consistently proved incorrect, and led to CDF’s economic 
demise in 1969.   
Around the same time the Cuyahoga River caught on fire, followed by Mayor Ralph Perk’s 
hair-on-fire incident, and Laugh-In’s award to Cleveland of its Flying Fickle Finger of Fate.  
Cleveland had become a national laughing stock.  And yet it had had the help of prominent 
businessmen throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  It is, of course, not fair to conclude from 
one study that businessmen are poor risks in public/private partnerships.  The Voinovich 
experience certainly suggests otherwise.  But it is important not to fall into the trap that 
businessmen have all the answers and that their background gives them automatic insights 
into the solving of social and political problems.  That is why more intensive historical 
research is needed. 
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Nonprofits and Government in Partnership:  Let Us Count the Ways 
 
    ABSTRACT 
For the last half century, the work of government in the United States and other western 
countries has moved inexorably towards a partnership model in which the provision of 
public services and the pursuit of public goals are shared between government and the 
private sector.  Various facets of this evolution have been described under such themes as 
privatization, hollowing out of the state, third party government and public-private 
partnerships.  An often underappreciated dimension of this movement is the critical role of 
nonprofit organizations – themselves a microcosm for joining public with private goals.  In 
this paper, we explore various ways in which nonprofits and government now work 
together, and or potentially could work together.  We begin with a review and elaboration 
of theory illuminating the nature of nonprofit-government relationships.  This leads us to 
the view that nonprofit-government relationships are rich in variety and often innovative – 
a result of mutual pragmatic problem-solving to address pressing social issues.  We further 
examine this theme through the lens of five prominent and established nonprofit 
organizations in social services, and arts and culture, in Cleveland, Ohio, each of which 
pursues a public mission, sometimes through multiple, creative strategies of cooperation 
with local, state and federal government.  The study of these cases is enhanced by insights 
found through examination of documents from the new George Voinovich digital archives.  
We conclude that nonprofit-government relationships can no longer be fully understood 
simply as governmental outsourcing through contractual relationships or indirect 
reflections of tax policy, but also as more intensive and complex collaborations that serve 
the mutual interests of both parties in pursuit of the public good. 
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Nonprofits and Government in Partnership:  Let Us Count the Ways 
Introduction 
The post-World War II expansion of “cradle to grave” welfare states in Western Europe and 
advanced countries such as Canada, Australia and Israel (Gidron, Kramer and Salamon, 
1992) was never fully imitated in the United States, where a skepticism towards 
government has prevailed since Colonial times.   The U.S. began to build its social safety net 
in the 1930s during the Franklin Roosevelt administration and the Great Depression, when 
important innovations including social security and unemployment insurance were 
instituted.  A great boost in U.S. social welfare programming took place in the 1960s with 
the War on Poverty and Great Society programs of Lyndon Johnson.  However, while 
government, at the federal and state levels, expanded significantly to administer and fund 
new programs in health care, education, community development, the arts and the 
environment, the country did not choose to build a vast new welfare bureaucracy to 
implement the new programs and deliver the array of new services.  Rather, it chose the 
route of “third party government”, as Lester Salamon (1987) called it, channeling much of 
the funding through the states, and through insurance programs such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, into a vastly expanded private network consisting substantially of nonprofit 
organizations (Bowman and Fremont-Smith, 2006).  Thus, even in the heyday of 
governmental support of social welfare programming in the U.S., the private sector was a 
critical element, with the expansion of new and existing nonprofits playing a major part.  
The role of nonprofits would become even more important in succeeding decades as 
governments took a generally more conservative turn and began retrenching. Beginning 
with the Reagan administration in the 1980s, government looked increasingly to the 
private sector not only for help in delivering services but paying for them as well. 
 
From the viewpoint of private, nonprofit organizations, these developments presented an 
array of challenges.  How could they operate with government support while retaining 
their coveted independence and autonomy?  How could they rise to the challenge of 
expansion and providing new services by raising the required additional private resources 
to match or supplement government support?  How could they best exploit tax incentives 
put in place by government to encourage private supply?  How could they avoid being 
exploited themselves, by allowing their own expansion justify further government retreat 
from support of critical social services? More broadly, how could they work with 
government as a partner to address the common ground between their own individual 
social missions and that of governmentally funded and regulated programs?  In the frenetic 
atmosphere of the past half century, the relationships between government and nonprofits 
have grown more complex, variegated and even hostile, yet often retaining the basic 
character of partnership as both parties struggle to serve their perceptions of the public 
interest. 
 
Scholars have helped to track and conceptualize this complex domain as it has evolved over 
time.  For example, Bowman and Fremont-Smith (2006) cataloged the multiple dimensions 
of financing, regulation and tax exemption characterizing the relationships of nonprofit 
with state and local governments (2006). Further, Gronbjerg and Salamon (2012) 
  
documented the ways in which government support of nonprofits has been changing, 
especially towards market-based mechanisms such as “tax expenditures” (government tax 
revenues forgone through various kinds of tax incentives) as well as loan programs.  In 
particular, these authors concluded that “…Certain components of the nonprofit 
sector…have become more deeply engaged with government.  However, the mechanisms 
by which these relationships are carried out have diversified beyond the grants and 
contracts of the 1960s and are now increasingly market-like in structure…” (p.578).  As 
Smith and Gronbjerg (2006) acknowledged, theorists of nonprofit-government relations 
have struggled to keep up with the changes, although there is a growing sense that a more 
nuanced and comprehensive framework reflecting new partnerships, networking and 
market relationships is needed. 
 
The aim of this paper is to uncover and illuminate some of the creativity and variety found 
in nonprofit-government relationships in a particular  effort to expand understanding of  
(intentional and implicit) strategies of public-private partnerships between nonprofits and 
government and how partnership arrangements might be further applied to the innovative 
solution of social problems.  In this connection, we differentiate between routine aspects of 
nonprofit-government relations in the domains of tax, financing and regulatory policies, 
and pro-active efforts to forge partnerships between nonprofits and government to solve 
specific problems or address particular local issues. In making this distinction we follow 
the observations of Gidron, Kramer and Salamon, 1992, p.19: 
 
“…nonprofits can simply function as agents of government program administrators, 
with little discretion or bargaining power. This might be termed the “collaborative-
vendor” model.  Alternatively, third-sector organizations can retain a considerable 
amount of discretion, either in managing programs or, through the political process, 
in developing them.  Such a situation might be termed the “collaborative-
partnership” model.” 
 
It is this latter kind of nonprofit-government relationship that we primarily examine in this 
paper.  We carry out our analysis in two steps.  We start with the rudiments of nonprofit-
government relationships as delineated in theories and conceptual frameworks offered in 
the nonprofit literature.  We further elaborate on one of these frameworks (Young, 2006), 
teasing out nuances that address nonprofit and government problem solving through a 
collaborative partnership model.  We then turn to a series of case studies of nonprofit 
organizations in Cleveland, Ohio originally developed for a project studying the changing 
finances of nonprofit organizations over the first decade of this century.  These cases allow 
us to search for nuances in nonprofit-government arrangements and to uncover variations 
that reflect the collaborative partnership model and further enrich our understanding of 
the potential of nonprofit-government partnerships for addressing social needs.    
 
Theory 
As noted above, scholars including Bowman and Fremont-Smith (2006) have documented 
the multiple facets of financing, regulation and tax exemption that characterize 
relationships of nonprofit with government.  These specific policy dimensions can be 
  
further generalized and abstracted, and related to economic theories of nonprofit 
organizations.  In particular,   
Young (2006) describes nonprofit- government relations along three distinct dimensions: 
supplementary, complementary and adversarial.  The complementary dimension, which 
describes how nonprofits and government often work together to share a common task 
such as delivery of a public service, is the one most closely associated with the notion of 
public-private partnership.   However, aspects of partnership manifest themselves along 
the supplementary and adversarial dimensions of nonprofit-government relations as well.  
For example, by providing tax incentives to donors, government can in effect collaborate 
with arts or religious organizations to help fund them while avoiding the problems of 
church-state separation or support of controversial art that may be offensive to some 
groups of citizens.  Similarly, nonprofit organizations can be seen to cooperate with 
government even along adversarial lines.  For example, government regulation of nonprofit 
service delivery programs helps ensure the quality of those programs, increasing the 
public’s trust in nonprofits and indirectly supporting their operations.  Alternatively, 
advocacy efforts undertaken by nonprofits for underserved groups may ultimately result in 
new government programs that support the nonprofit’s social mission. 
 
Each of the three dimensions of nonprofit-government relations is grounded in economic 
theory of nonprofit organizations in a democracy and market economy.   Such economic 
theory, as synthesized by Steinberg (2006), is bifurcated into two parts – demand for the 
services of nonprofit organizations and theory of nonprofit supply.  Demand-side theory 
features three key strands – based respectively on public goods theory, information 
asymmetry or contract failure theory, and the concept of third party government – while 
supply side theory is based on entrepreneurship and (managerial) theory of the nonprofit 
firm.  Public goods theory, as originally proposed by Weisbrod (1975), stipulates that 
nonprofit services arise from unsatisfied demand once government has responded to 
median voter preferences for public goods.  This theory corresponds with the 
supplementary dimension of nonprofit-government relations.  In particular, nonprofits 
finance and produce public goods that government is unable or unwilling to provide.  This 
may entail public goods for which there are no political majorities to justify government 
programming or expenditure, or for which government-provided levels of quantity and 
quality leave some portion of the citizenry insufficiently satisfied.  Indeed, this situation 
may even lead government to encourage nonprofit supply, through tax incentives for 
example, even if “tax expenditures” implicitly commit government resources to their 
provision.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the supplementary dimension of nonprofit government relations 
can entail more than just routine policies linking nonprofits and government.  For example, 
tax incentives can be targeted to specific projects, government loan guarantees or tax-free 
bond issues.  Thus the supplementary dimension of nonprofit-government relations is one 
avenue through which nonprofit-government partnerships can be forged. 
 
A second strand of demand-side economic theory entails information asymmetry, i.e. 
situations in which the consumer is disadvantaged in the market-place because important 
aspects of the quality of services are complex and opaque.  For example, parents may have 
  
difficulty discerning the quality of day care services provided by for-profit firms to their 
young children because they cannot be present to observe all the time or they may not 
know what to look for.  In such cases, the theory stipulates that nonprofit organizations 
may be more efficient suppliers because they face weaker incentives to exploit the 
information asymmetry.  Government may enter the picture in these situations by 
subsidizing nonprofit suppliers or restricting supply to nonprofit organizations, as well as 
by licensing and regulating suppliers. 
 
The theory of information asymmetry intersects all three dimensions of nonprofit-
government relations: government may choose to provide tax incentives encouraging 
nonprofit supply rather than offering that supply itself (supplementary); government may 
choose to subsidize nonprofit supply directly (complementary); and government may also 
regulate nonprofit (and for-profit) suppliers and oversee their operations and 
implementation, or nonprofit groups may lobby for government to improve the supply 
through tax incentives, regulation or subsidy (adversarial).  Situations of information 
asymmetry may also lead to nonprofit-government partnerships.  For example, early 
childhood programming, social services, K-12 education, health care and social services, 
may all be parts of community programs in which government engages nonprofits to 
ensure service provision of requisite quality. 
 
A third strand of demand-side theory of nonprofit organizations involves the decisions of 
governments to contract out the delivery of public services.  This is the essence of 
Salamon’s (1987) theory of third party government.  There are two chief underlying 
(economic and political) motivations for governments to do this.  First, it may be cheaper 
for one of two reasons:  (a) the costs of doing business in the public sector by running a 
direct program within government’s bureaucracy may be higher than the costs of 
administering a contract system, i.e., the “transactions costs” in the public sector vs. the 
market may differ; or (b) the operating expenses of direct public service provision may be 
higher within government versus what it costs for nonprofit service delivery.  Various 
factors may account for lower costs to government if it contracts with nonprofits: 
personnel costs may differ, nonprofits may have flexibility to use resources more efficiently 
than government, or nonprofits may be willing to shoulder a portion of the costs from 
other sources because the service fits their mission. 
 
Second, by contracting out, government may be able to be more responsive to demand by 
allowing nonprofits to customize services to their local situations.  Government, to the 
contrary, must generally operate according to uniform policies that cannot easily vary from 
one venue to another, a factor that James Douglas (1987) called the “categorical constraint” 
of government.   Indeed, government’s ability to contract out public service provision may 
even help address part of the problem of unsatisfied demand for public goods as discussed 
above. 
 
The third party government strand of nonprofit economic theory corresponds closely with 
the complementary dimension of nonprofit-government relationships.  Many such 
relationships may be routine, as reflected in established widespread government financing 
programs to support nonprofits’ provision of various social services, housing, education, 
  
and health care.  But the complementary dimension is also the most salient manifestation 
of nonprofit-government partnerships wherein special contractual relationships are 
established between particular nonprofits and agencies of government to carry out specific 
projects in particular locales, such as redevelopment of a neighborhood or addressing a 
local environmental issue.  
 
In juxtaposition with demand side theory, the supply-side theory of nonprofits posits that 
entrepreneurial and managerial goals drive the formation, expansion and programming of 
nonprofit organizations (James, 1983; Young, 2013a).  As such, the supply side theory is 
agnostic to the issue of relationships with government.  If opportunities for government 
funding are consistent with entrepreneurs’ or managers’ preferences for addressing social 
goals and their personal goals such as autonomy and compensation, then such 
opportunities will be pursued, otherwise not.  Supply-side theory also corresponds with all 
three dimensions of nonprofit-government relations.  In the case of undersupply of public 
goods, entrepreneurial leaders may respond with their own additional programming, 
supported by private resources, in supplementary fashion.  Where government seeks to 
support the work of nonprofits along complementary lines, entrepreneurial leaders will 
seek out these opportunities and try to engage with government on terms that meet their 
own requirements.   If there are extant social needs that require government to implement 
new policies and programs, nonprofit entrepreneurs may lead those efforts to influence 
government.  Various cases of these behaviors have been documented by Young (2013b) 
and others.  
 
Supply-side theory also underwrites both routine relationships between government and 
nonprofits, and those which rise to the level of partnership.  Nonprofit entrepreneurial 
leaders may in many cases simply be trying to break into established channels of 
government funding and service delivery.  However, the establishment of new nonprofits 
that undertake social missions with the support of newly allocated government funds, 
special tax advantages or policy mandates to carry out major social projects, would have 
the character of partnerships.  
 
In summary, economic theories of nonprofit organizations, undergirding the three 
dimensions of nonprofit government relationships, signal various possibilities for 
nonprofit-government partnerships that transcend the day to day provision, financing and 
regulation of services.  As such, they motivate the search for a variety of creative 
possibilities through which nonprofit-governmental partnerships are manifested.  As 
suggested in the cases offered in this paper and hinted in the forgoing theory, the diversity, 
innovativeness and creativity of public-private partnerships involving nonprofit 
organizations may be underappreciated and often subtle.  For example, public-private 
partnerships aimed at community economic development or advancement of local cultural 
activity commonly involve nonprofits as critical elements to success – for instance as 
umbrella agencies responsible for coordination of complex projects with many partners, or 
as governing bodies that connect the interests of communities and business partners with 
those of government.  Moreover such partnerships may employ creative means and 
strategies to accomplish their complex goals. 
 
  
Methodology 
This paper is exploratory in its approach.  Case studies of five Cleveland-based nonprofit 
organizations have recently been drafted for the purpose of understanding the trajectory of 
their finances over the first decade of this century.  The case analyses reveal both the extent 
and the nature of public sector involvement in the work of these nonprofits, during a 
period of considerable economic turmoil.  The cases span two broad subsectors of 
nonprofit activity – social services and arts and culture.  Each case illuminates various ways 
in which nonprofit-public partnerships can manifest themselves towards the achievement 
of a public purpose; the cases also hint at some as yet unrealized possibilities for 
productive partnership activity. 
The selected cases may be considered a small “convenience sample” available from an 
existing project, and corresponding to the venue in which the Voinovich archives offers 
additional data from the historical record.  Granted these limits, the sample has the 
advantage of holding the local venue, historical time period, and general fields of service 
constant so that we may reasonably expect that our results will be suggestive for other 
similar venues in the same fields and time period. 
We examined each of the cases by searching for and illuminating instances where the 
nonprofit in question has established some kind of working relationship with government.  
In our analysis, we sought to discern the nature of that relationship and whether and how it 
illustrated the possibilities and nuances for partnership along each of the three dimensions 
of nonprofit-government relationships discussed above.  The studied organizations were 
originally selected for an existing research project that examined their dependence over 
time on different sources of revenue, including charitable contributions, fee revenue, 
investment income, and government funding.  Based on publicly available IRS Form 990 
data, we found that these organizations had varying degrees of reliance on government 
sources.  To obtain greater detail, we contacted representatives of the selected 
organizations to participate in interviews during 2013 and 2014.  The executive directors, 
chief executive officers, and chief financial officers of the organizations provided us with 
annual reports and audited financial statements as well as other descriptive data.  We then 
sought to supplement this information with documents from The Voinovich Collections, 
available online through Cleveland State University, which provided further detail about 
the nature of nonprofit-government relations manifested in the cases.  The Voinovich 
Collections contain hundreds of documents from Voinovich’s political campaigns and time 
spent in political office in Ohio.  For the purpose of this research, we relied on the mayoral 
archive which contains documents from Voinovich’s tenure as the Mayor of the City of 
Cleveland from 1979 to 1989 and is the most pertinent for the Cleveland-based 
organizations we were studying.  With the assistance of the research project coordinator of 
The Voinovich Collections, we were able to examine memoranda, planning documents, 
press releases, and other materials that specifically mentioned the selected organizations 
or related to the overall nature of nonprofit-government relations in that time period.         
The following five case studies constitute our sample: 
The Centers for Families and Children is the largest social services organization in Cleveland, 
a result of significant mergers in 2011 and 1970 of various social service agencies, some of 
  
which date back to the 1800’s.   The Centers offers a comprehensive array of services in 
three broad categories: health, education and social services.  The Centers is also engaged 
in programs of government relations and public policy advocacy, and consulting with 
employers on workforce issues.  It focuses on families and children in need in the Cleveland 
region.  Its mission is to connect  “… challenged families and children with the help that 
they need to be self-sustaining, through connections with appropriate health, education 
and social services provided through the organization’s own programs or through 
partnerships with other local institutions” (“What We Do,” n.d.). 
  
The Cleveland Museum of Art (CMA) is a world class art museum, established in 1913 and 
located in University Circle, a special cultural district in the City of Cleveland.  Its mission 
“...is to fulfill its dual roles as one of the world’s most distinguished comprehensive art 
museums and one of northeastern Ohio’s principal civic and cultural institutions” (“Mission 
Statement,” 2013).  Its programs include display and conservation of its permanent 
collections, special exhibitions, musical performances, films and public lectures on art-
related topics.  CMA also offers classes for members of the community, school tours and 
outreach programs for children, and a day camp program in which children learn about the 
cultural institutions in University Circle.  Those institutions include the Cleveland 
Orchestra, the Cleveland Museum of Natural History, the Cleveland Arts Institute, the 
Cleveland Institute of Music, the Cleveland Botanical Garden, Western Reserve Historical 
Society and Case Western Reserve University.  CMA’s proximity to these organizations 
offers opportunities for collaboration, like the museum’s joint program in art history and 
museum studies with Case Western Reserve University.  CMA also maintains an important 
archive of materials pertaining to the history of the museum, a library of 450,000 volumes 
available to researchers and scholars, and a publications program. 
Famicos Foundation was established in 1969 in response to the civil unrest, disinvestment 
and suburban flight that followed the race riots in July of 1966 in the Hough neighborhood 
of Cleveland.  Its mission is “to enhance the quality of life in greater Cleveland through 
affordable housing, neighborhood revitalization and integrated social services” (“Our 
History,” 2014).  Famicos is now one of nine Community Development Corporations (CDCs) 
funded by Neighborhood Progress, Inc. (NPI), an umbrella nonprofit local intermediary for 
CDCs in the region.  Famicos’s programming includes Help for Homeowners, Youth and 
Family Services, Senior and Adult Services, Community Programming and Real Estate. 
 
Lake View Cemetery Foundation was established in 1984 to raise funds to restore the 
President Garfield monument in the historic Lake View Cemetery in Cleveland.  Since then, 
the Foundation has broadened its funding goals to provide support for an array of services 
that the Cemetery offers to the general public.  The Foundation is organized as a 501(c)(3) 
charitable organization and works closely with the Lake View Cemetery Association (a 
501(c)(13) organization), although it is separately governed and administered.  The 
mission of The Lake View Cemetery Foundation is to maintain, preserve and enhance, for 
the benefit of the general public, the historically and architecturally significant buildings, 
monuments and areas located within, and the horticulture, botanical gardens, and 
landscape of Lake View Cemetery and provide education outreach programs (“About Lake 
View Cemetery,” 2011).  Accordingly, the Foundation provides financial support to the 
  
Cemetery specifically for activities targeted to the general public including assistance with 
maintaining historically or architecturally significant facilities and property, horticultural 
programs, tourism, and education. 
The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum “…exists to educate visitors, fans and scholars 
from around the world about the history and continuing significance of rock and roll music. 
It carries out this mission through its operation of a world-class museum that collects, 
preserves, exhibits and interprets this art form and through its library and archives as well 
as its educational programs.” (“Learn About the Museum,” 2014).  Located on Lake Erie in 
downtown Cleveland, the Rock and Roll Hall, which opened in 1995, grew out of the work 
of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame Foundation in New York, which was instrumental in its 
founding and continues to support its work.   The museum’s programs are broadly divided 
into four areas:  exhibitions of resident and visiting collections; targeted educational 
programming; community programs and special events; and archival development and 
research.  The museum collaborates with other local nonprofit institutions in community 
benefit activities, such as the Guitarmania public art project in 2002 which placed 
artistically unique guitar sculptures on display outside prominent Cleveland organizations, 
and community partnerships with United Way, Make-a-Wish Foundations and other 
charities, to help those charities raise funds for their own causes. 
Analysis 
First we examined each case for instances of nonprofit-government partnership along each 
of the dimensions of the nonprofit-government relations framework. The results are 
summarized in Table 1: 
 Supplementary Complementary Adversarial 
Centers for 
Families 
and 
Children 
Initial program offerings 
of founding (merged) 
organizations, prior to 
government funding 
Partnerships with public schools, 
libraries and municipalities to assist 
children and families in Cleveland 
suburbs  
Policy advocacy to 
advance legislation in 
health care, education, 
employment, and food 
security 
Cleveland 
Museum of 
Art 
Preservation and 
display of collections 
and educational 
programming for the 
general public 
Advocacy for investment and 
neighborhood revitalization 
through University Circle, Inc.; 
Educational programs; Participation 
in Cultural Facility Revenue Bonds 
with Cleveland-Cuyahoga Port 
Authority 
 
Famicos 
Foundation 
 Lexington Village project; Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits; Sale of 
federal tax credits for affordable 
housing and historic preservation 
Advocacy efforts to 
create Lexington Village 
Lake View 
Cemetery 
Historic preservation; 
Horticultural and 
historical tours and 
programming for the 
general public 
Lake View Cemetery Dam; National 
Register of Historic Places 
recognition of Garfield Monument 
Lawsuit against 
University Heights and 
Cleveland Heights 
Rock and 
Roll Hall of 
Fame and 
Museum 
Preservation  and 
display of collections for 
the general public; other 
educational and cultural 
Creation of Rock Hall 501(c)(3); 
Lease of facilities from Port 
Authority; 2009 bonds secured by 
Cuyahoga County hotel bed tax; 
Advocacy for obtaining 
federal funding for initial 
construction 
  
programming Advocacy partnership with City of 
Cleveland to bring awards 
ceremony to Cleveland; Educational 
programs 
Table 1: Manifestations of Nonprofit-Government Partnership  
The Centers for Families and Children, as stated above, was the result of several mergers.  
The original organizations were created to meet the needs of unique communities that 
were not addressed by government, such as the provision of homemaker services for the 
homebound and Hispanic community integration (“History,” n.d.).  Although the 
organization’s origins are based on a supplementary nonprofit-government relationship, 
The Centers currently provides its wide array of services in complementary partnerships 
with various government organizations.  The Centers receives government funding to 
support many of its programs, from early childhood learning and food distribution to 
employment readiness services and mental health programming.  The Centers maintains an 
adversarial relationship with government as well.  As part of its Government Relations 
program, the organization “is responsible for leading the development and execution of 
government relations, advocacy and community relations strategies” (“Government 
Relations,” n.d.).  By advocating for continued and expanded government funding and other 
relevant policies, The Centers attempts to influence government in four policy areas: 
education, health care, employment, and food security in order to address problems in 
Cleveland and Ohio (“Government Relations,” n.d.). 
The Cleveland Museum of Art has an important complementary partnership with local 
government in Cleveland.  Because cultural institutions in University Circle have a high 
economic impact in Cleveland, the city government has had a special interest in working 
with the museum and its counterparts.  CMA and other organizations in University Circle 
are represented by the University Circle, Inc. (UCI), a nonprofit “development, service, and 
advocacy organization responsible for the growth of University Circle as a premier urban 
district…” (“About,” 2014).  Historically, UCI has participated in various partnerships with 
the City of Cleveland to assist with neighborhood revitalization and economic development 
of University Circle and nearby neighborhoods.  For instance, UCI, private businesses, and 
the City of Cleveland were participants in the Midtown Corridor revitalization project and 
the Cleveland Neighborhood Development Corporation in the 1980s (Mosier et al., 1989).  
CMA also works with UCI to provide educational programs, which sometimes involve 
partnerships with other public sector organizations.  For instance, the Early Learning 
Initiative program geared towards preschoolers involves local school districts while the Art 
Study Group program is offered in cooperation with public libraries (“In the Community,” 
2013).  In addition, the museum utilizes public funding, such as the $90 million Cultural 
Facility Revenue Bond with Cleveland-Cuyahoga Port Authority, to underwrite 
construction and other organizational needs that benefit both the museum and the City of 
Cleveland (“The Cleveland Museum of Art,” 2012).  The museum’s strong complementary 
partnership with the local government is of course more than matched by its 
supplementary programming, including the collections it maintains and makes available to 
the general public, along with its various privately supported educational and cultural 
programs.   
  
Famicos Foundation has an extensive history of complementary nonprofit-government 
partnerships with the City of Cleveland via the Lexington Village Project, a low and 
moderate-income housing project located in the Hough neighborhood.  The idea for the 
Lexington Village Project, as it was known, actually came from Famicos (Tittle, 1992).  As a 
result, the origins of the housing project stemmed from an adversarial relationship with the 
government, as the City of Cleveland had to be swayed to support the development.  Once 
the partnership was forged, however, the relationship became complementary as both 
Famicos and the local government worked together to complete the project during the 
1980s.  For instance, Famicos, local foundations and organizations, the City of Cleveland, 
and the federal government all funded construction and Mayor Voinovich himself was 
proactive in securing funding from the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development ((“Letter from Mayor Voinovich,” 1983; “Planning Overview,” 1983).  
Lexington Village was also built on land either owned by Famicos or the City of Cleveland, 
which sold some lots to Famicos (“Letter from Mayor Voinovich,” 1983).  Today, Famicos 
continues to engage in complementary relationships with government.  For instance, 
Famicos purchases some of its real estate assets from Cleveland for improvement and 
revitalization and takes advantage of Low Income Housing Tax Credits to fund construction 
and rehabilitation of low-income residential properties in areas where government 
rehabilitation is lacking.  Finally, Famicos earns revenue through the sale of federal tax 
credits earned by restoring historical buildings; the latter is a more nuanced example of a 
complementary relationship with supplementary features: it takes advantage of a tax credit 
program intended to encourage private (supplementary) initiative and turns it into a 
revenue stream for its own programming by selling the credits to private developers.  In 
this way, Famicos is able to achieve its mission of providing affordable housing and 
revitalizing Cleveland neighborhoods where the city is not necessarily able to do so.             
Lake View Cemetery Foundation provides examples of each type of nonprofit-government 
partnership relationship.  The Foundation has a supplementary relationship in the sense 
that the organization provides services that might well otherwise be provided by the 
government.  In particular, on cemetery grounds there are historical monuments, such as 
the James A. Garfield and John Davison Rockefeller monuments, which Lake View 
Foundation preserves without any government assistance.  Despite the historical and 
environmental significance of Lake View’s horticulture, the Foundation also provides its 
horticultural services without government assistance.  There are over 1,000 recorded 
plantings that date from 1869 when a prominent landscape architect designed the 
cemetery grounds (“Horticulture at Lake View Cemetery,” 2011).  In contrast, the Lake 
View Cemetery Foundation engages in both complementary and adversarial relationships 
with government in connection with the Lake View Cemetery Dam.  Dugway Brook, which 
flowed through cemetery property, used to flood the cemetery during heavy rainstorms.  
As a result, Lake View Cemetery sued the cities of University Heights and Cleveland Heights 
to cease their sewer expansions, which Lake View believed would exacerbate flooding 
(Morton, 2004).  This adversarial initiative helped prompt the approval for a dam to be 
constructed as part of the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (“Points of Interest,” 
2011).  The actual construction of the dam was completed in a complementary manner, as 
the cemetery donated ten acres of land for the dam (Morton, 2004).  Another example of 
complementary partnership with government is the recognition of the Garfield Monument 
  
as an important architectural and historical structure (“Ohio Historic Preservation Office 
National Register,” 2007) although this does not involve government funding. 
The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum’s founding in Cleveland was the result of 
cooperation among public and private organizations that sought the significant economic 
impact that the museum would bring to the city (“Update on Public/Private Partnerships,” 
1986).  The Rock and Roll Hall is especially interesting because a stipulation of its 
establishment was that the City of Cleveland had to be instrumental in the creation of the 
nonprofit organization that would operate the museum, in cooperation with the Rock and 
Roll Hall of Fame Foundation based in New York City (“Planning Documents,” 1985).  The 
initial board of directors would be comprised of various City of Cleveland officials and 
members of the Foundation’s board.  As with the construction of the Lexington Village 
Project, Mayor Voinovich was proactive in securing funding for the museum’s construction, 
which ultimately came from the federal government, the State of Ohio, the City of 
Cleveland, and various local organizations and events (“Planning Documents, 1985).  The 
Rock and Roll Hall continues to have a strong complementary relationship with local 
government, as it leases its facilities from the Port Authority and works with various public 
organizations, including Head Start and Northeast Ohio school districts, to provide 
educational programs (“Development Finance Project Summaries: 1993-1999,” n.d.; “Inside 
the Classroom,” 2014).  Cuyahoga County has also passed legislation that benefits the 
museum, such as the hotel bed tax used to fund a bond for construction in 2009 
(“Development Finance Project Summaries: 1993-1999,” n.d.).  Additionally, the museum 
and local government officials worked together to bring the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame 
Induction Ceremony to Cleveland.  The museum was also engaged in an adversarial 
relationship with the federal government when it participated in advocating for 
construction funds to be included as a budgetary line item (“Planning Documents,” 1985).  
Finally, the Rock and Roll Hall also sustains supplementary relationships with government, 
such as the general preservation of its collections for public viewing.  The organization 
holds special events without government involvement as well, such as the Music Masters 
series of lectures and musical programming (“American Music Masters,” n.d.).  
Latent Opportunities 
In addition to current and historical relationships, the five case studies also suggest various 
prospective opportunities for nonprofit-government partnership in the future. These are 
summarized in Table 2 below:  
The Centers for Families and Children may have opportunities to build additional 
supplementary and complementary partnerships with government.  In particular, as 
Cleveland’s largest social service organization, the Centers is well positioned to address 
emerging needs associated with contemporary issues such as homelessness, food 
insecurity or immigration.   Complementary partnerships may also be created as the 
organization expands its services into other jurisdictions.  Concentrated in Cleveland, the 
Centers currently offers selected programs in East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, and 
Lakewood and these could potentially be extended to other localities.  Moreover, The 
Centers could potentially offer a fuller range of services in these three cities.   
  
 
 Supplementary Complementary Adversarial 
Centers for 
Families and 
Children 
Additional program 
offerings dictated by 
community needs 
such as homelessness, 
food insecurity or 
immigration 
Extension of services 
through partnerships 
with governments in 
jurisdictions 
surrounding Cleveland 
 
Cleveland 
Museum of Art 
  Advocacy with state 
and local jurisdictions 
for including arts in 
public education 
Famicos 
Foundation 
 Extension of services 
through partnerships 
with governments in 
jurisdictions 
surrounding Cleveland 
Advocacy for 
affordable housing 
and sustainability 
Lake View 
Cemetery 
 Federal and state 
partnership in support 
of historical 
monuments and 
horticultural 
education and 
conservation 
 
Rock and Roll 
Hall of Fame 
and Museum 
 Engagement with arts 
councils and 
education 
departments in other 
states to support 
traveling exhibitions 
and educational 
programs 
Advocacy with state 
and local jurisdictions 
for including arts in 
public education or 
supporting public 
radio 
Table 2: Latent Opportunities for Nonprofit-Government Partnership  
The Cleveland Museum of Art has strong complementary partnerships with government as a 
stand-alone organization and as a member of UCI.  Given its high reputation and respected 
role in the community, CMA may also be able to take on an adversarial role with local or 
state governments by advocating for increased government support of arts education.  The 
museum does work with local government agencies to provide its own educational 
programs, but advocacy efforts might increase the capacity of public schools to expand arts 
programming themselves, including jurisdictions outside of Cleveland.  The mission of CMA 
is not geographically limited although it strives to be one of northeastern Ohio’s principal 
civic and cultural institution (“Mission Statement,” 2013).  By engaging in advocacy with 
local governments, CMA could be influential in generating additional funds for educational 
arts programs across northeastern Ohio or even across the state. 
  
Famicos Foundation may be able to expand its portfolio of complementary and adversarial 
partnerships with additional governmental jurisdictions.   For instance, Famicos has 
historically concentrated its efforts in the blighted Cleveland neighborhoods of Hough and 
Glenville.  Neighborhood revitalization, however, is a universal issue that is not limited to 
the neighborhoods in which Famicos already works.  As Famicos expands its services 
throughout Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, and Medina Counties, opportunities for new 
complementary partnerships for providing social services and affordable housing may well 
arise.  Adversarial opportunities may emerge for Famicos as well.  For example, affordable 
housing and neighborhood and environmental sustainability (a new program area begun in 
2011) are policy-driven areas where Famicos has considerable expertise and a good 
reputation.  Famicos could potentially advocate effectively for continued or expanded 
government support in these areas.           
Lake View Cemetery Foundation independently preserves historical monuments and 
maintains myriad plantings on cemetery grounds, which are public goods open for visitors 
to view and enjoy.  Lake View could plausibly argue for government support of its work to 
preserve its historical monuments.  In particular, federal and state governments should 
have an interest in preserving and enhancing the James A. Garfield Monument, since the 
monument is listed on the National Register of Historic Places and is the resting place of a 
U.S president, as well as many historic Ohio figures.  Lake View could also take advantage of 
partnerships with local government agencies to support horticultural education and 
conservation.  Some plants on cemetery grounds are believed to have been present at the 
time of Cleveland’s founding, so there is a historical significance to Lake View’s plants that 
is not yet reflected in government engagement.  Additionally, although Lake View does 
allow horticultural students and academic institutions access to its plants, there is no clear 
relationship with public school districts or other governmental agencies through 
prospective arrangements to support and expand Lake View’s services in these areas 
(“Horticulture at Lake View Cemetery,” 2011). 
The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum has had strong complementary partnerships 
with the Cleveland and Ohio governments throughout its history, based on the museum’s 
economic significance.  There are opportunities for additional government engagement as 
well.  As one of the largest and well-known music museums in the country, the Rock and 
Roll Hall could work with arts councils in other states to produce exhibitions outside of 
Ohio.  The Rock and Roll Hall also currently works with various public sector organizations 
to provide educational programming to students of all ages.  Toddlers participate in a 
music therapy program through a partnership with Head Start, elementary and secondary 
school students in Northeast Ohio participate in the Rockin’ the Schools program via 
partnerships with the local school districts, and the Rock and Roll Hall teaches in-person 
and online university courses by working with public and private universities in Ohio and 
beyond.  The museum could potentially expand these complementary partnerships to Head 
Start and educational districts outside of Northeast Ohio, as well as cultivating additional 
state university partnerships.  Finally, in terms of adversarial relationships with 
government, both locally and with Ohio, the Rock and Roll Hall could advocate for more 
arts education, especially in the performing and broadcast arts.  
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
According to documents prepared by public agencies during Voinovich’s mayoral tenure: 
 
The success or failure of economic development in Cleveland over the long term is 
largely contingent upon the ability of the public and private sectors to create a well-
organized, structured and continuing partnership…In some instances, the 
responsibilities attributed to each organization constitute a ‘lead agency’ role.  In 
others, the responsibilities are to be carried out in a support capacity. (“Partnership 
for Economic Development,” 1981, p. 2) 
 
As the cases studied here illustrate, public-private partnerships do indeed entail diverse 
roles for government and private agencies through a variety of arrangements.  In general, 
the private agencies involved in such relationships with government may be for-profit or 
nonprofit, although public-private partnerships are typically thought of as occurring 
between businesses and governments.  However, the experiences of the five nonprofit 
organizations discussed here show that nonprofits are truly important partners of 
government in various and meaningful ways.   
The multifaceted relationships that the five organizations have with government showcase 
the different modes of nonprofit-government relationships.  Notably, all of the studied 
organizations have engaged in complementary partnerships with government.  This is the 
most common and proto-typical partnership mode wherein nonprofit organizations work 
alongside government to provide a service often financed or otherwise directly supported 
by government.  The nature of these complementary partnerships can vary, however.  
Some involve local government and others are manifested on a state or federal level.  The 
nature and intensity of government involvement varies as well.  In some instances, 
governmental entities fund service provision by enacting favorable legislation or securing 
funding from other governmental or nongovernmental sources.  The Rock and Roll Hall of 
Fame and Museum illustrates this scenario.  In other cases, public entities are active in 
providing in-kind resources such as program space, as in the public library partnerships 
with the Centers for Families and Children, or by obtaining land, as the City of Cleveland did 
to aid Famicos Foundation’s construction of Lexington Village. 
Although complementary nonprofit-government partnerships are the most common 
among the five cases discussed here, public-private partnerships are manifested in other 
forms as well.  Supplementary partnerships are those in which nonprofit organizations 
provide a public good without direct government involvement or support.   For example, 
The Cleveland Museum of Art offers many of its essentially public services such as display 
and preservation of great art, and various educational programs, without any direct 
government support, only the implicit assistance it receives from tax incentives for 
individuals to donate art or monetary gifts.  Lake View Cemetery does not receive support 
from government to preserve historic monuments or conserve environmental assets, yet 
these too are public goods whose provision is assisted by tax incentives. 
Finally, adversarial relationships have proved to be important in some of our observed 
cases as well, allowing these organizations to address their public goals, by advocating for 
  
government support or changes in public policy.  For instance, the Centers for Families and 
Children argues for policies that maintain or increase funding for their programs and Lake 
View Cemetery sued local governments to protect environmentally sensitive property on 
which the organization operates. 
In summary, the five nonprofit organizations studied here not only illustrate and 
acknowledge the three distinct types of government-nonprofit relationships outlined in the 
literature, but they point to various facets of public-private partnership outside of the 
stereotypical (complementary) government funder-private supplier model.  In addition, 
they illuminate the considerable variation within each class of partnership as well. 
Furthermore, the cases suggest that the possibilities for public-private partnership 
involving nonprofit organizations are not fully exploited.   We are particularly struck by the 
potential of our case organizations to extend their services to neighboring jurisdictions or 
beyond, through partnerships with other local governments. Or in the case of nationally 
prominent institutions with unique assets and programs, such as the Cleveland Museum of 
Art or the Rock and Roll Hall, partnerships with jurisdictions in other states or indeed 
internationally may be possible.  Furthermore, we are impressed with the fact that some of 
these institutions have undertaken missions that clearly deserve consideration for yet 
unrealized governmental involvement and support to maintain and expand their range and 
impact.  The Lake View Cemetery is the most obvious example, given its historic 
importance to the nation and the State of Ohio, and its local environmental significance. 
The five organizations examined here attest to Cleveland’s continued commitment to 
public-private partnerships stemming from the Voinovich era.  We make no claim that 
these organizations or Cleveland itself is representative of other jurisdictions or fields of 
nonprofit activity.  However, our pilot study suggests the value of studying government-
nonprofit relations in other nonprofit subsectors and political environments.  Nonetheless, 
the Cleveland organizations do provide models of nonprofit-government partnerships that 
have contributed significantly to the revitalization of the city and the provision of valuable 
public services that other communities may reference in building their own nonprofit-
government partnerships.  Moreover, the Cleveland cases suggest the wide range of 
possibilities along all three lines of nonprofit/government relationship - complementary, 
supplementary, and adversarial.  Certainly the cases illustrate that public/private 
partnership arrangements are by no means be restricted to government and business.  
Nonprofits are clearly positioned to play important roles in such arrangements.              
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Chairman: John C.  Green 
John C. Green is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Director of 
the Ray C. Bliss Institute, and Chair of the Departments of Political 
Science and Public Administration at the University of Akron. He has 
published extensively on American and Ohio politics and Government, 
and has been widely quoted in the news media. 
 
 
Chairman: Lee Fisher 
Lee Fisher is president and CEO of CEOs for Cities, and a Senior Fellow 
with the Center for Economic Development at Cleveland State 
University’s Levin College of Urban Affairs. He has served as Ohio Lt. 
Governor, Director of the Ohio Department of Development, Chair of the 
Ohio Third Frontier Commission, Ohio Attorney General, State Senator, 
State Representative, and President/CEO of the Center for Families and 
Children, one of the largest human service nonprofits in the Midwest. 
During the time Lee led Ohio’s economic development efforts, Site Selection magazine 
awarded its highest economic development award, the Governor’s Cup, to Ohio three 
consecutive years and the Competitiveness Award, which recognized the Ohio Department 
of Development under Lee’s leadership as the most effective economic development agency 
in the country. 
A graduate of Oberlin College, Lee served on the Oberlin College Board for 12 years. He 
earned both a law degree and master degree in nonprofit organization from Case Western 
Reserve University, and received the law school’s first-ever Distinguished Recent Graduate 
Award. 
 
Chairman: Robert L. Fischer 
Robert Fischer is a Research Associate Professor at the Jack, Joseph and 
Morton Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences of Case Western 
Reserve University. He is also Co-Director of the Center on Urban Poverty 
and Community Development at the Mandel School, and leads the 
Center’s efforts in regard to evaluation research. Dr. Fischer leads a range 
of evaluation research studies and teaches evaluation methods to 
students in social science administration and nonprofit management. Dr. 
Fischer is also faculty director of the Masters of Nonprofit Organizations 
(MNO) degree program at the Mandel School. 
 
  
Dr. Fischer has presented the findings from his research at national and international 
conferences in the evaluation, social work and nonprofit research fields and has published 
these results in various professional journals. Dr. Fischer is an active member of the 
American Evaluation Association (AEA) and served for six years as president of the Ohio 
Program Evaluators’ Group, a state-wide organization of evaluation professionals. He has 
served as an evaluation consultant in such areas as social work and community-based 
intervention, organ donation promotion, faith-based programming, and minority health 
programming. He is the 2011 recipient of the Roberta O’Keefe Service Award from the Ohio 
Program Evaluators’ Group and a 2006 recipient of the Teacher of the Year Award from the 
Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations. Dr. Fischer received his Ph.D. from Vanderbilt 
University in policy development and program evaluation and holds a master degree from 
Vanderbilt’s Peabody College of Education, and a bachelor degree from Duke University, 
both in public policy studies.  
 
Interests 
• Evaluation of social/behavioral interventions in regard to delivery and effectiveness 
• Nonprofit program research and outcome measurement 
• Policy context and using data to inform research and practice in social welfare field 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
